Gavin Andresen [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-07-21 📝 Original message:On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at ...

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-21
📝 Original message:On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 7:10 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Mitigate a potential CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attack by limiting
> > the maximum size of a transaction included in a block.
>
> This seems like a fairly indirect approach. The resource being watched
> for is not the size (otherwise two transactions for 200k would be
> strictly worse than one 200k transactions) but the potential of N^2
> costs related to repeated hashing in checksig; which this ignores.
>

Yes. The tradeoff is implementation complexity: it is trivial to check
transaction size,
not as trivial to count signature operations, because
number-of-bytes-in-transaction
doesn't require any context.

But I would REALLY hate myself if in ten years a future version of me was
struggling to
get consensus to move away from some stupid 100,000 byte transaction size
limit
I imposed to mitigate a potential DoS attack.

So I agree, a limit on sigops is the right way to go. And if that is being
changed,
might as well accurately count exactly how many sigops a transaction
actually
requires to be validated...

--
--
Gavin Andresen
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