Andrew Kozlik [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2020-05-01 📝 Original message:Hi Jeremy, What you are ...
📅 Original date posted:2020-05-01
📝 Original message:Hi Jeremy,
What you are saying is correct and I am not disputing that there is
sufficient cryptographic commitment in the signature message. As I tried to
explain, my proposal is about avoiding the need for the metadata protocol
you speak of. Avoiding such a protocol has been a design goal in both
BIP-143 [1, 2] and BIP-341 [3, 4], because having to acquire each of the
transactions being spent in their entirety places a significant burden on
offline signing devices.
Cheers,
Andrew
[1]
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0143.mediawiki#motivation
[2] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=181734.0
[3]
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#cite_note-16
[4]
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#cite_note-17
On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 8:56 AM Jeremy <jlrubin at mit.edu> wrote:
> Hi Andrew,
>
> If you use SIGHASH_ALL it shall sign the COutPoints of all inputs which
> commit to the scriptPubKeys of the txn.
>
> Thus the 341 hash doesn't need to sign any additional data.
>
> As a metadata protocol you can provide all input transactions to check the
> scriptPubKeys.
>
> Best,
>
> Jeremy
> --
> @JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 1:22 AM Andrew Kozlik via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi everyone,
>>
>> In the current draft of BIP-0341 [1] the signature message commits to the
>> scriptPubKey of the output being spent by the input. I propose that the
>> signature message should commit to the scriptPubKeys of *all* transaction
>> inputs.
>>
>> In certain applications like CoinJoin, a wallet has to deal with
>> transactions containing external inputs. To calculate the actual amount
>> that the user is spending, the wallet needs to reliably determine for each
>> input whether it belongs to the wallet or not. Without such a mechanism an
>> adversary can fool the wallet into displaying incorrect information about
>> the amount being spent, which can result in theft of user funds [2].
>>
>> In order to ascertain non-ownership of an input which is claimed to be
>> external, the wallet needs the scriptPubKey of the previous output spent by
>> this input. It must acquire the full transaction being spent and verify its
>> hash against that which is given in the outpoint. This is an obstacle in
>> the implementation of lightweight air-gapped wallets and hardware wallets
>> in general. If the signature message would commit to the scriptPubKeys of
>> all transaction inputs, then the wallet would only need to acquire the
>> scriptPubKey of the output being spent without having to acquire and verify
>> the hash of the entire previous transaction. If an attacker would provide
>> an incorrect scriptPubKey, then that would cause the wallet to generate an
>> invalid signature message.
>>
>> Note that committing only to the scriptPubKey of the output being spent
>> is insufficient for this application, because the scriptPubKeys which are
>> needed to ascertain non-ownership of external inputs are precisely the ones
>> that would not be included in any of the signature messages produced by the
>> wallet.
>>
>> The obvious way to implement this is to add another hash to the signature
>> message:
>> sha_scriptPubKeys (32): the SHA256 of the serialization of all
>> scriptPubKeys of the previous outputs spent by this transaction.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Andrew Kozlik
>>
>> [1]
>> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#common-signature-message
>> [2]
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-August/014843.html
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
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📝 Original message:Hi Jeremy,
What you are saying is correct and I am not disputing that there is
sufficient cryptographic commitment in the signature message. As I tried to
explain, my proposal is about avoiding the need for the metadata protocol
you speak of. Avoiding such a protocol has been a design goal in both
BIP-143 [1, 2] and BIP-341 [3, 4], because having to acquire each of the
transactions being spent in their entirety places a significant burden on
offline signing devices.
Cheers,
Andrew
[1]
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0143.mediawiki#motivation
[2] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=181734.0
[3]
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#cite_note-16
[4]
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#cite_note-17
On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 8:56 AM Jeremy <jlrubin at mit.edu> wrote:
> Hi Andrew,
>
> If you use SIGHASH_ALL it shall sign the COutPoints of all inputs which
> commit to the scriptPubKeys of the txn.
>
> Thus the 341 hash doesn't need to sign any additional data.
>
> As a metadata protocol you can provide all input transactions to check the
> scriptPubKeys.
>
> Best,
>
> Jeremy
> --
> @JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 1:22 AM Andrew Kozlik via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi everyone,
>>
>> In the current draft of BIP-0341 [1] the signature message commits to the
>> scriptPubKey of the output being spent by the input. I propose that the
>> signature message should commit to the scriptPubKeys of *all* transaction
>> inputs.
>>
>> In certain applications like CoinJoin, a wallet has to deal with
>> transactions containing external inputs. To calculate the actual amount
>> that the user is spending, the wallet needs to reliably determine for each
>> input whether it belongs to the wallet or not. Without such a mechanism an
>> adversary can fool the wallet into displaying incorrect information about
>> the amount being spent, which can result in theft of user funds [2].
>>
>> In order to ascertain non-ownership of an input which is claimed to be
>> external, the wallet needs the scriptPubKey of the previous output spent by
>> this input. It must acquire the full transaction being spent and verify its
>> hash against that which is given in the outpoint. This is an obstacle in
>> the implementation of lightweight air-gapped wallets and hardware wallets
>> in general. If the signature message would commit to the scriptPubKeys of
>> all transaction inputs, then the wallet would only need to acquire the
>> scriptPubKey of the output being spent without having to acquire and verify
>> the hash of the entire previous transaction. If an attacker would provide
>> an incorrect scriptPubKey, then that would cause the wallet to generate an
>> invalid signature message.
>>
>> Note that committing only to the scriptPubKey of the output being spent
>> is insufficient for this application, because the scriptPubKeys which are
>> needed to ascertain non-ownership of external inputs are precisely the ones
>> that would not be included in any of the signature messages produced by the
>> wallet.
>>
>> The obvious way to implement this is to add another hash to the signature
>> message:
>> sha_scriptPubKeys (32): the SHA256 of the serialization of all
>> scriptPubKeys of the previous outputs spent by this transaction.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Andrew Kozlik
>>
>> [1]
>> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#common-signature-message
>> [2]
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-August/014843.html
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
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