Nicole Rust on Nostr: Do psychologists "measure"? Weird question, right? "Measurements of attributes such ...
Do psychologists "measure"?
Weird question, right?
"Measurements of attributes such as emotions, well-being, or intelligence are widely used for various purposes in society, but it remains a matter of discussion whether psychological measurement is analogous to measurement in the natural sciences, and to what extent it qualifies as measurement at all.'
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2300693
My initial take: what?! This seems silly. But I'm starting to warm up to it. It's about causality. Consider: "insomnia causes fatigue"; no one disputes it. But there's not a physical thing in the world called insomnia that causes a physical thing in the world, fatigue billiard-ball-style. Rather, the physical causal chain happens by way of a lack of sleep causing the brain state that leads to the mind state of fatigue (in other words, that word "cause" is doing some heavy lifting in that phrase). The question is: can you meaningfully talk about causality when you have abstracted away from physical interactions?
On one hand, of course - you can develop causal models formulated entirely at the psychological level (rewards, punishments, surprises, mood) that make falsifiable predictions and you can both perturb and measure these things to test those models.
On the other hand, we probably do need to take some care that we aren't confusing ourselves as we throw around that word "cause" interchangeably for things that physically interact and abstractions of those things.
Thoughts? I'm particularly curious about cases in which this type of abstraction has led researchers astray.
Weird question, right?
"Measurements of attributes such as emotions, well-being, or intelligence are widely used for various purposes in society, but it remains a matter of discussion whether psychological measurement is analogous to measurement in the natural sciences, and to what extent it qualifies as measurement at all.'
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2300693
My initial take: what?! This seems silly. But I'm starting to warm up to it. It's about causality. Consider: "insomnia causes fatigue"; no one disputes it. But there's not a physical thing in the world called insomnia that causes a physical thing in the world, fatigue billiard-ball-style. Rather, the physical causal chain happens by way of a lack of sleep causing the brain state that leads to the mind state of fatigue (in other words, that word "cause" is doing some heavy lifting in that phrase). The question is: can you meaningfully talk about causality when you have abstracted away from physical interactions?
On one hand, of course - you can develop causal models formulated entirely at the psychological level (rewards, punishments, surprises, mood) that make falsifiable predictions and you can both perturb and measure these things to test those models.
On the other hand, we probably do need to take some care that we aren't confusing ourselves as we throw around that word "cause" interchangeably for things that physically interact and abstractions of those things.
Thoughts? I'm particularly curious about cases in which this type of abstraction has led researchers astray.