Erik Aronesty [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: π Original date posted:2017-05-03 π Original message:> But as you've observed, ...
π
Original date posted:2017-05-03
π Original message:> But as you've observed, the failure probabilities are rather high,
> especially if an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly
> available blocks.
Wouldn't the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attacker
uses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a
random percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set?
IE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random set, Z%
patch/fill set to deter attacks
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170503/f9489c19/attachment.html>
π Original message:> But as you've observed, the failure probabilities are rather high,
> especially if an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly
> available blocks.
Wouldn't the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attacker
uses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a
random percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set?
IE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random set, Z%
patch/fill set to deter attacks
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170503/f9489c19/attachment.html>