Prayank [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-10-02 📝 Original message:This looks interesting ...

📅 Original date posted:2021-10-02
📝 Original message:This looks interesting although I don't understand few things:

> The scheme should include public precommitments collected at ceremonial intervals.

How would this work? Can you explain with an example please.

> Upon assignment, the dev would have community approval to opportunistically insert a security flaw

Who is doing the assignment?

--
Prayank

A3B1 E430 2298 178F



Oct 2, 2021, 01:45 by bitcoin-dev at rgrant.org:

> Due to the uneven reputation factor of various devs, and uneven review
> attention for new pull requests, this exercise would work best as a
> secret sortition.
>
> Sortition would encourage everyone to always be on their toes rather
> than only when dealing with new github accounts or declared Red Team
> devs. The ceremonial aspects would encourage more devs to participate
> without harming their reputation.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sortition
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_team
>
> The scheme should include public precommitments collected at
> ceremonial intervals.
>
> where:
> hash1 /* sortition ticket */ = double-sha256(secret)
> hash2 /* public precommitment */ = double-sha256(hash1)
>
> The random oracle could be block hashes. They could be matched to
> hash1, the sortition ticket. A red-team-concurrency difficulty
> parameter could control how many least-significant bits must match to
> be secretly selected. The difficulty parameter could be a matter of
> group consensus at the ceremonial intervals, based on a group decision
> on how much positive effect the Red Team exercise is providing.
>
> Upon assignment, the dev would have community approval to
> opportunistically insert a security flaw; which, when either caught,
> merged, or on timeout, they would reveal along with the sortition
> ticket that hashes to their public precommitment.
>
> Sortition Precommitment Day might be once or twice a year.
>

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