Luke-Jr [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2013-12-17 📝 Original message:On Tuesday, December 17, ...
📅 Original date posted:2013-12-17
📝 Original message:On Tuesday, December 17, 2013 10:41:30 PM Troy Benjegerdes wrote:
> I want to get some feedback.. I've used distributed version control
> systems for a long time, and the most useful feature is to be able
> to merge two different forks.
>
> So what's the equivalent of this for Bitcoin or other crypto-currencies?
>
> Let's suppose that me and my friends get 'islanded' from the rest of
> the internet for a week, but we still want to trade bitcoin. It would
> work if there are local miners, until we reconnect.
>
> Suppose we have the main chain (Alice), while bob is on a boat, trading
> with some friends, but has no network connectivity.
>
> When bob reconnects with Alice, a 'Merge' transaction happens where a
> miner looks at bob's forked blockchain, sees no double-spends, and
> includes BOTH chains.
>
> Now suppose someone on bob's boat has a buggy client, or sent a
> transaction before disconnect that results in a double-spend on the
> merge.
>
> So we have a merge conflict, which generally requires human interaction,
> so bob and his friends broadcast a MERGE request with a transaction fee
> sufficient to cover reconciling the double-spends, AND incentivize a
> miner to do some extra work to merge.
>
> Thoughts everyone?
This is interesting, but I'm not sure it has the right incentives. First, it
adds more reason for miners to *avoid* including transactions (they might turn
out to be double-spends and make merging costly). Second, it gives people
reason to double-spend (the miner might cover the cost of it). Finally, you
don't appear to address how to deal with the subsidy - do both miners get it?
Luke
📝 Original message:On Tuesday, December 17, 2013 10:41:30 PM Troy Benjegerdes wrote:
> I want to get some feedback.. I've used distributed version control
> systems for a long time, and the most useful feature is to be able
> to merge two different forks.
>
> So what's the equivalent of this for Bitcoin or other crypto-currencies?
>
> Let's suppose that me and my friends get 'islanded' from the rest of
> the internet for a week, but we still want to trade bitcoin. It would
> work if there are local miners, until we reconnect.
>
> Suppose we have the main chain (Alice), while bob is on a boat, trading
> with some friends, but has no network connectivity.
>
> When bob reconnects with Alice, a 'Merge' transaction happens where a
> miner looks at bob's forked blockchain, sees no double-spends, and
> includes BOTH chains.
>
> Now suppose someone on bob's boat has a buggy client, or sent a
> transaction before disconnect that results in a double-spend on the
> merge.
>
> So we have a merge conflict, which generally requires human interaction,
> so bob and his friends broadcast a MERGE request with a transaction fee
> sufficient to cover reconciling the double-spends, AND incentivize a
> miner to do some extra work to merge.
>
> Thoughts everyone?
This is interesting, but I'm not sure it has the right incentives. First, it
adds more reason for miners to *avoid* including transactions (they might turn
out to be double-spends and make merging costly). Second, it gives people
reason to double-spend (the miner might cover the cost of it). Finally, you
don't appear to address how to deal with the subsidy - do both miners get it?
Luke