Peter Todd [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-11-02 📝 Original message:I'm now running a full-RBf ...
📅 Original date posted:2022-11-02
📝 Original message:I'm now running a full-RBf bounty program for miners.
tl;dr: I'm broadcasting full-RBF replacements paying extremely high fees to
reward miners that turn on full-RBF. I'm starting small, just ~$100/block in
times of congestion. Miner and pool profit margins are pretty small, on the
order of $1k/block in many cases, so I know it doesn't take that much more
money to make a difference.
Why should you do this? Full-RBF/zeroconf has been discussed to death. But
tl;dr: You'll earn more money, and help transition Bitcoin to a more secure
mempool policy based on economic incentives rather than trust.
If you're a miner and want to participate, the easiest way to so is to use the
mempoolfullrbf=1 option in the upcoming Bitcoin Core v24 release (eg the
24.0rc3 tag), or use the mempoolreplacement=fee option in Bitcoin Knots.
You can also just modify the code yourself by removing the opt-in RBF check.
For example against the v23.0 tag:
$ git diff
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index 214112e2b..44c364623 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// check all unconfirmed ancestors; otherwise an opt-in ancestor
// might be replaced, causing removal of this descendant.
if (!SignalsOptInRBF(*ptxConflicting)) {
- return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "txn-mempool-conflict");
+ // return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "txn-mempool-conflict");
}
ws.m_conflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash());
Once you've enabled full-RBF, you need a full-RBF peer. I'm running a few of
them:
cup.nop.lol
mug.nop.lol
jar.nop.lol
jug.nop.lol
These nodes run a preferential peering patch (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25600)
to ensure that full-RBF nodes are interconnected to each other and replacements
can easily propagate. Also feel free to contact me if you'd like to peer with a
private node.
If you'd like to donate to this effort, send BTC to
bc1qagmufdn6rf80kj3faw4d0pnhxyr47sevp3nj9m
...and yes, I'm well aware that miners could collect this bounty in other ways,
eg by raising minimum fees. Doing that also breaks zeroconf, so I'm not too
concerned.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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📝 Original message:I'm now running a full-RBf bounty program for miners.
tl;dr: I'm broadcasting full-RBF replacements paying extremely high fees to
reward miners that turn on full-RBF. I'm starting small, just ~$100/block in
times of congestion. Miner and pool profit margins are pretty small, on the
order of $1k/block in many cases, so I know it doesn't take that much more
money to make a difference.
Why should you do this? Full-RBF/zeroconf has been discussed to death. But
tl;dr: You'll earn more money, and help transition Bitcoin to a more secure
mempool policy based on economic incentives rather than trust.
If you're a miner and want to participate, the easiest way to so is to use the
mempoolfullrbf=1 option in the upcoming Bitcoin Core v24 release (eg the
24.0rc3 tag), or use the mempoolreplacement=fee option in Bitcoin Knots.
You can also just modify the code yourself by removing the opt-in RBF check.
For example against the v23.0 tag:
$ git diff
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index 214112e2b..44c364623 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// check all unconfirmed ancestors; otherwise an opt-in ancestor
// might be replaced, causing removal of this descendant.
if (!SignalsOptInRBF(*ptxConflicting)) {
- return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "txn-mempool-conflict");
+ // return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "txn-mempool-conflict");
}
ws.m_conflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash());
Once you've enabled full-RBF, you need a full-RBF peer. I'm running a few of
them:
cup.nop.lol
mug.nop.lol
jar.nop.lol
jug.nop.lol
These nodes run a preferential peering patch (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25600)
to ensure that full-RBF nodes are interconnected to each other and replacements
can easily propagate. Also feel free to contact me if you'd like to peer with a
private node.
If you'd like to donate to this effort, send BTC to
bc1qagmufdn6rf80kj3faw4d0pnhxyr47sevp3nj9m
...and yes, I'm well aware that miners could collect this bounty in other ways,
eg by raising minimum fees. Doing that also breaks zeroconf, so I'm not too
concerned.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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