Peter Todd [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-05-09 📝 Original message:On Sat, May 09, 2015 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-05-09
📝 Original message:On Sat, May 09, 2015 at 01:36:56AM +0300, Joel Joonatan Kaartinen wrote:
> such a contract is a possibility, but why would big owners give an
> exclusive right to such pools? It seems to me it'd make sense to offer
> those for any miner as long as the get paid a little for it. Especially
> when it's as simple as offering an incomplete transaction with the
> appropriate SIGHASH flags.
Like many things, the fact that they need to negotiate the right at all
is a *huge* barrier to smaller mining operations, as well as being an
attractive point of control for regulators.
> a part of the reason I like this idea is because it will allow stakeholders
> a degree of influence on how large the fees are. At least from the surface,
> it looks like incentives are pretty well matched. They have an incentive to
> not let the fees drop too low so the network continues to be usable and
> they also have an incentive to not raise them too high because it'll push
> users into using other systems. Also, there'll be competition between
> stakeholders, which should keep the fees reasonable.
If you want to allow stakeholders influence you should look into John Dillon's
proof-of-stake blocksize voting scheme:
http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
00000000000000000e7980aab9c096c46e7f34c43a661c5cb2ea71525ebb8af7
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📝 Original message:On Sat, May 09, 2015 at 01:36:56AM +0300, Joel Joonatan Kaartinen wrote:
> such a contract is a possibility, but why would big owners give an
> exclusive right to such pools? It seems to me it'd make sense to offer
> those for any miner as long as the get paid a little for it. Especially
> when it's as simple as offering an incomplete transaction with the
> appropriate SIGHASH flags.
Like many things, the fact that they need to negotiate the right at all
is a *huge* barrier to smaller mining operations, as well as being an
attractive point of control for regulators.
> a part of the reason I like this idea is because it will allow stakeholders
> a degree of influence on how large the fees are. At least from the surface,
> it looks like incentives are pretty well matched. They have an incentive to
> not let the fees drop too low so the network continues to be usable and
> they also have an incentive to not raise them too high because it'll push
> users into using other systems. Also, there'll be competition between
> stakeholders, which should keep the fees reasonable.
If you want to allow stakeholders influence you should look into John Dillon's
proof-of-stake blocksize voting scheme:
http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
00000000000000000e7980aab9c096c46e7f34c43a661c5cb2ea71525ebb8af7
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