email at yancy.lol [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-10-18 📝 Original message:> not sure if this is ...
📅 Original date posted:2022-10-18
📝 Original message:> not sure if this is helpful, but when i'm code reviewing a change to
> an existing, functioning and very complex system, i rarely go back to
> "first principles" to analyze that change independently, and instead
> try to decide if it's better or worse than what we have now
I agree that it's important to not be too dogmatic, which includes
Satoshi and the white paper. It's fun to look back and read to try to
find inspiration, although, it seems to me, a lot has been learned since
then. And a lot will be learned in the future. I was thinking to
myself, what if in the distant future, quantum entanglement could be
used to update all nodes simultaneously across any distance in space?
How cool would that be? How might that change from the original vision?
Well, if we ever get that far, I'm sure Satoshi could not have planned
for that, or maybe they could have.. :)
On 2022-10-18 19:33, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> not sure if this is helpful, but when i'm code reviewing a change to
> an existing, functioning and very complex system, i rarely go back to
> "first principles" to analyze that change independently, and instead
> try to decide if it's better or worse than what we have now
>
> you can introduce a new feature, for example, that has a bunch of
> noncritical bugs, especially in ux, and then you can weigh in on
> whether its better to get it out now for the people that need it, or
> bikeshed ux for another 2 releases
>
> i'm often a fan of the former
>
> if someone proposes a change to bitcoin, we should probably review it
> as "better or worse than what we have", rather than "has perfectly
> aligned incentives promoting honest behavior even among selfish
> actors"
>
> we know bitcoin functions now with a complex series of incentives,
> especially regarding node operators
>
> in other words, does the change "improve what we have" is a better bar
> than "stands on its own"
>
> in that way the system can slowly improve over time, rather than be
> stuck
>
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 12:28 PM Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> I think the issue with
>
> I still think it is misguided to think that the "honest" (i.e.
> rule following) majority is to just be accepted as an axiom and if
> it is violated, well, then sorry. The rules need to be incentive
> compatible for the system to be functional. The honest majority
> is only considered an assumption because even if following the
> rules were clearly the 100% dominant strategy, this doesn't prove
> that the majority is honest, since mathematics cannot say what is
> happening in the real world at any given time. Still, we must
> have a reason to think that the majority would be honest, and that
> reasoning should come from an argument that the rule set is
> incentive compatible.
> epistemically is that even within the game that you prove the
> dominant strategy, you can't be certain that you've captured (except
> maybe through clever use of exogenous parameters, which reduces to
> the same thing as % honest) the actual incentives of all players.
> For example, you would need to capture the existence of large
> hegemonic governments defending their legacy currencies by attacking
> bitcoin.
>
> I think we may be talking past each other if it is a concern /
> valuable exercise to decrease the assumptions that Bitcoin rests on
> to make it more secure than it is as defined in the whitepaper.
> That's an exercise of tremendous value. I think my point is that
> those things are aspirational (aspirations that perhaps we should
> absolutely achieve?) but to the extent that we need to fix things
> like the fee market, selfish mining, mind the gap, etc, those are
> modifying Bitcoin to be secure (or more fair is perhaps another way
> to look at it) in the presence of deviations from a hypothesized
> "incentive compatible Bitcoin", which is a different thing that
> "whitepaper bitcoin". I think that I largely fall in the camp -- as
> evidenced by some past conversations I won't rehash -- that all of
> Bitcoin should be incentive compatible and we should fix it if not.
> But from those conversations I also learned that there are large
> swaths of the community who don't share that value, or only share it
> up to a point, and do feel comfortable resting on honest majority
> assumptions at one layer of the stack or another. And I think that
> prior / axiom is a pretty central one to debug or comprehend when
> dealing with, as is happening now, a fight over something that seems
> obviously not incentive compatible.
>
> --
> @JeremyRubin [1 [1]]
>
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 10:30 AM Russell O'Connor
> <roconnor at blockstream.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 9:07 AM Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> However, what *is* important about what Satoshi wrote is that it is
> sort of the "social contract" of what Bitcoin is that we can all
> sort of minimally agree to. This makes it clear, when we try to
> describe Bitcoin with differing assumptions than in the whitepaper,
> what the changes are and why we think the system might support those
> claims. But if we can't prove the new description sound, such as
> showing tip mining to be rational in a fully adversarial model, it
> doesn't mean Bitcoin doesn't work as promised, since all that was
> promised originally is functioning under an honest majority. Caveat
> Emptor!
>
> I still think it is misguided to think that the "honest" (i.e. rule
> following) majority is to just be accepted as an axiom and if it is
> violated, well, then sorry. The rules need to be incentive
> compatible for the system to be functional. The honest majority is
> only considered an assumption because even if following the rules
> were clearly the 100% dominant strategy, this doesn't prove that the
> majority is honest, since mathematics cannot say what is happening
> in the real world at any given time. Still, we must have a reason
> to think that the majority would be honest, and that reasoning
> should come from an argument that the rule set is incentive
> compatible.
>
> The stability of mining, i.e. the incentives to mine on the most
> work chain, is actually a huge concern, especially in a future low
> subsidy environment. There is actually much fretting about this
> issue, and rightly so. We don't actually know that Bitcoin can
> function in a low subsidy environment because we have never tested
> it. Bitcoin could still end up a failure if that doesn't work out.
> My current understanding/guess is that with a "thick mempool" (that
> is lots of transactions without large gaps in fee rates between
> them) and/or miners rationally leaving behind transactions to
> encourage mining on their block (after all it is in a miner's own
> interest not to have their block orphaned), that mining will be
> stable. But I don't know this for sure, and we cannot know with
> certainty that we are going to have a "thick mempool" when it is
> needed.
>
> It is most certainly the case that one can construct situations
> where not mining on the tip is going to be the prefered strategy.
> But even if that happens on occasion, it's not like the protocol
> immediately collapses, because mining off the tip is
> indistinguishable from being a high latency miner who simply didn't
> receive the most work block in time. So it is more of a question of
> how rare does it need to be, and what can we do to reduce the
> chances of such situations arising (e.g. updating our mining policy
> to leave some transactions out based on current (and anticipated)
> mempool conditions, or (for a sufficiently capitalized miner) leave
> an explicit, ANYONECANSPEND transaction output as a tip for the next
> miner to build upon mined blocks.)
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Links:
------
[1] https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Links:
------
[1] https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin
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📝 Original message:> not sure if this is helpful, but when i'm code reviewing a change to
> an existing, functioning and very complex system, i rarely go back to
> "first principles" to analyze that change independently, and instead
> try to decide if it's better or worse than what we have now
I agree that it's important to not be too dogmatic, which includes
Satoshi and the white paper. It's fun to look back and read to try to
find inspiration, although, it seems to me, a lot has been learned since
then. And a lot will be learned in the future. I was thinking to
myself, what if in the distant future, quantum entanglement could be
used to update all nodes simultaneously across any distance in space?
How cool would that be? How might that change from the original vision?
Well, if we ever get that far, I'm sure Satoshi could not have planned
for that, or maybe they could have.. :)
On 2022-10-18 19:33, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> not sure if this is helpful, but when i'm code reviewing a change to
> an existing, functioning and very complex system, i rarely go back to
> "first principles" to analyze that change independently, and instead
> try to decide if it's better or worse than what we have now
>
> you can introduce a new feature, for example, that has a bunch of
> noncritical bugs, especially in ux, and then you can weigh in on
> whether its better to get it out now for the people that need it, or
> bikeshed ux for another 2 releases
>
> i'm often a fan of the former
>
> if someone proposes a change to bitcoin, we should probably review it
> as "better or worse than what we have", rather than "has perfectly
> aligned incentives promoting honest behavior even among selfish
> actors"
>
> we know bitcoin functions now with a complex series of incentives,
> especially regarding node operators
>
> in other words, does the change "improve what we have" is a better bar
> than "stands on its own"
>
> in that way the system can slowly improve over time, rather than be
> stuck
>
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 12:28 PM Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> I think the issue with
>
> I still think it is misguided to think that the "honest" (i.e.
> rule following) majority is to just be accepted as an axiom and if
> it is violated, well, then sorry. The rules need to be incentive
> compatible for the system to be functional. The honest majority
> is only considered an assumption because even if following the
> rules were clearly the 100% dominant strategy, this doesn't prove
> that the majority is honest, since mathematics cannot say what is
> happening in the real world at any given time. Still, we must
> have a reason to think that the majority would be honest, and that
> reasoning should come from an argument that the rule set is
> incentive compatible.
> epistemically is that even within the game that you prove the
> dominant strategy, you can't be certain that you've captured (except
> maybe through clever use of exogenous parameters, which reduces to
> the same thing as % honest) the actual incentives of all players.
> For example, you would need to capture the existence of large
> hegemonic governments defending their legacy currencies by attacking
> bitcoin.
>
> I think we may be talking past each other if it is a concern /
> valuable exercise to decrease the assumptions that Bitcoin rests on
> to make it more secure than it is as defined in the whitepaper.
> That's an exercise of tremendous value. I think my point is that
> those things are aspirational (aspirations that perhaps we should
> absolutely achieve?) but to the extent that we need to fix things
> like the fee market, selfish mining, mind the gap, etc, those are
> modifying Bitcoin to be secure (or more fair is perhaps another way
> to look at it) in the presence of deviations from a hypothesized
> "incentive compatible Bitcoin", which is a different thing that
> "whitepaper bitcoin". I think that I largely fall in the camp -- as
> evidenced by some past conversations I won't rehash -- that all of
> Bitcoin should be incentive compatible and we should fix it if not.
> But from those conversations I also learned that there are large
> swaths of the community who don't share that value, or only share it
> up to a point, and do feel comfortable resting on honest majority
> assumptions at one layer of the stack or another. And I think that
> prior / axiom is a pretty central one to debug or comprehend when
> dealing with, as is happening now, a fight over something that seems
> obviously not incentive compatible.
>
> --
> @JeremyRubin [1 [1]]
>
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 10:30 AM Russell O'Connor
> <roconnor at blockstream.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 9:07 AM Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> However, what *is* important about what Satoshi wrote is that it is
> sort of the "social contract" of what Bitcoin is that we can all
> sort of minimally agree to. This makes it clear, when we try to
> describe Bitcoin with differing assumptions than in the whitepaper,
> what the changes are and why we think the system might support those
> claims. But if we can't prove the new description sound, such as
> showing tip mining to be rational in a fully adversarial model, it
> doesn't mean Bitcoin doesn't work as promised, since all that was
> promised originally is functioning under an honest majority. Caveat
> Emptor!
>
> I still think it is misguided to think that the "honest" (i.e. rule
> following) majority is to just be accepted as an axiom and if it is
> violated, well, then sorry. The rules need to be incentive
> compatible for the system to be functional. The honest majority is
> only considered an assumption because even if following the rules
> were clearly the 100% dominant strategy, this doesn't prove that the
> majority is honest, since mathematics cannot say what is happening
> in the real world at any given time. Still, we must have a reason
> to think that the majority would be honest, and that reasoning
> should come from an argument that the rule set is incentive
> compatible.
>
> The stability of mining, i.e. the incentives to mine on the most
> work chain, is actually a huge concern, especially in a future low
> subsidy environment. There is actually much fretting about this
> issue, and rightly so. We don't actually know that Bitcoin can
> function in a low subsidy environment because we have never tested
> it. Bitcoin could still end up a failure if that doesn't work out.
> My current understanding/guess is that with a "thick mempool" (that
> is lots of transactions without large gaps in fee rates between
> them) and/or miners rationally leaving behind transactions to
> encourage mining on their block (after all it is in a miner's own
> interest not to have their block orphaned), that mining will be
> stable. But I don't know this for sure, and we cannot know with
> certainty that we are going to have a "thick mempool" when it is
> needed.
>
> It is most certainly the case that one can construct situations
> where not mining on the tip is going to be the prefered strategy.
> But even if that happens on occasion, it's not like the protocol
> immediately collapses, because mining off the tip is
> indistinguishable from being a high latency miner who simply didn't
> receive the most work block in time. So it is more of a question of
> how rare does it need to be, and what can we do to reduce the
> chances of such situations arising (e.g. updating our mining policy
> to leave some transactions out based on current (and anticipated)
> mempool conditions, or (for a sufficiently capitalized miner) leave
> an explicit, ANYONECANSPEND transaction output as a tip for the next
> miner to build upon mined blocks.)
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Links:
------
[1] https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Links:
------
[1] https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin
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