ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2019-10-03 📝 Original message: > > let me propose the ...
📅 Original date posted:2019-10-03
📝 Original message:
> > let me propose the more radical excision, starting with SegWit v1:
> >
> > - Remove `SIGHASH` from signatures.
> > - Put `SIGHASH` on public keys.
> > <sighash> <pubkey> OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH
> >
>
> I don't think you could reasonably do this for key path spends -- if
> you included the sighash as part of the scriptpubkey explicitly, that
> would lose some of the indistinguishability of taproot addresses, and be
> more expensive than having the sighash be in witness data.
Nonexistence of sighash byte implies `SIGHASH_ALL`, and for offchain anyway the desired path is to end up with an n-of-n MuSig `SIGHASH_ALL` signed mutual close transaction.
Indeed we can even restrict keypath spends to not having a sighash byte and just implicitly requiring `SIGHASH_ALL` with no loss of privacy for offchain while attaining safety against `SIGHASH_NOINPUT` for MuSig and VSSS multisignature adresses.
> So I think
> that means sighashes would still be included in key path signatures,
> which would make the behaviour a little confusingly different between
> signing for key path and script path spends.
>
> > This removes the problems with `SIGHASH_NONE` `SIGHASH_SINGLE`, as they are allowed only if the output specifically says they are allowed.
>
> I don't think the problems with NONE and SINGLE are any worse than using
> SIGHASH_ALL to pay to "1*G" -- someone may steal the money you send,
> but that's as far as it goes. NOINPUT/ANYPREVOUT is worse in that if
> you use it, someone may steal funds from other UTXOs too -- similar
> to nonce-reuse. So I think having to commit to enabling NOINPUT for an
> address may make sense; but I don't really see the need for doing the
> same for other sighashes generally.
As the existing sighashes are not particularly used anyway, additional restrictions on them are relatively immaterial.
>
> FWIW, one way of looking at a transaction spending UTXO "U" to address
> "A" is something like:
>
> - "script" lets you enforce conditions on the transaction when you
> create "A" [0]
>
> - "sighash" lets you enforce conditions on the transaction when
> you sign the transaction
>
> - nlocktime, nsequence, taproot annex are ways you express conditions
> on the transaction
>
> In that view, "sighash" is actually an extremely simple scripting
> language itself (with a total of six possible scripts).
>
> That doesn't seem like a bad design to me, fwiw.
Only one of the scripts is widely used, another has an edge use it sucks at (assurance contracts).
Does not seem to be good design, rather legacy cruft.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
>
> Cheers,
> aj
>
> [0] "graftroot" lets you update those conditions for address "A" after
> the fact
>
📝 Original message:
> > let me propose the more radical excision, starting with SegWit v1:
> >
> > - Remove `SIGHASH` from signatures.
> > - Put `SIGHASH` on public keys.
> > <sighash> <pubkey> OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH
> >
>
> I don't think you could reasonably do this for key path spends -- if
> you included the sighash as part of the scriptpubkey explicitly, that
> would lose some of the indistinguishability of taproot addresses, and be
> more expensive than having the sighash be in witness data.
Nonexistence of sighash byte implies `SIGHASH_ALL`, and for offchain anyway the desired path is to end up with an n-of-n MuSig `SIGHASH_ALL` signed mutual close transaction.
Indeed we can even restrict keypath spends to not having a sighash byte and just implicitly requiring `SIGHASH_ALL` with no loss of privacy for offchain while attaining safety against `SIGHASH_NOINPUT` for MuSig and VSSS multisignature adresses.
> So I think
> that means sighashes would still be included in key path signatures,
> which would make the behaviour a little confusingly different between
> signing for key path and script path spends.
>
> > This removes the problems with `SIGHASH_NONE` `SIGHASH_SINGLE`, as they are allowed only if the output specifically says they are allowed.
>
> I don't think the problems with NONE and SINGLE are any worse than using
> SIGHASH_ALL to pay to "1*G" -- someone may steal the money you send,
> but that's as far as it goes. NOINPUT/ANYPREVOUT is worse in that if
> you use it, someone may steal funds from other UTXOs too -- similar
> to nonce-reuse. So I think having to commit to enabling NOINPUT for an
> address may make sense; but I don't really see the need for doing the
> same for other sighashes generally.
As the existing sighashes are not particularly used anyway, additional restrictions on them are relatively immaterial.
>
> FWIW, one way of looking at a transaction spending UTXO "U" to address
> "A" is something like:
>
> - "script" lets you enforce conditions on the transaction when you
> create "A" [0]
>
> - "sighash" lets you enforce conditions on the transaction when
> you sign the transaction
>
> - nlocktime, nsequence, taproot annex are ways you express conditions
> on the transaction
>
> In that view, "sighash" is actually an extremely simple scripting
> language itself (with a total of six possible scripts).
>
> That doesn't seem like a bad design to me, fwiw.
Only one of the scripts is widely used, another has an edge use it sucks at (assurance contracts).
Does not seem to be good design, rather legacy cruft.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
>
> Cheers,
> aj
>
> [0] "graftroot" lets you update those conditions for address "A" after
> the fact
>