Event JSON
{
"id": "71e98399421bd9d52e61c676d94168a7c24aa662a016f947e5c1667fc88fc6f9",
"pubkey": "39710decd8d524182da5daaa524407d5207c33bedb3bf95a4340bd8aa739b16a",
"created_at": 1697499592,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"p",
"d84d427460c5b35de0e276ceeb80d806eefcd05c71bb85afb8df4f48bd3231a7",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub"
],
[
"p",
"240808d34f92fac49a98804745b0726b2ae6c4dfd3abd04f555771293ecb143b",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub"
],
[
"e",
"884dc22bb374eadcde0a37f36a002195ed01bd7dafb164dae4a5dfddbf14afa6",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub",
"reply"
],
[
"proxy",
"https://mastodon.social/users/rmbolger/statuses/111247333284535353",
"activitypub"
]
],
"content": "nostr:npub1mpx5yarqcke4mc8zwm8whqxcqmh0e5zuwxacttacma8530fjxxnslqn2a6 Seems like a pretty low risk issue all things considered. As you said, public DNS zones aren't \"real\" until a parent DNS zone actually points to NS records to them which would require the actual domain owner to make that change. So a malicious party would have to know the real owner is moving to Azure, register a bunch of copies of the zone, and hope the real owner typos the NS record changes to one of the sets they control?",
"sig": "31132ab28d374a9cc6b802cc781f1248cff966275858446330c8e749534202792036bb435a204ffb8c07039589b28991209bc44b3c4a3297ebdce64aa506861f"
}