Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-03-02 📝 Original message:I agree. Thank you Erik ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-03-02
📝 Original message:I agree.
Thank you Erik for proposing it. It's a pretty good idea.
P.S. I wouldn't want a chain split of a low percentage of users though. The minority will be at the mercy of massive PoW swings and the chain will lose friends so it's not good for anyone. I recommend changing the final percentage to %50 because that's the hurdle where non-upgraded users *must* activate to avoid the risk of being reorged. The number of running users will quickly jump to 90%+ if it ever gets near 50%.
Cheers
Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
On Mar 1, 2021, 5:54 AM, at 5:54 AM, Erik Aronesty <erik at q32.com> wrote:
>> Today users should start cooperating again to continue using the
>> optimal strategy.
>
>the "gradual" method of reducing the % of miners required for lock-in
>as time goes on seems to encode this optimal strategy.
>
>On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 6:43 AM Ariel Luaces via bitcoin-dev
><bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 12:09 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev
>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > If social consensus is what drives technical consensus and not the
>other way around it seems as if there cannot exist a valid (rational?)
>reason to oppose Taproot itself, and then by extension with the
>arguments laid out above, LOT=true seems to be the logical conclusion
>of all of this, even if Core ships LOT=false at the outset.
>> >
>> > Where am I wrong here?
>> >
>> > Keagan
>> >
>> > On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 7:11 PM Jeremy via bitcoin-dev
><bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Personally, I think with either plan the ultimate risk of forking
>is low given probability to activate before timeout, so we should just
>pick something and move on, accepting that we aren't setting a
>precedent by which all future forks should abide. Given my
>understanding of the tradeoffs, I believe that the safest choice is
>LOT=true, but I wouldn't move to hold back a plan of LOT=false (but
>would probably take mitigative steps on community advocacy if it looks
>like there is non majority but non negligible LOT=true uptake).
>> >>
>> >> Cheers,
>> >>
>> >> Jeremy
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>> To favor LOT=true because it seems like the inevitable result is like
>> playing the prisoner's dilemma and never cooperating instead of using
>> the most optimal strategy which is tit-for-tat (cooperating at first
>> and then cheating once for every time your counterparty cheats).
>>
>> During segwit users started by cooperating (BIP9, or "LOT=false"),
>> then a minority of
>> miners didn't cooperate (small veto but remember the majority of
>> miners cooperated), then users stopped cooperating in response
>(UASF),
>> then miners
>> reverted to cooperating (MASF while intolerant miners forked off).
>> Today users should start cooperating again to continue using the
>> optimal strategy.
>>
>> Cheers
>> Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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📝 Original message:I agree.
Thank you Erik for proposing it. It's a pretty good idea.
P.S. I wouldn't want a chain split of a low percentage of users though. The minority will be at the mercy of massive PoW swings and the chain will lose friends so it's not good for anyone. I recommend changing the final percentage to %50 because that's the hurdle where non-upgraded users *must* activate to avoid the risk of being reorged. The number of running users will quickly jump to 90%+ if it ever gets near 50%.
Cheers
Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
On Mar 1, 2021, 5:54 AM, at 5:54 AM, Erik Aronesty <erik at q32.com> wrote:
>> Today users should start cooperating again to continue using the
>> optimal strategy.
>
>the "gradual" method of reducing the % of miners required for lock-in
>as time goes on seems to encode this optimal strategy.
>
>On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 6:43 AM Ariel Luaces via bitcoin-dev
><bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 12:09 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev
>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > If social consensus is what drives technical consensus and not the
>other way around it seems as if there cannot exist a valid (rational?)
>reason to oppose Taproot itself, and then by extension with the
>arguments laid out above, LOT=true seems to be the logical conclusion
>of all of this, even if Core ships LOT=false at the outset.
>> >
>> > Where am I wrong here?
>> >
>> > Keagan
>> >
>> > On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 7:11 PM Jeremy via bitcoin-dev
><bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Personally, I think with either plan the ultimate risk of forking
>is low given probability to activate before timeout, so we should just
>pick something and move on, accepting that we aren't setting a
>precedent by which all future forks should abide. Given my
>understanding of the tradeoffs, I believe that the safest choice is
>LOT=true, but I wouldn't move to hold back a plan of LOT=false (but
>would probably take mitigative steps on community advocacy if it looks
>like there is non majority but non negligible LOT=true uptake).
>> >>
>> >> Cheers,
>> >>
>> >> Jeremy
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>> To favor LOT=true because it seems like the inevitable result is like
>> playing the prisoner's dilemma and never cooperating instead of using
>> the most optimal strategy which is tit-for-tat (cooperating at first
>> and then cheating once for every time your counterparty cheats).
>>
>> During segwit users started by cooperating (BIP9, or "LOT=false"),
>> then a minority of
>> miners didn't cooperate (small veto but remember the majority of
>> miners cooperated), then users stopped cooperating in response
>(UASF),
>> then miners
>> reverted to cooperating (MASF while intolerant miners forked off).
>> Today users should start cooperating again to continue using the
>> optimal strategy.
>>
>> Cheers
>> Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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