Gregory Maxwell [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2016-06-28 📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2016-06-28
📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 11:33 PM, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
> I don't follow this comment. The BIP aims quite clearly at "SPV" wallets as its justifying scenario.
It cites SPV as an example, doesn't mention bloom filters.. and sure--
sounds like the bip text should make the
>> Without something like BIP151 network participants cannot have privacy for the transactions they originate within the protocol against network observers.
>
> And they won't get it with BIP151 either. Being a peer is easier than observing the network.
Not passively, undetectable, and against thousands of users at once at low cost.
> If one can observe the encrypted traffic one can certainly use a timing attack to determine what the node has sent.
Not against Bitcoin Core, transactions are batched and relayed in
sorted order. (obviously there are limits at what this provides;
ironically, the lack of link encryption has been used to argue against
privacy preserving relay behavior)
>> Even if, through some extraordinary effort, their own first hop is encrypted, unencrypted later hops would rapidly
>> expose significant information about transaction origins in the network.
>
> As will remain the case until all connections are encrypted and authenticated, and all participants are known to be good guys. Starting to sound like PKI?
Huh? The first and subsequent hops obscures the origin and timing.
>> Without something like BIP151 authenticated links are not possible, so
>> manually curated links (addnode/connect) cannot be counted on to provide protection against partitioning sybils.
>
> If we trust the manual links we don't need/want the other links. In fact retaining the other links enables the attack you described above. Of course there is no need to worry about Sybil attacks when all of your peers are authenticated. But again, let us not ignore the problems of requiring all peers on the network be authenticated.
Don't need and want them for what? For _partitioning_ resistance,
you are not partitioned if you have one honest connection to the
functional network. Additional peers purely reduce your partition
vulnerability-- so long as an active network attacker isn't
itercepting all your connections out.
For privacy, you have improve transaction privacy so long as your
transaction isn't initially relayed to a malicious peer-- but
malicious peers can lie further out because transit nodes obscure the
order of message creation. Bitcoin Core currently relays transactions
first and more frequently to outbound and whitelisted peers.
> Maybe I was insufficiently explicit. By "relies on identity" I meant that the BIP is not effective without it. I did not mean to imply that the BIP itself implements an identity scheme. I thought this was clear from the context.
I understood that, but my point was that Bitcoin cannot be used at
all_unless users have secure communication channels to share
addresses.
> then there is no reason to expect any effective improvement, since nodes will necessarily have to connect with anonymous peers.
They're not required to _only_ connect with anonymous peers. And
partition resistance requires that you have any one good link.
> Anyone with a node and the ability to monitor traffic should remain very effective.
Not via passive observation.
> Defining an auth implementation is not a hard problem, nor is it the concern I have raised.
Glad you agree.
We seem to be looping now. Feel free to not implement this proposal,
no one suggests making it mandatory.
📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 11:33 PM, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
> I don't follow this comment. The BIP aims quite clearly at "SPV" wallets as its justifying scenario.
It cites SPV as an example, doesn't mention bloom filters.. and sure--
sounds like the bip text should make the
>> Without something like BIP151 network participants cannot have privacy for the transactions they originate within the protocol against network observers.
>
> And they won't get it with BIP151 either. Being a peer is easier than observing the network.
Not passively, undetectable, and against thousands of users at once at low cost.
> If one can observe the encrypted traffic one can certainly use a timing attack to determine what the node has sent.
Not against Bitcoin Core, transactions are batched and relayed in
sorted order. (obviously there are limits at what this provides;
ironically, the lack of link encryption has been used to argue against
privacy preserving relay behavior)
>> Even if, through some extraordinary effort, their own first hop is encrypted, unencrypted later hops would rapidly
>> expose significant information about transaction origins in the network.
>
> As will remain the case until all connections are encrypted and authenticated, and all participants are known to be good guys. Starting to sound like PKI?
Huh? The first and subsequent hops obscures the origin and timing.
>> Without something like BIP151 authenticated links are not possible, so
>> manually curated links (addnode/connect) cannot be counted on to provide protection against partitioning sybils.
>
> If we trust the manual links we don't need/want the other links. In fact retaining the other links enables the attack you described above. Of course there is no need to worry about Sybil attacks when all of your peers are authenticated. But again, let us not ignore the problems of requiring all peers on the network be authenticated.
Don't need and want them for what? For _partitioning_ resistance,
you are not partitioned if you have one honest connection to the
functional network. Additional peers purely reduce your partition
vulnerability-- so long as an active network attacker isn't
itercepting all your connections out.
For privacy, you have improve transaction privacy so long as your
transaction isn't initially relayed to a malicious peer-- but
malicious peers can lie further out because transit nodes obscure the
order of message creation. Bitcoin Core currently relays transactions
first and more frequently to outbound and whitelisted peers.
> Maybe I was insufficiently explicit. By "relies on identity" I meant that the BIP is not effective without it. I did not mean to imply that the BIP itself implements an identity scheme. I thought this was clear from the context.
I understood that, but my point was that Bitcoin cannot be used at
all_unless users have secure communication channels to share
addresses.
> then there is no reason to expect any effective improvement, since nodes will necessarily have to connect with anonymous peers.
They're not required to _only_ connect with anonymous peers. And
partition resistance requires that you have any one good link.
> Anyone with a node and the ability to monitor traffic should remain very effective.
Not via passive observation.
> Defining an auth implementation is not a hard problem, nor is it the concern I have raised.
Glad you agree.
We seem to be looping now. Feel free to not implement this proposal,
no one suggests making it mandatory.