Gregory Maxwell [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: đź“… Original date posted:2013-05-06 đź“ť Original message:On Mon, May 6, 2013 at ...
đź“… Original date posted:2013-05-06
đź“ť Original message:On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 10:19 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>> running hash of all messages sent on a connection so far. Add a new
>> protocol message that asks the node to sign the current accumulated
>> hash.
> We already depend on OpenSSL, why not just use standard SSL?
SSL doesn't actually provide non-repudiation. We actually want
non-repudiation. I want to be able to prove to others that some node
deceived me.
(there are a number of other arguments I could make against SSL, but
that one is probably sufficient— or rather, it's an argument that we
should have some way of cheaply getting non-reputable signatures
regardless of the transport)
>> Last time I looked, Tor wasn't really usable in library form and
>> connecting to hidden services is really slow. So it'd be an issue to
>> just re-use it out of the box, I think.
> For phone stuff you should work with The Guardian Project - they've
> implemented Tor on Android among other things and want to find easier
> ways for apps to use it.
Also look into torchat, which bundles a special tor build and runs a
hidden service.
Because of services like Blockchain.info attacking the casual privacy
users not using their webwallet service I've been thinking that even
for clients that don't normally use tor their own transaction
announcements should probably be made by bringing up a connection over
tor and announcing. But thats another matter...
I've switched to running on tor exclusively for my personal node (yay
dogfooding) and I've found it to connect and sync up very fast most of
the time. The biggest slowdown appears to be the our timeout on the
tor connections is very high and so if it gets unlucky on the first
couple attempts it can be minutes before it gets a connection. We're
short on onion peers and I sometimes get inbound connections before I
manage to get an outbound.
đź“ť Original message:On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 10:19 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>> running hash of all messages sent on a connection so far. Add a new
>> protocol message that asks the node to sign the current accumulated
>> hash.
> We already depend on OpenSSL, why not just use standard SSL?
SSL doesn't actually provide non-repudiation. We actually want
non-repudiation. I want to be able to prove to others that some node
deceived me.
(there are a number of other arguments I could make against SSL, but
that one is probably sufficient— or rather, it's an argument that we
should have some way of cheaply getting non-reputable signatures
regardless of the transport)
>> Last time I looked, Tor wasn't really usable in library form and
>> connecting to hidden services is really slow. So it'd be an issue to
>> just re-use it out of the box, I think.
> For phone stuff you should work with The Guardian Project - they've
> implemented Tor on Android among other things and want to find easier
> ways for apps to use it.
Also look into torchat, which bundles a special tor build and runs a
hidden service.
Because of services like Blockchain.info attacking the casual privacy
users not using their webwallet service I've been thinking that even
for clients that don't normally use tor their own transaction
announcements should probably be made by bringing up a connection over
tor and announcing. But thats another matter...
I've switched to running on tor exclusively for my personal node (yay
dogfooding) and I've found it to connect and sync up very fast most of
the time. The biggest slowdown appears to be the our timeout on the
tor connections is very high and so if it gets unlucky on the first
couple attempts it can be minutes before it gets a connection. We're
short on onion peers and I sometimes get inbound connections before I
manage to get an outbound.