odinn [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-10-04 📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-10-04
📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Hello,
Some background on this....
A very long while ago I posted to the bitcoin-development mailing list
some ABIS concepts having to do with microdonations:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2013-December/00
3791.html
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-January/004
049.html
And an interesting post (which led me to explore BCN) via nullc:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7765455
(posted 1 & 1/3 year ago).
Anyway, some long while ago this discussion came up about "Incentives
to run full nodes," and the last post in the thread was here:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/006083
.html
Since that time, some new developments have come to light which the
participants in that thread may find interesting;
Please see in part,
https://bytecoin.org/news/bytecoin-wallet-1.0.8-release-introduces-micro
- -donations/
This presents a working implementation in BCN; the concept as
implemented there is arguably viable in BTC as well.
Please explore, play with, discuss, etc.
Cheers,
- - O
odinn:
> Potentially relevant...
>
> "Incentivizing the running of full nodes"
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/0060
28
>
>
.html
>
> (However, the issue to which I referred here is now closed)
>
> View whole thread:
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/thre
ad
>
>
.html#6028
>
> On 08/17/2015 02:44 PM, Chris Pacia via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
>> On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev"
>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote: From the
>> point of view of a
>>> wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and
>>> volunteers running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil
>>> attacking the IP address space is pretty easy in comparison to
>>> aquiring hashing power sufficient to create false
>>> confirmations, so any attacker able to do the former will
>>> likely be running the full node you're connecting too anyway.
>>> Ultimately, Hearn-style SPV is a close approximation to just
>>> trusting anyone with a non-trivial amount of hashing power.
>>> (and getting that is surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining)
>
>> Can you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a
>> non-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To
>> attack an spv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations,
>> you would not only need to Sybil them but also summon a massive
>> amount of hashing power to create a chain of headers (while
>> forgoing the opportunity to mine valid blocks with that hash
>> power).
>
>> But could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full
>> node and give them a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan
>> fork)? The failure model doesn't seem specific to spv to me.
>
>
>
>> _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev
>> mailing list bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
>
- --
http://abis.io ~
"a protocol concept to enable decentralization
and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good"
https://keybase.io/odinn
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📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Hello,
Some background on this....
A very long while ago I posted to the bitcoin-development mailing list
some ABIS concepts having to do with microdonations:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2013-December/00
3791.html
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-January/004
049.html
And an interesting post (which led me to explore BCN) via nullc:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7765455
(posted 1 & 1/3 year ago).
Anyway, some long while ago this discussion came up about "Incentives
to run full nodes," and the last post in the thread was here:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/006083
.html
Since that time, some new developments have come to light which the
participants in that thread may find interesting;
Please see in part,
https://bytecoin.org/news/bytecoin-wallet-1.0.8-release-introduces-micro
- -donations/
This presents a working implementation in BCN; the concept as
implemented there is arguably viable in BTC as well.
Please explore, play with, discuss, etc.
Cheers,
- - O
odinn:
> Potentially relevant...
>
> "Incentivizing the running of full nodes"
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/0060
28
>
>
.html
>
> (However, the issue to which I referred here is now closed)
>
> View whole thread:
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/thre
ad
>
>
.html#6028
>
> On 08/17/2015 02:44 PM, Chris Pacia via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
>> On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev"
>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote: From the
>> point of view of a
>>> wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and
>>> volunteers running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil
>>> attacking the IP address space is pretty easy in comparison to
>>> aquiring hashing power sufficient to create false
>>> confirmations, so any attacker able to do the former will
>>> likely be running the full node you're connecting too anyway.
>>> Ultimately, Hearn-style SPV is a close approximation to just
>>> trusting anyone with a non-trivial amount of hashing power.
>>> (and getting that is surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining)
>
>> Can you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a
>> non-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To
>> attack an spv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations,
>> you would not only need to Sybil them but also summon a massive
>> amount of hashing power to create a chain of headers (while
>> forgoing the opportunity to mine valid blocks with that hash
>> power).
>
>> But could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full
>> node and give them a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan
>> fork)? The failure model doesn't seem specific to spv to me.
>
>
>
>> _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev
>> mailing list bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
>
- --
http://abis.io ~
"a protocol concept to enable decentralization
and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good"
https://keybase.io/odinn
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