Gavin Andresen [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: š Original date posted:2015-07-20 š Original message:On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at ...
š
Original date posted:2015-07-20
š Original message:On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:43 PM, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This could render transactions with a locktime in the future as
> unspendable.
>
> It is pretty low probability that someone has created a >100kB locked
> transaction though.
>
> It violates the principle that no fork should render someone's coins
> unspendable.
>
Mmmm.... you'd have to:
a) Have lost or thrown away the keys to the unspent transaction outputs
b) Have created a locktime'd transaction with a lock time after the
BIP100/101 switchover times
that is more than 100,000 bytes big
c) Have some special relationship with a miner that you trust to still be
around when the transaction
unlocks that would mine the bigger-than-standard transaction for you.
I don't think adding extra complexity to consensus-critical code to support
such an incredibly unlikely
scenario is the right decision here. I think it is more likely that the
extra complexity would trigger a bug
that causes a loss of bitcoin greater than the amount of bitcoin tied up in
locktime'ed transactions
(because I think there are approximately zero BTC tied up in >100K
locktime'ed transactions).
RE: limit size of transaction+parents: Feature creep, belongs in another
BIP in my opinion. This one
is focused on fixing CVE-2013-2292
--
--
Gavin Andresen
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š Original message:On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:43 PM, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This could render transactions with a locktime in the future as
> unspendable.
>
> It is pretty low probability that someone has created a >100kB locked
> transaction though.
>
> It violates the principle that no fork should render someone's coins
> unspendable.
>
Mmmm.... you'd have to:
a) Have lost or thrown away the keys to the unspent transaction outputs
b) Have created a locktime'd transaction with a lock time after the
BIP100/101 switchover times
that is more than 100,000 bytes big
c) Have some special relationship with a miner that you trust to still be
around when the transaction
unlocks that would mine the bigger-than-standard transaction for you.
I don't think adding extra complexity to consensus-critical code to support
such an incredibly unlikely
scenario is the right decision here. I think it is more likely that the
extra complexity would trigger a bug
that causes a loss of bitcoin greater than the amount of bitcoin tied up in
locktime'ed transactions
(because I think there are approximately zero BTC tied up in >100K
locktime'ed transactions).
RE: limit size of transaction+parents: Feature creep, belongs in another
BIP in my opinion. This one
is focused on fixing CVE-2013-2292
--
--
Gavin Andresen
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