ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-06-19 📝 Original message:Good morning Raymo, > Hi, ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-06-19
📝 Original message:Good morning Raymo,
> Hi,
> I have a proposal for improve Bitcoin TPS and privacy, here is the post.
> https://raymo-49157.medium.com/time-to-boost-bitcoin-circulation-million-transactions-per-second-and-privacy-1eef8568d180
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5344020.0
> Can you please read it and share your idea about it.
Guarantee Transactions (GT) being higher-fee is ***not*** assured.
Feerates are always bumpable --- the sender of a transaction only needs to directly contact a miner and offer a fee to take a specific transaction on the next block proposal, conditional on the transaction *actually* getting into a block.
Such "side fees" are always possible.
Indeed, the in-transaction fees are "just" a way to anonymously and atomically make that fee offer to miners --- but miners and issuers can always communicate directly without using Bitcoin transaction to arrange a higher fee for a fraudulent Main Transaction (MT).
because of this, you should really treat all unconfirmed transactions --- including MTs and GTs --- as potentially replaceable, i.e. RBFable.
There is no such thing as "RBF disabled", all transactions are inherently RBF-able due to side fees --- it is simply a matter of anonymity, atomicity, and ease-of-use.
---
Every offchain protocol needs *the receiver* as a signatory to any unconfirmed transaction.
Or more strongly, the receiver **must** be a signatory --- the receiver cannot trust an unconfirmed transaction where the spent UTXO has an alternate branch that does *not* have the receiver as a signatory.
See: https://zmnscpxj.github.io/offchain/safety.html
Thus, all safe offchain schemes need to use an n-of-n signing set.
The smallest n-of-n that is still useful is 2-of-2, where one participant is a sender and the other is a receiver.
(1-of-1 is not useful since there is no possible receiver who can sign).
This requires Bitcoin to splinter into lots of 2-of-2 funds, each one a sovereign sub-money (that is *eventually* convertible to Bitcoin), each one a cryptocurrency system in its own right.
However, it so happens that we have a mechanism for transferring value across multiple cryptocurrency systems: the HTLC.
2-of-2 is also the most stable.
This is because *all* signatories of an n-of-n cryptocurrency system need to be online at the same time in order for *any* of them to use the funds in the system.
If any one of them is offline, then the system is unusable.
With 2 participants, there is some probability that one of them is offline and the individual 2-of-2 system is unusable.
With 3 participants, the probability is higher (there are more participants that can be offline).
With 4 participants, higher still.
Thus, the most stable is to split Bitcoin into lots of little 2-of-2 systems, and use HTLCs to transfer funds across the little 2-of-2 systems.
Thus, Lightning Network, which splits Bitcoin into lots of little 2-of-2 cryptocurrency systems (channels), and uses HTLCs to atomically transfer value across them (routing).
Of course, having larger n is better as we need to splinter Bitcoin into fewer funds with larger participant sets.
And we can mitigate the offline-problem by using a two-layer system: we have a n-of-n system (n > 2) that itself splits into multiple smaller 2-of-2 systems.
That way, the Bitcoin layer is split into fewer UTXOs, reducing blockchain resource consumption further.
Thus, Channel Factories hosting Lightning Channels.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
📝 Original message:Good morning Raymo,
> Hi,
> I have a proposal for improve Bitcoin TPS and privacy, here is the post.
> https://raymo-49157.medium.com/time-to-boost-bitcoin-circulation-million-transactions-per-second-and-privacy-1eef8568d180
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5344020.0
> Can you please read it and share your idea about it.
Guarantee Transactions (GT) being higher-fee is ***not*** assured.
Feerates are always bumpable --- the sender of a transaction only needs to directly contact a miner and offer a fee to take a specific transaction on the next block proposal, conditional on the transaction *actually* getting into a block.
Such "side fees" are always possible.
Indeed, the in-transaction fees are "just" a way to anonymously and atomically make that fee offer to miners --- but miners and issuers can always communicate directly without using Bitcoin transaction to arrange a higher fee for a fraudulent Main Transaction (MT).
because of this, you should really treat all unconfirmed transactions --- including MTs and GTs --- as potentially replaceable, i.e. RBFable.
There is no such thing as "RBF disabled", all transactions are inherently RBF-able due to side fees --- it is simply a matter of anonymity, atomicity, and ease-of-use.
---
Every offchain protocol needs *the receiver* as a signatory to any unconfirmed transaction.
Or more strongly, the receiver **must** be a signatory --- the receiver cannot trust an unconfirmed transaction where the spent UTXO has an alternate branch that does *not* have the receiver as a signatory.
See: https://zmnscpxj.github.io/offchain/safety.html
Thus, all safe offchain schemes need to use an n-of-n signing set.
The smallest n-of-n that is still useful is 2-of-2, where one participant is a sender and the other is a receiver.
(1-of-1 is not useful since there is no possible receiver who can sign).
This requires Bitcoin to splinter into lots of 2-of-2 funds, each one a sovereign sub-money (that is *eventually* convertible to Bitcoin), each one a cryptocurrency system in its own right.
However, it so happens that we have a mechanism for transferring value across multiple cryptocurrency systems: the HTLC.
2-of-2 is also the most stable.
This is because *all* signatories of an n-of-n cryptocurrency system need to be online at the same time in order for *any* of them to use the funds in the system.
If any one of them is offline, then the system is unusable.
With 2 participants, there is some probability that one of them is offline and the individual 2-of-2 system is unusable.
With 3 participants, the probability is higher (there are more participants that can be offline).
With 4 participants, higher still.
Thus, the most stable is to split Bitcoin into lots of little 2-of-2 systems, and use HTLCs to transfer funds across the little 2-of-2 systems.
Thus, Lightning Network, which splits Bitcoin into lots of little 2-of-2 cryptocurrency systems (channels), and uses HTLCs to atomically transfer value across them (routing).
Of course, having larger n is better as we need to splinter Bitcoin into fewer funds with larger participant sets.
And we can mitigate the offline-problem by using a two-layer system: we have a n-of-n system (n > 2) that itself splits into multiple smaller 2-of-2 systems.
That way, the Bitcoin layer is split into fewer UTXOs, reducing blockchain resource consumption further.
Thus, Channel Factories hosting Lightning Channels.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj