Billy Tetrud [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-05-25 📝 Original message:> It seems to me bitcoin's ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-05-25
📝 Original message:> It seems to me bitcoin's biggest vulnerabilities are either covert
compromise of mining pool operations, or widespread compromise of networked
mining systems and client node
Stratum v2 will solve the mining pool problem. Widespread compromise of
mining systems seems far fetched. That would involve compromising hundreds
of thousands or perhaps millions of systems in disparate areas with
disparate operating systems and security procedures, run by people who
probably understand computer security better than most (given their
involvement in bitcoin).
I think the biggest vulnerability bitcoin has is a sybil attack draining
the resources of public full nodes. We only have like 10,000 public full
nodes serving the whole network. It wouldn't take that much money to create
a sybil botnet of 100,000 or 1 million nodes that connect to the bitcoin
network and simply take up public node resources, denying service to most
people's full nodes.
> I don't see why it would necessarily be made public if a government
compromised their nation's mining farms. Governments have skilled
operatives for things like that.
Skilled operatives have their limits. It could be kept secret if spies were
hired as employees and then systematically infected all the machines in a
mining operation's machines. But spies aren't magic, no matter how skilled.
One mistake and the jig is up. It would be more likely to be a backroom
deal, which would be harder to keep secret, especially in large operations.
Propaganda has its limits too, sure you could convince some people things
are fine, but sophisticated people like miners? I doubt it.
On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 2:55 PM Karl <gmkarl at gmail.com> wrote:
> If bitcoin were to ever consider changing their PoW algorithm a
> little, it seems that would immediately make purchased ASIC mining
> equipment partially or wholly unusable to compromise the chain (and
> temporarily reduce energy usage without necessarily reducing
> security). One possible plan to deter a multibillionaire attack.
>
> Also regarding the word "security" here, a 51% attack impacts some
> parts of chain operations, but not others.
>
> It seems to me bitcoin's biggest vulnerabilities are either covert
> compromise of mining pool operations, or widespread compromise of
> networked mining systems and client nodes. Far easier than
> outcompeting the mining network with hardware.
>
> I don't see why it would necessarily be made public if a government
> compromised their nation's mining farms. Governments have skilled
> operatives for things like that. People would guess it happened, and
> the government would cover up the guesses with more powerful stories.
>
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📝 Original message:> It seems to me bitcoin's biggest vulnerabilities are either covert
compromise of mining pool operations, or widespread compromise of networked
mining systems and client node
Stratum v2 will solve the mining pool problem. Widespread compromise of
mining systems seems far fetched. That would involve compromising hundreds
of thousands or perhaps millions of systems in disparate areas with
disparate operating systems and security procedures, run by people who
probably understand computer security better than most (given their
involvement in bitcoin).
I think the biggest vulnerability bitcoin has is a sybil attack draining
the resources of public full nodes. We only have like 10,000 public full
nodes serving the whole network. It wouldn't take that much money to create
a sybil botnet of 100,000 or 1 million nodes that connect to the bitcoin
network and simply take up public node resources, denying service to most
people's full nodes.
> I don't see why it would necessarily be made public if a government
compromised their nation's mining farms. Governments have skilled
operatives for things like that.
Skilled operatives have their limits. It could be kept secret if spies were
hired as employees and then systematically infected all the machines in a
mining operation's machines. But spies aren't magic, no matter how skilled.
One mistake and the jig is up. It would be more likely to be a backroom
deal, which would be harder to keep secret, especially in large operations.
Propaganda has its limits too, sure you could convince some people things
are fine, but sophisticated people like miners? I doubt it.
On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 2:55 PM Karl <gmkarl at gmail.com> wrote:
> If bitcoin were to ever consider changing their PoW algorithm a
> little, it seems that would immediately make purchased ASIC mining
> equipment partially or wholly unusable to compromise the chain (and
> temporarily reduce energy usage without necessarily reducing
> security). One possible plan to deter a multibillionaire attack.
>
> Also regarding the word "security" here, a 51% attack impacts some
> parts of chain operations, but not others.
>
> It seems to me bitcoin's biggest vulnerabilities are either covert
> compromise of mining pool operations, or widespread compromise of
> networked mining systems and client nodes. Far easier than
> outcompeting the mining network with hardware.
>
> I don't see why it would necessarily be made public if a government
> compromised their nation's mining farms. Governments have skilled
> operatives for things like that. People would guess it happened, and
> the government would cover up the guesses with more powerful stories.
>
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