Jeremy Rubin [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-05-07 📝 Original message:Have you seen the ...
📅 Original date posted:2022-05-07
📝 Original message:Have you seen the inherited ID proposal from John Law on this list?
It's a pretty thorough treatment of this type of proposal, curious if you
think it overlaps what you had in mind?
Honestly, I've yet to fully load in exactly how the applications of it
work, but I'd be interested to hear your thoughts.
On Sat, May 7, 2022, 4:55 AM vjudeu via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> For now, we have txid:vout as a previous transaction output. This means
> that to have a stable TXID, we are forced to use SIGHASH_ALL somewhere,
> just to prevent any transaction modifications that can happen during adding
> some inputs and outputs. But it seems that new sighashes could be far more
> powerful than we expected: it is technically possible to not only remove
> previous transaction output by using SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT. We can do more and
> do it better, we could decide, how to calculate this txid at all!
>
> So, something like SIGHASH_PREVOUT_NONE would be similar to SIGHASH_NONE
> (applied to the previous transaction, taken from txid). To have
> SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT, we need to remove absolutely everything, I don't know
> any such sighashes, because even SIGHASH_NONE | SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY will
> commit at least to some fields, for example to the locktime. But, if we
> introduce SIGHASH_PREVOUT_XYZ flags for all existing sighashes, we would
> have this:
>
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_NONE
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_SINGLE
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ALL
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ANYONECANPAY
>
> Then, the procedure is as follows: we use txid:vout to find our previous
> transaction. Then, we apply those sighashes to this previous transaction,
> to form a new txid, that will be checked during every OP_CHECKSIG-based
> opcode. In this way, our txid:vout is used just to do transaction lookup,
> after that, sighashes can be applied to the previous transaction, so our
> txid could remain stable, even if someone will add some inputs and outputs.
>
> By default, we could use SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ALL, that would mean our
> txid:vout remains unchanged. Then, SIGHASH_PREVOUT_SINGLE would obviously
> mean, that we want to commit only to this particular previous transaction
> output. That would allow adding any new outputs to the previous
> transaction, without affecting our replaced txid, but also without blindly
> accepting any txid, because some data of the previous transaction would be
> still hashed.
>
> Then, SIGHASH_PREVOUT_NONE is an interesting case, because it would mean
> that no outputs of the previous transaction are checked. But still, the
> inputs will be! That would mean: "I don't care about in-between addresses,
> but I care that it was initiated from these inputs". In this case, it is
> possible to choose some input without those flags, and then apply
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_NONE many times, to make sure that everything started from
> that input, but everything in-between can be anything.
>
> All of those three SIGHASH_PREVOUT_XYZ flags could be combined with
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ANYONECANPAY. That would mean all inputs of the previous
> transaction are discarded, except from the input number matching "vout". Or
> we could just use SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ANY instead and discard all inputs from
> that previous transaction, that could also be combined with other sighashes.
>
> So, to sum up, by applying sighashes to the previous transaction, instead
> of allowing for any transaction, we could still have some control of our
> txid, and I think it could be better than just saying "give me any txid, I
> will accept that". I think in most cases we don't want to allow any txid:
> we want to only "control the flow", just to make sure that our signatures
> will sign what we want and will not be invalidated by changing some
> transaction inputs and outputs, unrelated to the currently-checked
> signature.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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📝 Original message:Have you seen the inherited ID proposal from John Law on this list?
It's a pretty thorough treatment of this type of proposal, curious if you
think it overlaps what you had in mind?
Honestly, I've yet to fully load in exactly how the applications of it
work, but I'd be interested to hear your thoughts.
On Sat, May 7, 2022, 4:55 AM vjudeu via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> For now, we have txid:vout as a previous transaction output. This means
> that to have a stable TXID, we are forced to use SIGHASH_ALL somewhere,
> just to prevent any transaction modifications that can happen during adding
> some inputs and outputs. But it seems that new sighashes could be far more
> powerful than we expected: it is technically possible to not only remove
> previous transaction output by using SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT. We can do more and
> do it better, we could decide, how to calculate this txid at all!
>
> So, something like SIGHASH_PREVOUT_NONE would be similar to SIGHASH_NONE
> (applied to the previous transaction, taken from txid). To have
> SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT, we need to remove absolutely everything, I don't know
> any such sighashes, because even SIGHASH_NONE | SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY will
> commit at least to some fields, for example to the locktime. But, if we
> introduce SIGHASH_PREVOUT_XYZ flags for all existing sighashes, we would
> have this:
>
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_NONE
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_SINGLE
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ALL
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ANYONECANPAY
>
> Then, the procedure is as follows: we use txid:vout to find our previous
> transaction. Then, we apply those sighashes to this previous transaction,
> to form a new txid, that will be checked during every OP_CHECKSIG-based
> opcode. In this way, our txid:vout is used just to do transaction lookup,
> after that, sighashes can be applied to the previous transaction, so our
> txid could remain stable, even if someone will add some inputs and outputs.
>
> By default, we could use SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ALL, that would mean our
> txid:vout remains unchanged. Then, SIGHASH_PREVOUT_SINGLE would obviously
> mean, that we want to commit only to this particular previous transaction
> output. That would allow adding any new outputs to the previous
> transaction, without affecting our replaced txid, but also without blindly
> accepting any txid, because some data of the previous transaction would be
> still hashed.
>
> Then, SIGHASH_PREVOUT_NONE is an interesting case, because it would mean
> that no outputs of the previous transaction are checked. But still, the
> inputs will be! That would mean: "I don't care about in-between addresses,
> but I care that it was initiated from these inputs". In this case, it is
> possible to choose some input without those flags, and then apply
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_NONE many times, to make sure that everything started from
> that input, but everything in-between can be anything.
>
> All of those three SIGHASH_PREVOUT_XYZ flags could be combined with
> SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ANYONECANPAY. That would mean all inputs of the previous
> transaction are discarded, except from the input number matching "vout". Or
> we could just use SIGHASH_PREVOUT_ANY instead and discard all inputs from
> that previous transaction, that could also be combined with other sighashes.
>
> So, to sum up, by applying sighashes to the previous transaction, instead
> of allowing for any transaction, we could still have some control of our
> txid, and I think it could be better than just saying "give me any txid, I
> will accept that". I think in most cases we don't want to allow any txid:
> we want to only "control the flow", just to make sure that our signatures
> will sign what we want and will not be invalidated by changing some
> transaction inputs and outputs, unrelated to the currently-checked
> signature.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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