Eric Voskuil [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2016-03-23 📝 Original message:On 03/23/2016 01:36 PM, ...
📅 Original date posted:2016-03-23
📝 Original message:On 03/23/2016 01:36 PM, Tom via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Wednesday 23 Mar 2016 16:24:12 Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> * why would you not allow encryption on non-pre-approved connections?
Agree
> * we just removed (ssl) encryption from the JSON interface, how do you suggest
> this encryption to be implemented without openSSL?
CurveCP
> * What is the reason for using the p2p code to connect a wallet to a node?
> I suggest using one of the other connection methods to connect to the node.
> This avoids a change in the bitcoin protocol for a very specific usecase.
Agree, P2P and client-server protocols are distinct use-cases. Missing
this distinction is the root cause of problems with the bloom filters
feature.
> * Why do you want to do a per-message encryption (wrapping the original)?
> Smaller messages that contain predictable content and are able to be matched
> to the unencrypted versions on the wire send to other nodes will open this
> scheme up to various old statistical attacks.
Privacy cannot currently be achieved unless the server is trusted. In
most wallet scenarios that's not a reasonable assumption unless one
controls the full node. So this is only useful in the case where the
wallet is trusting a remote server, and as you point out - message
encryption is weak in this case. In a trustless server scenario
encryption would be unnecessary overhead.
>> Responding peers must ignore (banning would lead to fingerprinting) the
> requesting peer after 5 unsuccessfully authentication tries to avoid resource
> attacks.
>
> Any implementation of that kind would itself again be open to resource
> attacks.
> Why 5? Do you want to allow a node to make a typo?
Agree, denial of service protection can and should be much more flexible
than this. It's not necessary to incorporate DoS protection into a
protocol. I think maybe this stems from the ill-advised attempt at
messaging reliability.
>> To ensure that no message was dropped or blocked, the complete communication
> must be hashed (sha256). Both peers keep the SHA256 context of the encryption
> session. The complete <code>enc</code> message (leaving out the hash itself)
> must be added to the hash-context by both parties. Before sending a
> <code>enc</code> command, the sha256 context will be copied and finalized.
>
> You write "the complete communication must be hashed" and every message has a
> hash of the state until it is at that point.
> I think you need to explain how that works specifically.
Also, this gets into the area of messaging reliability. This is
certainly not something I would recommend for a P2P protocol optimized
for maintaining a cache of public data.
e
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📝 Original message:On 03/23/2016 01:36 PM, Tom via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Wednesday 23 Mar 2016 16:24:12 Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> * why would you not allow encryption on non-pre-approved connections?
Agree
> * we just removed (ssl) encryption from the JSON interface, how do you suggest
> this encryption to be implemented without openSSL?
CurveCP
> * What is the reason for using the p2p code to connect a wallet to a node?
> I suggest using one of the other connection methods to connect to the node.
> This avoids a change in the bitcoin protocol for a very specific usecase.
Agree, P2P and client-server protocols are distinct use-cases. Missing
this distinction is the root cause of problems with the bloom filters
feature.
> * Why do you want to do a per-message encryption (wrapping the original)?
> Smaller messages that contain predictable content and are able to be matched
> to the unencrypted versions on the wire send to other nodes will open this
> scheme up to various old statistical attacks.
Privacy cannot currently be achieved unless the server is trusted. In
most wallet scenarios that's not a reasonable assumption unless one
controls the full node. So this is only useful in the case where the
wallet is trusting a remote server, and as you point out - message
encryption is weak in this case. In a trustless server scenario
encryption would be unnecessary overhead.
>> Responding peers must ignore (banning would lead to fingerprinting) the
> requesting peer after 5 unsuccessfully authentication tries to avoid resource
> attacks.
>
> Any implementation of that kind would itself again be open to resource
> attacks.
> Why 5? Do you want to allow a node to make a typo?
Agree, denial of service protection can and should be much more flexible
than this. It's not necessary to incorporate DoS protection into a
protocol. I think maybe this stems from the ill-advised attempt at
messaging reliability.
>> To ensure that no message was dropped or blocked, the complete communication
> must be hashed (sha256). Both peers keep the SHA256 context of the encryption
> session. The complete <code>enc</code> message (leaving out the hash itself)
> must be added to the hash-context by both parties. Before sending a
> <code>enc</code> command, the sha256 context will be copied and finalized.
>
> You write "the complete communication must be hashed" and every message has a
> hash of the state until it is at that point.
> I think you need to explain how that works specifically.
Also, this gets into the area of messaging reliability. This is
certainly not something I would recommend for a P2P protocol optimized
for maintaining a cache of public data.
e
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