steve on Nostr: “Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict” ...
“Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict” by Vipin Narang
⭐️⭐️⭐️
The study of coercion and nuclear deterrence is primarily one of qualitative studies—it’s difficult to perform quantitative analysis when only two atomic weapons have ever been operationally employed throughout history. Narang, a chemical engineer turned political scientist, attempts a genuine mixed-methods analysis to answer two questions: Why do states choose specific nuclear postures and do those chosen postures effectively deter adversaries? Narang uses the cases of China, India, Pakistan, France, Israel, and South Africa to explore the efficacy of three distinct options: catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation nuclear postures. While his analysis is fraught with potentially damning assumptions, Narang approaches this difficult subject in a manner that does prove useful for policy advocates and academics alike. His conclusion that only asymmetric escalation postures actually produce deterrent effects is also compelling, even if you take the analysis with a grain of salt. This book was ambitious in its analysis but definitely helps the reader categorize a topic as “fuzzy” as nuclear coercion. ☢️
⭐️⭐️⭐️
The study of coercion and nuclear deterrence is primarily one of qualitative studies—it’s difficult to perform quantitative analysis when only two atomic weapons have ever been operationally employed throughout history. Narang, a chemical engineer turned political scientist, attempts a genuine mixed-methods analysis to answer two questions: Why do states choose specific nuclear postures and do those chosen postures effectively deter adversaries? Narang uses the cases of China, India, Pakistan, France, Israel, and South Africa to explore the efficacy of three distinct options: catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation nuclear postures. While his analysis is fraught with potentially damning assumptions, Narang approaches this difficult subject in a manner that does prove useful for policy advocates and academics alike. His conclusion that only asymmetric escalation postures actually produce deterrent effects is also compelling, even if you take the analysis with a grain of salt. This book was ambitious in its analysis but definitely helps the reader categorize a topic as “fuzzy” as nuclear coercion. ☢️