Joseph Poon [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-07-27 📝 Original message: On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at ...

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-27
📝 Original message:
On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 11:58:12AM +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
> The asymmetric risk is as much a feature as a problem: with the
> dual-anchor proposal, either side could abort with no penalty and make
> the other side wait for the escape timeout anyway.

Cool, I think this works.

Yeah non-cooperation risks in this model aren't that big of a deal,
because the channel is going to be closed out anyway if they're not
cooperative -- they could always refuse to route payments, and then
everyone's going to get their money back.

> We've handwaved over the incentives for channel creation so far; they're
> tied with routing, and not immediately clear to me. But it doesn't seem
> unreasonable that if you connect to a hub, you front the funds.

Yeah, there's likely some weird asymmetric economic incentive things
going on. If both channels are established with the same person, it
should be fairly clean, though. I think there will probably be some
measure of trust/reputation involved with pre-payment of the time-value
for the channel (shorter with OP_CSV, but still non-zero).

OP_CSV still requires BIP 62, though. It's possible to construct a model
with OP_CLTV without BIP 62 (described in a post earlier today) using
single-funder with some OP_CLTV'd output which returns the full balance
to the original funder at a date very far in the future after the
expiration of all Commitments and its dependent outputs.

--
Joseph Poon