Dave Scotese [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-12-29 📝 Original message:It cannot possibly be ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-12-29
📝 Original message:It cannot possibly be enforced. Enforcement is not important when you're
setting defaults. In fact, you don't want to enforce defaults, but rather
allow anyone who cares to deviate from them to do so.
The importance of default behavior is proportional to the number of folks
who mess with the defaults, and that, among miners, is pretty small as far
as I know, at least in the area of deciding how to decide which block to
build on when two show up at nearly the same time.
On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 11:25 AM, Allen Piscitello <
allen.piscitello at gmail.com> wrote:
> How could this possibly be enforced?
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Dave Scotese via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> There have been no decent objections to altering the block-selection
>> mechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the same time) as
>> described at
>>
>> http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226
>>
>> Key components are:
>>
>> - Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using only transactions that have been
>> in your mempool for some time as oBTCDD ("old BTCDD").
>> - Use "nearly the same time" to mean separated in time by your guess
>> of the average duration of block propagation times.
>> - When two block solutions come in at nearly the same time, build on
>> the one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that came in first.
>>
>> The goal of this change is to reduce the profitability of withholding
>> block solutions by severely reducing the chances that a block solved a
>> while ago can orphan one solved recently. "Came in first" seems more
>> easily gamed than "most oBTCDD". As I wrote there, "*old coins* is
>> always a dwindling resource and *global nodes willing to help cheat* is
>> probably a growing one."
>>
>> I will write a BIP if anyone agrees it's a good idea.
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
>>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>> Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and
>>>> small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt
>>>> where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil
>>>> attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small
>>>> and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying
>>>> problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time
>>>> is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with <30%
>>>> hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated
>>>> by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network
>>> reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or
>>> vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network
>>> bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than <$0.02/kwh
>>> electricity, for example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric
>>> miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access
>>> to 10gbit university connections and free electricity.
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a
>> techie?
>> I own Litmocracy <http://www.litmocracy.com>; and Meme Racing
>> <http://www.memeracing.net>; (in alpha).
>> I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist <http://www.voluntaryist.com>;
>> which now accepts Bitcoin.
>> I also code for The Dollar Vigilante <http://dollarvigilante.com/>;.
>> "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi
>> Nakamoto
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>>
>
--
I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a
techie?
I own Litmocracy <http://www.litmocracy.com>; and Meme Racing
<http://www.memeracing.net>; (in alpha).
I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist <http://www.voluntaryist.com>; which
now accepts Bitcoin.
I also code for The Dollar Vigilante <http://dollarvigilante.com/>;.
"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi
Nakamoto
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📝 Original message:It cannot possibly be enforced. Enforcement is not important when you're
setting defaults. In fact, you don't want to enforce defaults, but rather
allow anyone who cares to deviate from them to do so.
The importance of default behavior is proportional to the number of folks
who mess with the defaults, and that, among miners, is pretty small as far
as I know, at least in the area of deciding how to decide which block to
build on when two show up at nearly the same time.
On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 11:25 AM, Allen Piscitello <
allen.piscitello at gmail.com> wrote:
> How could this possibly be enforced?
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Dave Scotese via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> There have been no decent objections to altering the block-selection
>> mechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the same time) as
>> described at
>>
>> http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226
>>
>> Key components are:
>>
>> - Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using only transactions that have been
>> in your mempool for some time as oBTCDD ("old BTCDD").
>> - Use "nearly the same time" to mean separated in time by your guess
>> of the average duration of block propagation times.
>> - When two block solutions come in at nearly the same time, build on
>> the one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that came in first.
>>
>> The goal of this change is to reduce the profitability of withholding
>> block solutions by severely reducing the chances that a block solved a
>> while ago can orphan one solved recently. "Came in first" seems more
>> easily gamed than "most oBTCDD". As I wrote there, "*old coins* is
>> always a dwindling resource and *global nodes willing to help cheat* is
>> probably a growing one."
>>
>> I will write a BIP if anyone agrees it's a good idea.
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
>>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>> Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and
>>>> small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt
>>>> where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil
>>>> attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small
>>>> and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying
>>>> problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time
>>>> is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with <30%
>>>> hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated
>>>> by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network
>>> reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or
>>> vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network
>>> bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than <$0.02/kwh
>>> electricity, for example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric
>>> miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access
>>> to 10gbit university connections and free electricity.
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a
>> techie?
>> I own Litmocracy <http://www.litmocracy.com>; and Meme Racing
>> <http://www.memeracing.net>; (in alpha).
>> I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist <http://www.voluntaryist.com>;
>> which now accepts Bitcoin.
>> I also code for The Dollar Vigilante <http://dollarvigilante.com/>;.
>> "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi
>> Nakamoto
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>>
>
--
I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a
techie?
I own Litmocracy <http://www.litmocracy.com>; and Meme Racing
<http://www.memeracing.net>; (in alpha).
I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist <http://www.voluntaryist.com>; which
now accepts Bitcoin.
I also code for The Dollar Vigilante <http://dollarvigilante.com/>;.
"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi
Nakamoto
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