kravietz 🦇 on Nostr: To add some clarity to the ongoing debate (Ukr.: "srach") about whether Zaluzhny or ...
To add some clarity to the ongoing debate (Ukr.: "srach") about whether Zaluzhny or Arestovych are calling #Ukraine to surrender (yes, there are people who claim that), the best tool to describe the dillema is a decision tree. A decision with multiple choices is assigned various outcomes, each with its own worth and probability, and drawn as downward facing tree with all options as branches. At the end, you choose the branch with the best product of worth and probability.
As a reminder, Arestovych proposal is to switch Ukraine to strategic defense, obtain Western security guarantees (or even NATO membership) and then return the occupied territories over time using unspecified political mechanisms. Zaluzhny doesn't of course say anything about strategic defense but many people have derived a similar conclusion from his constatation of "parity" between the armies.
Of course, the choice here is not "should we liberate Crimea or not liberate", that's would be a no brainer. The real choice Ukraine is facing can be described by the following options:
* bet on military liberation of the 18% occupied territories, while at the same time risking losing up to 82% of the remaining lands if its armed forces suffer heavy losses in the process — either outcome is highly uncertain, meaning any of them can happen to different extent and we don't know which
* bet on strategic defense, almost certainly preserving the 82% territories but with only a vague hope to recover the occupied 18%
The latter choice is complicated by the fact that it's not only about mere comparison of percentage points, because #Russia has captured strategic assets such as Mariupol, Enerhodar, Donetsk etc.
In a proper decision tree we would use asset values (e.g. "how much Enerhodar NPP is worth") and probabilities, which is easy if you're doing car insurance but notoriously difficult if you deal with the largest war in Europe since WW2.
And I'm not asking you to try to make that decision now or even try to guess. What I'm trying to show is the dramatic dillema faced by Ukrainian leadership, knowing that whatever they choose will be almost certainly subject to harsh criticism regardless of what they choose, because in retrospect everyone will say "you should have done the opposite!"
But probably what I'm trying to show in the first place is that whatever strategic decisions the Ukrainian leadership makes, it will be likely much better informed than any guesses that we can make and it should be respected and supported.
As a reminder, Arestovych proposal is to switch Ukraine to strategic defense, obtain Western security guarantees (or even NATO membership) and then return the occupied territories over time using unspecified political mechanisms. Zaluzhny doesn't of course say anything about strategic defense but many people have derived a similar conclusion from his constatation of "parity" between the armies.
Of course, the choice here is not "should we liberate Crimea or not liberate", that's would be a no brainer. The real choice Ukraine is facing can be described by the following options:
* bet on military liberation of the 18% occupied territories, while at the same time risking losing up to 82% of the remaining lands if its armed forces suffer heavy losses in the process — either outcome is highly uncertain, meaning any of them can happen to different extent and we don't know which
* bet on strategic defense, almost certainly preserving the 82% territories but with only a vague hope to recover the occupied 18%
The latter choice is complicated by the fact that it's not only about mere comparison of percentage points, because #Russia has captured strategic assets such as Mariupol, Enerhodar, Donetsk etc.
In a proper decision tree we would use asset values (e.g. "how much Enerhodar NPP is worth") and probabilities, which is easy if you're doing car insurance but notoriously difficult if you deal with the largest war in Europe since WW2.
And I'm not asking you to try to make that decision now or even try to guess. What I'm trying to show is the dramatic dillema faced by Ukrainian leadership, knowing that whatever they choose will be almost certainly subject to harsh criticism regardless of what they choose, because in retrospect everyone will say "you should have done the opposite!"
But probably what I'm trying to show in the first place is that whatever strategic decisions the Ukrainian leadership makes, it will be likely much better informed than any guesses that we can make and it should be respected and supported.