Jeremy [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-03-16 📝 Original message:inline responses -- ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-03-16
📝 Original message:inline responses
--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 11:10 PM ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com> wrote:
> Good morning Jeremy,
>
> This is a very cool idea!
>
> > Multiple Delegates: By signing a txn with several delegate outputs, it
> is possible to enforce multiple disparate conditions. Normally this is
> superfluous -- why not just concatenate S1 and S2? The answer is that you
> may have S1 require a relative height lock and S2 require a relative time
> lock (this was one of the mechanisms investigated for powswap.com).
>
> I am somewhat confused by this.
> Do you mean that the delegating transaction (the one signed using the
> script of A with `SIGHASH_NONE`) has as input (consumes) multiple delegate
> outputs D1, D2... with individual scripts S1, S2... ?
>
>
Correct -- you can do this if you want multiple independent delegates to be
able to revoke, or if you want S1 and S2 to mix height + time based
relative locks -- bonus points if D1.txid == D2.txid, then you can be sure
they're counting from the same origin point.
> > Sequenced Contingent Delegation: By constructing a specific TXID that
> may delegate the coins, you can make a coin's delegation contingent on some
> other contract reaching a specific state. For example, suppose I had a
> contract that had 100 different possible end states, all with fixed
> outpoints at the end. I could delegate coins in different arrangements to
> be claimable only if the contract reaches that state. Note that such a
> model requires some level of coordination between the main and observing
> contract as each Coin delegate can only be claimed one time.
>
> Does this require that each contract end-state have a known TXID at setup
> time?
>
Without anyprevout or similar, I believe so.
>
> > Redelegating: This is where A delegates to S, S delegates to S'. This
> type of mechanism most likely requires the coin to be moved on-chain to the
> script (A OR S or S'), but the on-chain movement may be delayed (via
> presigned transactions) until S' actually wants to do something with the
> coin.
>
> The script `A || S || S'` suggests that delegation effectively still
> allows the original owner to still control the coin, right?
> Which I suppose is implied by "Revocation" above.
>
Yes, redelegating (or I guess rather recursive delegation?) would mean A,
S, and S' are all in play. if you want to revoke just A, then S must move
to a utxo with S and S'.
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>
>
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📝 Original message:inline responses
--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 11:10 PM ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com> wrote:
> Good morning Jeremy,
>
> This is a very cool idea!
>
> > Multiple Delegates: By signing a txn with several delegate outputs, it
> is possible to enforce multiple disparate conditions. Normally this is
> superfluous -- why not just concatenate S1 and S2? The answer is that you
> may have S1 require a relative height lock and S2 require a relative time
> lock (this was one of the mechanisms investigated for powswap.com).
>
> I am somewhat confused by this.
> Do you mean that the delegating transaction (the one signed using the
> script of A with `SIGHASH_NONE`) has as input (consumes) multiple delegate
> outputs D1, D2... with individual scripts S1, S2... ?
>
>
Correct -- you can do this if you want multiple independent delegates to be
able to revoke, or if you want S1 and S2 to mix height + time based
relative locks -- bonus points if D1.txid == D2.txid, then you can be sure
they're counting from the same origin point.
> > Sequenced Contingent Delegation: By constructing a specific TXID that
> may delegate the coins, you can make a coin's delegation contingent on some
> other contract reaching a specific state. For example, suppose I had a
> contract that had 100 different possible end states, all with fixed
> outpoints at the end. I could delegate coins in different arrangements to
> be claimable only if the contract reaches that state. Note that such a
> model requires some level of coordination between the main and observing
> contract as each Coin delegate can only be claimed one time.
>
> Does this require that each contract end-state have a known TXID at setup
> time?
>
Without anyprevout or similar, I believe so.
>
> > Redelegating: This is where A delegates to S, S delegates to S'. This
> type of mechanism most likely requires the coin to be moved on-chain to the
> script (A OR S or S'), but the on-chain movement may be delayed (via
> presigned transactions) until S' actually wants to do something with the
> coin.
>
> The script `A || S || S'` suggests that delegation effectively still
> allows the original owner to still control the coin, right?
> Which I suppose is implied by "Revocation" above.
>
Yes, redelegating (or I guess rather recursive delegation?) would mean A,
S, and S' are all in play. if you want to revoke just A, then S must move
to a utxo with S and S'.
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>
>
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