Tom Harding [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-07-30 📝 Original message:On 7/29/2015 9:48 PM, Ryan ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-07-30
📝 Original message:On 7/29/2015 9:48 PM, Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> I shouldn't have said unlimited, i should have said a greater
> blocksize limit such as 8mb.
>
> Anyways, why is that the assumption? If a miner can do so, and do so
> profitably, isn't that just competition? Isn't that what we want? If
> a miner can mine low transaction fees at a profit then don't they
> deserve to have their spot? Surely if they do so unprofitably they
> quickly find themselves out of business? Besides, if a miner mines
> low fee transactions by breaking rank, how does this affect another
> miner EXCEPT for the additional blocksize load. I would maintain this
> is just competition amongst miners gentlemen. And it's a good thing.
>
> Right now things are distorted because most income comes from the
> coinbase, but as transaction fees start to constitute the majority of
> income this idea seems to have more importance.
>
You're completely correct Ryan.
There has been a well functioning fee market since 2011. Average fees
have never been zero, despite low-fee transactions being mined, and
despite no block size pressure until September 2014.
Another empirical fact also needs explaining. Why have average fees *as
measured in BTC* risen during the times of highest public interest in
bitcoin? This happened without block size pressure, and it is not an
exchange rate effect -- these are raw BTC fees:
https://blockchain.info/charts/transaction-fees?timespan=all&daysAverageString=7
... more evidence that conclusively refutes the conjecture that a
production quota is necessary for a "functioning fee market." A
production quota merely pushes up fees. We have a functioning market,
and so far, it shows that wider bitcoin usage is even more effective
than a quota at pushing up fees.
> On Jul 29, 2015 11:00 PM, "Adam Back" <adam at cypherspace.org
> <mailto:adam at cypherspace.org>> wrote:
>
>
> The assumption is that wont work because any miner can break ranks and
> do so profitably, so to expect otherwise is to expect oligopoly
> behaviour which is the sort of antithesis of a decentralised mining
> system. It's in fact a similar argument as to why decentralisation of
> mining provides policy neutrality: some miner somewhere with some
> hashrate will process your transaction even if some other miners are
> by policy deciding not to mine it. It is also similar reason why free
> transactions are processed today - policies vary and this is good for
> ensuring many types of transaction get processed.
>
📝 Original message:On 7/29/2015 9:48 PM, Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> I shouldn't have said unlimited, i should have said a greater
> blocksize limit such as 8mb.
>
> Anyways, why is that the assumption? If a miner can do so, and do so
> profitably, isn't that just competition? Isn't that what we want? If
> a miner can mine low transaction fees at a profit then don't they
> deserve to have their spot? Surely if they do so unprofitably they
> quickly find themselves out of business? Besides, if a miner mines
> low fee transactions by breaking rank, how does this affect another
> miner EXCEPT for the additional blocksize load. I would maintain this
> is just competition amongst miners gentlemen. And it's a good thing.
>
> Right now things are distorted because most income comes from the
> coinbase, but as transaction fees start to constitute the majority of
> income this idea seems to have more importance.
>
You're completely correct Ryan.
There has been a well functioning fee market since 2011. Average fees
have never been zero, despite low-fee transactions being mined, and
despite no block size pressure until September 2014.
Another empirical fact also needs explaining. Why have average fees *as
measured in BTC* risen during the times of highest public interest in
bitcoin? This happened without block size pressure, and it is not an
exchange rate effect -- these are raw BTC fees:
https://blockchain.info/charts/transaction-fees?timespan=all&daysAverageString=7
... more evidence that conclusively refutes the conjecture that a
production quota is necessary for a "functioning fee market." A
production quota merely pushes up fees. We have a functioning market,
and so far, it shows that wider bitcoin usage is even more effective
than a quota at pushing up fees.
> On Jul 29, 2015 11:00 PM, "Adam Back" <adam at cypherspace.org
> <mailto:adam at cypherspace.org>> wrote:
>
>
> The assumption is that wont work because any miner can break ranks and
> do so profitably, so to expect otherwise is to expect oligopoly
> behaviour which is the sort of antithesis of a decentralised mining
> system. It's in fact a similar argument as to why decentralisation of
> mining provides policy neutrality: some miner somewhere with some
> hashrate will process your transaction even if some other miners are
> by policy deciding not to mine it. It is also similar reason why free
> transactions are processed today - policies vary and this is good for
> ensuring many types of transaction get processed.
>