Antoine Riard [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-06-21 📝 Original message: Hi Dave, > That might ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-06-21
📝 Original message:
Hi Dave,
> That might work for current LN-penalty, but I'm not sure it works for
eltoo.
Well, we have not settled yet on the eltoo design but if we take the later
proposal in date [0], signing the update transaction with
SIGHGASH_ANYPREVOUT lets you attach non-interactively a single-party
controlled input at broadcast-time. Providing the input amount is high
enough to bump the transaction feerate over network mempools, it should
allow the tx to propagate across network mempools and that way solve the
pre-signed feerate problem as defined in the post ?
> If Bitcoin Core can rewrite the blind CPFP fee bump transaction
> to refer to any prevout, that implies anyone else can do the same.
> Miners who were aware of two or more states from an eltoo channel would
> be incentivized to rewrite to the oldest state, giving them fee revenue
> now and ensuring fee revenue in the future when a later state update is
> broadcast.
Yep, you can add a per-participant key to lockdown the transaction and
avoid any in-flight malleability ? I think this is discussed in the "A
Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques" thread.
> If the attacker using pinning is able to reuse their attack at no cost,
> they can re-pin the channel again and force the honest user to pay
> another anyprevout bounty to miners.
This is also true with package-relay where your counterparty, with a better
knowledge of network mempools, can always re-broadcast a CPFP-bumped
malicious package ? Under this assumption, I think you should always be
ready to bump our honest package.
Further, for the clarity of the discussion, can you point to which pinning
scenario you're thinking of or if it's new under SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT,
describe it ?
> Repeat this a bunch of times and the honest user has now spent more on
fees than their balance from the
closed channel.
And sadly, as this concern also exists in case of a miner-harvesting attack
against LN nodes, a concern that Gleb and I expressed more than a year ago
in a public post [1], a good L2 client should always upper bound its
fee-bumping reserve. I've a short though-unclear note on this notion of
fee-bumping upper to warn other L2 engineers in "On Mempool Funny Games
against Multi-Party Funded Transactions"
Please read so:
"A L2 client, with only a view of its mempool at best, won't understand why
the transaction doesn't confirm and if it's responsible for the
fee-bumping, it might do multiple rounds of feerate increase through CPFP,
in vain. As the fee-bumping algorithm is assumed to be known if the victim
client is open source code, the attacker can predict when the fee-bumping
logic reaches its upper bound."
Though thanks for the recall! I should log dynamic-balances in RL's
`ChannelMonitorUpdate` for our ongoing implementation of anchor, updating
my TODO :p
> Even if my analysis above is wrong, I would encourage you or Matt or
someone to write up this anyprevout idea in more detail and distribute
it before you promote it much more.
That's a really fair point, as a lot of the reasoning was based on private
discussion with Matt. Though as SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT isn't advocated for
community consensus and those things take time, should just take a few
hours of my time.
> Even if every protocol based on presigned transactions can magically
allow dynamically adding inputs and modifying outputs for fees, and we
also have a magic perfect transaction replacement protocol,
"“Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”
Arthur C. Clarke
Wit apart, that might be the outcome with careful bitcoin protocol
development, where technical issues are laid out in a best effort (of
mine!) and spread to the Bitcoin community on the most public bitcoin
communication channel ?
And humbly, on all those L2 issues I did change my opinion, as I've written
so much explicitly in this thread post by pointing to an older post of mine
("Advances in Bitcoin Contracting : Uniform Policy and Package Relay").
This reversal, partially motivated by a lot of discussion with folks,
including yourself, initiated since at least mid last year.
> package relay is still fundamentally useful for CPFP fee bumping very low
> feerate transactions received from an external party. E.g. Alice pays
> Bob, mempool min feerates increase and Alice's transaction is dropped,
> Bob still wants the money, so he submits a package with Alice's
> transaction plus his own high feerate spend of it.
I think this point would be a reverse of our p2p design where we are now
making the sender responsible for the receiver quality of its mempool
feerate ? This question has never been clear up during the years-long
discussion of package-relay design [1].
Though referring to the thread post and last week's transaction-relay
workshop, I did point out that package-relay might serve in the long-term
as a mempool-sync mechanism to prevent potential malicious mempool
partitions [2].
> Package relay is a clear improvement now, and one I expect to be
permanent for as long as we're using anything like the current protocol
Again, reading my post, I did point out that we might keep the "lower half"
of package-relay and deprecate only the higher part of it as we have more
feerate-efficient fee-bumping primitive available. If it sounds too much
of a release engineering effort to synchronize on the scale of an
ecosystem, think about the ongoing deprecation of Tor V2.
Further, you did express a far less assertive opinion during last Tuesday
transaction-relay workshops, to which a lot of folks attended, where you
pointed it might not be a good idea for L2s to make more assumptions on
non-normative:
"harding> I do think we should be using miners profit incentive more for
stuff rather than trying to normalize mempool policy (which not entirely
possible), e.g. things like
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-April/002664.html
"
Arguing for package-relay "permanence" moves in the contrary decision IMHO ?
> I don't think it's appropriate to be creating timelines like this that
depend on the work of a large number of contributors who I don't believe
Thanks Dave, this is your opinion and I respect this. I'll let any
participant of this mailing list make an opinion on its own, following
their private judgement. It might be based from a lot of different factors,
e.g "trusting the experts" or gathering diverse in-field authorities'
opinions or reasoning from scratch based on raw, public facts.
Though might I ask you on which information sources are you finding your
belief ? I'm curious if you're aware of any contributors who feel entitled
to be consulted in a decentralized development process...
For the records, I did consult no one. As even in the technical circle that
would have been a lot of open source projects teams to reach out : LND,
c-ligtning, Eclair, coin-teleport, revault, sapio, btcsuite, bcoin,
libbitcoin, wasabi's coinjoin, samourai wallet's coinjoin, ...
I was lazy, I just shot a mail :p
W.r.t to Greg's 4-year old's piece, I'll let him express his opinion on how
the expressed framework applies to my post, the Bitcoin dev stage has grown
a lot since then. What was making sense when you had like ~20 Bitcoin dev
with 90% of the technical knowledge doesn't scale when you have multiple
second-layers specifications of which you have multiple implementations
teams, some of them decentralized and spread through different
countries/timezones, IMHO.
Though, Dave if you strongly hold your opinion on my behavior, I would
invite you to do this intellectual work by yourself.
Browsing quickly through Greg's piece, a lot of the reasoning is based on
FOSS experience from Linux/Juniper, which to the best of my knowledge are
centralized software projects ?
Note, also Paul Storzc's post has the simple phrase :
"I emphasized concrete numbers, and concrete dates"
I believe my post doesn't have such numbers and concrete dates ?
Presence of Core version numbers are motivated as clear signalling for L2
developpers to update their backend in case of undocumented, subtle policy
changes slipping in the codebase. Let's minimize CVE-2020-26895
style-of-bugs across the ecosystem :/
Finally, the presence of timelines in this post is also a gentle call for
the Bitcoin ecosystem to act on those safety holes, of which the
seriousness has been underscored by a lot of contributors in the past,
especially for the pre-signed feerate problem and even before I was in the
Bitcoin stage.
So better to patch them before they do manifest in the wild, and folks
start to bleed coins. What you learn from practicing security research,
the lack of action can be harmful :/
> Stuff will get done when it gets done.
Don't forget bugs might slip in but that's fine if you have the skilled
folks around to catch them :)
And yes I really care about Lightning, and all those cute new L2 protocols
fostering in the community :)
Finally, you know Dave, I'm just spreading ideas.
If those ideas are sound and folks love them, awesome! They're free to use,
study, share and modify them to build better systems.
If I'm wrong, like I've been in the past, like I might be today and like
I'll be in the future, I hope they will be patient to teach me back and
we'll learn.
Hacker ethos :) ?
Cheers,
Antoine
[0]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-January/002448.html
[1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/14895
[2]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-February/002569.html
Le sam. 19 juin 2021 à 09:38, David A. Harding <dave at dtrt.org> a écrit :
> On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 06:11:38PM -0400, Antoine Riard wrote:
> > 2) Solving the Pre-Signed Feerate problem : Package-Relay or
> > SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT
> >
> > For Lightning, either package-relay or SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT should be able
> to
> > solve the pre-signed feerate issue [3]
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > [3] I don't think there is a clear discussion on how SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT
> > solves pinnings beyond those LN meetings logs:
> > https://gnusha.org/lightning-dev/2020-06-08.log
>
> For anyone else looking, the most relevant line seems to be:
>
> 13:50 < BlueMatt> (sidenote: sighash_no_input is *really* elegant here
> - assuming a lot of complicated logic in core to do so, you could
> imagine blind-cpfp-bumping *any* commitment tx without knowing its
> there or which one it is all with one tx.......in theory)
>
> That might work for current LN-penalty, but I'm not sure it works for
> eltoo. If Bitcoin Core can rewrite the blind CPFP fee bump transaction
> to refer to any prevout, that implies anyone else can do the same.
> Miners who were aware of two or more states from an eltoo channel would
> be incentivized to rewrite to the oldest state, giving them fee revenue
> now and ensuring fee revenue in the future when a later state update is
> broadcast.
>
> If the attacker using pinning is able to reuse their attack at no cost,
> they can re-pin the channel again and force the honest user to pay
> another anyprevout bounty to miners. Repeat this a bunch of times and
> the honest user has now spent more on fees than their balance from the
> closed channel.
>
> Even if my analysis above is wrong, I would encourage you or Matt or
> someone to write up this anyprevout idea in more detail and distribute
> it before you promote it much more.
>
> > package-relay sounds a reasonable, temporary "patch".
>
> Even if every protocol based on presigned transactions can magically
> allow dynamically adding inputs and modifying outputs for fees, and we
> also have a magic perfect transaction replacement protocol, package
> relay is still fundamentally useful for CPFP fee bumping very low
> feerate transactions received from an external party. E.g. Alice pays
> Bob, mempool min feerates increase and Alice's transaction is dropped,
> Bob still wants the money, so he submits a package with Alice's
> transaction plus his own high feerate spend of it.
>
> Package relay is a clear improvement now, and one I expect to be
> permanent for as long as we're using anything like the current protocol.
>
> > # Deployment timeline
> >
> > So what I believe as a rough deployment timeline.
>
> I don't think it's appropriate to be creating timelines like this that
> depend on the work of a large number of contributors who I don't believe
> you've consulted. For details on this point of view, please see
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-July/014726.html
>
> Stuff will get done when it gets done.
>
> -Dave
>
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📝 Original message:
Hi Dave,
> That might work for current LN-penalty, but I'm not sure it works for
eltoo.
Well, we have not settled yet on the eltoo design but if we take the later
proposal in date [0], signing the update transaction with
SIGHGASH_ANYPREVOUT lets you attach non-interactively a single-party
controlled input at broadcast-time. Providing the input amount is high
enough to bump the transaction feerate over network mempools, it should
allow the tx to propagate across network mempools and that way solve the
pre-signed feerate problem as defined in the post ?
> If Bitcoin Core can rewrite the blind CPFP fee bump transaction
> to refer to any prevout, that implies anyone else can do the same.
> Miners who were aware of two or more states from an eltoo channel would
> be incentivized to rewrite to the oldest state, giving them fee revenue
> now and ensuring fee revenue in the future when a later state update is
> broadcast.
Yep, you can add a per-participant key to lockdown the transaction and
avoid any in-flight malleability ? I think this is discussed in the "A
Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques" thread.
> If the attacker using pinning is able to reuse their attack at no cost,
> they can re-pin the channel again and force the honest user to pay
> another anyprevout bounty to miners.
This is also true with package-relay where your counterparty, with a better
knowledge of network mempools, can always re-broadcast a CPFP-bumped
malicious package ? Under this assumption, I think you should always be
ready to bump our honest package.
Further, for the clarity of the discussion, can you point to which pinning
scenario you're thinking of or if it's new under SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT,
describe it ?
> Repeat this a bunch of times and the honest user has now spent more on
fees than their balance from the
closed channel.
And sadly, as this concern also exists in case of a miner-harvesting attack
against LN nodes, a concern that Gleb and I expressed more than a year ago
in a public post [1], a good L2 client should always upper bound its
fee-bumping reserve. I've a short though-unclear note on this notion of
fee-bumping upper to warn other L2 engineers in "On Mempool Funny Games
against Multi-Party Funded Transactions"
Please read so:
"A L2 client, with only a view of its mempool at best, won't understand why
the transaction doesn't confirm and if it's responsible for the
fee-bumping, it might do multiple rounds of feerate increase through CPFP,
in vain. As the fee-bumping algorithm is assumed to be known if the victim
client is open source code, the attacker can predict when the fee-bumping
logic reaches its upper bound."
Though thanks for the recall! I should log dynamic-balances in RL's
`ChannelMonitorUpdate` for our ongoing implementation of anchor, updating
my TODO :p
> Even if my analysis above is wrong, I would encourage you or Matt or
someone to write up this anyprevout idea in more detail and distribute
it before you promote it much more.
That's a really fair point, as a lot of the reasoning was based on private
discussion with Matt. Though as SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT isn't advocated for
community consensus and those things take time, should just take a few
hours of my time.
> Even if every protocol based on presigned transactions can magically
allow dynamically adding inputs and modifying outputs for fees, and we
also have a magic perfect transaction replacement protocol,
"“Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”
Arthur C. Clarke
Wit apart, that might be the outcome with careful bitcoin protocol
development, where technical issues are laid out in a best effort (of
mine!) and spread to the Bitcoin community on the most public bitcoin
communication channel ?
And humbly, on all those L2 issues I did change my opinion, as I've written
so much explicitly in this thread post by pointing to an older post of mine
("Advances in Bitcoin Contracting : Uniform Policy and Package Relay").
This reversal, partially motivated by a lot of discussion with folks,
including yourself, initiated since at least mid last year.
> package relay is still fundamentally useful for CPFP fee bumping very low
> feerate transactions received from an external party. E.g. Alice pays
> Bob, mempool min feerates increase and Alice's transaction is dropped,
> Bob still wants the money, so he submits a package with Alice's
> transaction plus his own high feerate spend of it.
I think this point would be a reverse of our p2p design where we are now
making the sender responsible for the receiver quality of its mempool
feerate ? This question has never been clear up during the years-long
discussion of package-relay design [1].
Though referring to the thread post and last week's transaction-relay
workshop, I did point out that package-relay might serve in the long-term
as a mempool-sync mechanism to prevent potential malicious mempool
partitions [2].
> Package relay is a clear improvement now, and one I expect to be
permanent for as long as we're using anything like the current protocol
Again, reading my post, I did point out that we might keep the "lower half"
of package-relay and deprecate only the higher part of it as we have more
feerate-efficient fee-bumping primitive available. If it sounds too much
of a release engineering effort to synchronize on the scale of an
ecosystem, think about the ongoing deprecation of Tor V2.
Further, you did express a far less assertive opinion during last Tuesday
transaction-relay workshops, to which a lot of folks attended, where you
pointed it might not be a good idea for L2s to make more assumptions on
non-normative:
"harding> I do think we should be using miners profit incentive more for
stuff rather than trying to normalize mempool policy (which not entirely
possible), e.g. things like
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-April/002664.html
"
Arguing for package-relay "permanence" moves in the contrary decision IMHO ?
> I don't think it's appropriate to be creating timelines like this that
depend on the work of a large number of contributors who I don't believe
Thanks Dave, this is your opinion and I respect this. I'll let any
participant of this mailing list make an opinion on its own, following
their private judgement. It might be based from a lot of different factors,
e.g "trusting the experts" or gathering diverse in-field authorities'
opinions or reasoning from scratch based on raw, public facts.
Though might I ask you on which information sources are you finding your
belief ? I'm curious if you're aware of any contributors who feel entitled
to be consulted in a decentralized development process...
For the records, I did consult no one. As even in the technical circle that
would have been a lot of open source projects teams to reach out : LND,
c-ligtning, Eclair, coin-teleport, revault, sapio, btcsuite, bcoin,
libbitcoin, wasabi's coinjoin, samourai wallet's coinjoin, ...
I was lazy, I just shot a mail :p
W.r.t to Greg's 4-year old's piece, I'll let him express his opinion on how
the expressed framework applies to my post, the Bitcoin dev stage has grown
a lot since then. What was making sense when you had like ~20 Bitcoin dev
with 90% of the technical knowledge doesn't scale when you have multiple
second-layers specifications of which you have multiple implementations
teams, some of them decentralized and spread through different
countries/timezones, IMHO.
Though, Dave if you strongly hold your opinion on my behavior, I would
invite you to do this intellectual work by yourself.
Browsing quickly through Greg's piece, a lot of the reasoning is based on
FOSS experience from Linux/Juniper, which to the best of my knowledge are
centralized software projects ?
Note, also Paul Storzc's post has the simple phrase :
"I emphasized concrete numbers, and concrete dates"
I believe my post doesn't have such numbers and concrete dates ?
Presence of Core version numbers are motivated as clear signalling for L2
developpers to update their backend in case of undocumented, subtle policy
changes slipping in the codebase. Let's minimize CVE-2020-26895
style-of-bugs across the ecosystem :/
Finally, the presence of timelines in this post is also a gentle call for
the Bitcoin ecosystem to act on those safety holes, of which the
seriousness has been underscored by a lot of contributors in the past,
especially for the pre-signed feerate problem and even before I was in the
Bitcoin stage.
So better to patch them before they do manifest in the wild, and folks
start to bleed coins. What you learn from practicing security research,
the lack of action can be harmful :/
> Stuff will get done when it gets done.
Don't forget bugs might slip in but that's fine if you have the skilled
folks around to catch them :)
And yes I really care about Lightning, and all those cute new L2 protocols
fostering in the community :)
Finally, you know Dave, I'm just spreading ideas.
If those ideas are sound and folks love them, awesome! They're free to use,
study, share and modify them to build better systems.
If I'm wrong, like I've been in the past, like I might be today and like
I'll be in the future, I hope they will be patient to teach me back and
we'll learn.
Hacker ethos :) ?
Cheers,
Antoine
[0]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-January/002448.html
[1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/14895
[2]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-February/002569.html
Le sam. 19 juin 2021 à 09:38, David A. Harding <dave at dtrt.org> a écrit :
> On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 06:11:38PM -0400, Antoine Riard wrote:
> > 2) Solving the Pre-Signed Feerate problem : Package-Relay or
> > SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT
> >
> > For Lightning, either package-relay or SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT should be able
> to
> > solve the pre-signed feerate issue [3]
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > [3] I don't think there is a clear discussion on how SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT
> > solves pinnings beyond those LN meetings logs:
> > https://gnusha.org/lightning-dev/2020-06-08.log
>
> For anyone else looking, the most relevant line seems to be:
>
> 13:50 < BlueMatt> (sidenote: sighash_no_input is *really* elegant here
> - assuming a lot of complicated logic in core to do so, you could
> imagine blind-cpfp-bumping *any* commitment tx without knowing its
> there or which one it is all with one tx.......in theory)
>
> That might work for current LN-penalty, but I'm not sure it works for
> eltoo. If Bitcoin Core can rewrite the blind CPFP fee bump transaction
> to refer to any prevout, that implies anyone else can do the same.
> Miners who were aware of two or more states from an eltoo channel would
> be incentivized to rewrite to the oldest state, giving them fee revenue
> now and ensuring fee revenue in the future when a later state update is
> broadcast.
>
> If the attacker using pinning is able to reuse their attack at no cost,
> they can re-pin the channel again and force the honest user to pay
> another anyprevout bounty to miners. Repeat this a bunch of times and
> the honest user has now spent more on fees than their balance from the
> closed channel.
>
> Even if my analysis above is wrong, I would encourage you or Matt or
> someone to write up this anyprevout idea in more detail and distribute
> it before you promote it much more.
>
> > package-relay sounds a reasonable, temporary "patch".
>
> Even if every protocol based on presigned transactions can magically
> allow dynamically adding inputs and modifying outputs for fees, and we
> also have a magic perfect transaction replacement protocol, package
> relay is still fundamentally useful for CPFP fee bumping very low
> feerate transactions received from an external party. E.g. Alice pays
> Bob, mempool min feerates increase and Alice's transaction is dropped,
> Bob still wants the money, so he submits a package with Alice's
> transaction plus his own high feerate spend of it.
>
> Package relay is a clear improvement now, and one I expect to be
> permanent for as long as we're using anything like the current protocol.
>
> > # Deployment timeline
> >
> > So what I believe as a rough deployment timeline.
>
> I don't think it's appropriate to be creating timelines like this that
> depend on the work of a large number of contributors who I don't believe
> you've consulted. For details on this point of view, please see
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-July/014726.html
>
> Stuff will get done when it gets done.
>
> -Dave
>
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