Jeremy [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2020-02-26 📝 Original message:As a replacement for ...
📅 Original date posted:2020-02-26
📝 Original message:As a replacement for paper, something like this makes sense v.s. what you
do with a ledger presently.
However, shamir's shares notoriously have the issue that the key does exist
plaintext on a device at some point.
Non-interactive multisig has the benefit of being able to sign transactions
without having keys in the same room/place/device ever.
--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 9:14 AM Contact Team via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi Everyone,
> Seed phrase security has been a subject of discussion for a long time now.
> Though there are varying opinions on the subject but the conflict usually
> arises due to different security models used by different individuals. The
> general practice in the space has been to use paper or metal engraving
> options to secure seed phrase but those too act as a single point of
> failure when secure storage is concerned. The hardware wallets, no matter
> whether use a secure element or not can be hacked either through basic
> glitching or through bigger schemes state enforced backdoors in the closed
> soured SE used.
>
> The option that Cypherock (Cypherock X1 Wallet) is working on removes a
> single point of failure when it comes to storage of seed phrases. It uses 2
> of 4 (with the option of setting up custom threshold limit) Shamir Secret
> Sharing to split the seed phrase into 4 different shares. Each share gets
> stored in a PIN ( hardware enforced ) Card with an EAL 6+ secure element.
> The user would need any 2 of these 4 cyCards to recover the seed or make a
> transaction. Ideally they should all be stored at different locations and
> this added security through distribution makes losing seed phrase highly
> improbable. We have decoupled storage and computation aspect of a hardware
> wallet. More information can be obtained from cypherock.com. The purpose
> of this mail is to get feedback from the community. Let us know if there is
> any feedback, we would love it.
>
> Thanks
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20200226/5c9f93c7/attachment-0001.html>;
📝 Original message:As a replacement for paper, something like this makes sense v.s. what you
do with a ledger presently.
However, shamir's shares notoriously have the issue that the key does exist
plaintext on a device at some point.
Non-interactive multisig has the benefit of being able to sign transactions
without having keys in the same room/place/device ever.
--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 9:14 AM Contact Team via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi Everyone,
> Seed phrase security has been a subject of discussion for a long time now.
> Though there are varying opinions on the subject but the conflict usually
> arises due to different security models used by different individuals. The
> general practice in the space has been to use paper or metal engraving
> options to secure seed phrase but those too act as a single point of
> failure when secure storage is concerned. The hardware wallets, no matter
> whether use a secure element or not can be hacked either through basic
> glitching or through bigger schemes state enforced backdoors in the closed
> soured SE used.
>
> The option that Cypherock (Cypherock X1 Wallet) is working on removes a
> single point of failure when it comes to storage of seed phrases. It uses 2
> of 4 (with the option of setting up custom threshold limit) Shamir Secret
> Sharing to split the seed phrase into 4 different shares. Each share gets
> stored in a PIN ( hardware enforced ) Card with an EAL 6+ secure element.
> The user would need any 2 of these 4 cyCards to recover the seed or make a
> transaction. Ideally they should all be stored at different locations and
> this added security through distribution makes losing seed phrase highly
> improbable. We have decoupled storage and computation aspect of a hardware
> wallet. More information can be obtained from cypherock.com. The purpose
> of this mail is to get feedback from the community. Let us know if there is
> any feedback, we would love it.
>
> Thanks
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20200226/5c9f93c7/attachment-0001.html>;