MachuPikacchu on Nostr: What can game theory teach us in this new world of decentralized networks? It pays to ...
What can game theory teach us in this new world of decentralized networks? It pays to cooperate [1].
According to Robert Axelrod [2] for players in an iterative prisoner's dilemma game [3] the following qualities are required for success: being nice, forgiving, retaliatory, and transparent.
In the context of a game: don't strike first. If your opponent strikes, then don't hold a grudge. Don't be a pushover though. And to some extent be open about your strategy or else others have to treat you as random and can't cooperate.
According to simulations a tit-for-tat approach (one where you cooperate by default and retaliate a single time for each time the others take action against you) is optimal in most cases but not all. For example, tit-for-tat loses miserably if everyone else is being nasty.
However, the interesting thing is that if you have a few participants cooperating tit-for-tat with each other they tend to outcompete all the nasties.
I think this is especially relevant for places like Nostr where webs of trust are being established. Webs of cooperation are more likely to produce economic prosperity, and to a greater extent, than random or adversarial interactions (like what you'd see on traditional social media).
"But Nostr isn't a game! There's no give and take here." Except there is! Zaps are monetary points in an economic game. Contributing to others' development efforts rather than deriding or sabotaging produces a better environment for everyone.
Consider "X" where whining, ridiculing, or saying things for shock value gets your content promoted and user timelines end up filled with ragebait. It takes a toll on morale and creates an adversarial environment where the community at large loses.
On Nostr, where users have control over their timelines, quality interactions get surfaced and builders can build.
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mScpHTIi-kM
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Axelrod_(political_scientist)
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma#The_iterated_prisoner's_dilemma
According to Robert Axelrod [2] for players in an iterative prisoner's dilemma game [3] the following qualities are required for success: being nice, forgiving, retaliatory, and transparent.
In the context of a game: don't strike first. If your opponent strikes, then don't hold a grudge. Don't be a pushover though. And to some extent be open about your strategy or else others have to treat you as random and can't cooperate.
According to simulations a tit-for-tat approach (one where you cooperate by default and retaliate a single time for each time the others take action against you) is optimal in most cases but not all. For example, tit-for-tat loses miserably if everyone else is being nasty.
However, the interesting thing is that if you have a few participants cooperating tit-for-tat with each other they tend to outcompete all the nasties.
I think this is especially relevant for places like Nostr where webs of trust are being established. Webs of cooperation are more likely to produce economic prosperity, and to a greater extent, than random or adversarial interactions (like what you'd see on traditional social media).
"But Nostr isn't a game! There's no give and take here." Except there is! Zaps are monetary points in an economic game. Contributing to others' development efforts rather than deriding or sabotaging produces a better environment for everyone.
Consider "X" where whining, ridiculing, or saying things for shock value gets your content promoted and user timelines end up filled with ragebait. It takes a toll on morale and creates an adversarial environment where the community at large loses.
On Nostr, where users have control over their timelines, quality interactions get surfaced and builders can build.
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mScpHTIi-kM
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Axelrod_(political_scientist)
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma#The_iterated_prisoner's_dilemma