kravietz 🦇 on Nostr: Watching the endless discussions after the perceived failure of #Ukraine summer ...
Watching the endless discussions after the perceived failure of #Ukraine summer offensive with reactions ranging from blaming (including victim blaming) and despair…
Can lessons be learned from the summer campaign? Sure, lessons can be always learned
Was the offensive a failure? Was it a mistake? Were mistakes made in its course? Honestly, I don’t know. The more I read and hear, the less I’m inclined to judge.
One reason is that some events can’t be judged ex post if there’s a high uncertainty about alternative scenarios.
Some events just have a tendency to develop in one direction regardless of what you do.
Can you imagine a situation where Ukraine HQ announces in May-June that the offensive is cancelled? I can’t. Even if every single rational calculation indicated it’s the most reasonable thing to do.
That kind of happened in July, when HQ called off the “armoured fist” tactics and switched to “small mobile groups”.
If he didn’t and concentrated all forces on one directioni, we may have been in a radically different reality today. Either one in which Ukrainian army reached Tokmak (very unlikely), or one in which it suffered losses on the minefields that reduced its combat capabilities to such an extent that it would be unable to beat Russian counter-offensive this autumn.
Was “fortress Bakhmut” justified? I have no strong opinions on that, even though my close friend got killed there. If Bakhmut was surrendered earlier, we might have 20k strong “Wagner” assault groups in Avdiivka today. Or Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.
By end of 2022 #Russia was in much worse situation after embarrassing retreats from Kyiv, Kherson and Lyman. There was some low-profile blaming and despair, but overall they regrouped and learned their lessons.
I wish allies of Ukraine had the same resilience in crisis situations - and that’s precisely how I read recent Stoltenberg’s advice “we need to be prepared for bad news”. Don’t despair, just regroup and learn lessons. At the end of the day, Russia today controls less Ukraine’s territory than it controlled in 2022.
Can lessons be learned from the summer campaign? Sure, lessons can be always learned
Was the offensive a failure? Was it a mistake? Were mistakes made in its course? Honestly, I don’t know. The more I read and hear, the less I’m inclined to judge.
One reason is that some events can’t be judged ex post if there’s a high uncertainty about alternative scenarios.
Some events just have a tendency to develop in one direction regardless of what you do.
Can you imagine a situation where Ukraine HQ announces in May-June that the offensive is cancelled? I can’t. Even if every single rational calculation indicated it’s the most reasonable thing to do.
That kind of happened in July, when HQ called off the “armoured fist” tactics and switched to “small mobile groups”.
If he didn’t and concentrated all forces on one directioni, we may have been in a radically different reality today. Either one in which Ukrainian army reached Tokmak (very unlikely), or one in which it suffered losses on the minefields that reduced its combat capabilities to such an extent that it would be unable to beat Russian counter-offensive this autumn.
Was “fortress Bakhmut” justified? I have no strong opinions on that, even though my close friend got killed there. If Bakhmut was surrendered earlier, we might have 20k strong “Wagner” assault groups in Avdiivka today. Or Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.
By end of 2022 #Russia was in much worse situation after embarrassing retreats from Kyiv, Kherson and Lyman. There was some low-profile blaming and despair, but overall they regrouped and learned their lessons.
I wish allies of Ukraine had the same resilience in crisis situations - and that’s precisely how I read recent Stoltenberg’s advice “we need to be prepared for bad news”. Don’t despair, just regroup and learn lessons. At the end of the day, Russia today controls less Ukraine’s territory than it controlled in 2022.