Caleb James DeLisle [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2013-05-15 📝 Original message:I can't see this working, ...
📅 Original date posted:2013-05-15
📝 Original message:I can't see this working, if 51% of the mining power doesn't like your
coins, when you create the commitment they will reject it.
If the commitment is opaque at the time of inclusion in the block then
I will create multiple commitments and then after revealing the
commitment and spend to you I will reveal the earlier commitment which
commits the coins to an address I control.
On the topic of reversibility, I suspect in the long term the lack of
chargebacks will create issues as criminals learn that for the first
time in history, kidnap & ransom is effective. Suffice to say after the
first >= $10mn kidnapping-for-bitcoin heist, governments will be forced
to decide how they view the system. It will likely fall somewhere between
"arrest/question anyone identified holding tainted coins" to something
nonsensical and reactionary like "blocking" bitcoin as Iran does TOR.
Thanks,
Caleb
On 05/15/2013 07:49 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 07:19:06AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
>> Protocols aren't set in stone - any attacker that controls enough
>> hashing power to pose a 51% attack can simply demand that you use a
>> Bitcoin client modified [to facilitate evaluation of his policy]
>
> Protocol voting is a vote per user policy preference, not a CPU vote, which
> is the point. Current bitcoin protocol is vulnerable to hard to prove
> arbitrary policies being imposable by a quorum of > 50% miners. The blind
> commitment proposal fixes that, so even an 99% quorum cant easily impose
> policies, which leaves the weaker protocol vote attack as the remaining
> avenue of attack. That is a significant qualitative improvement.
>
> The feasibility of protocol voting attacks is an open question, but you
> might want to consider the seeming unstoppability of p2p protocols for a
> hint.
>
> Adam
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> AlienVault Unified Security Management (USM) platform delivers complete
> security visibility with the essential security capabilities. Easily and
> efficiently configure, manage, and operate all of your security controls
> from a single console and one unified framework. Download a free trial.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/alienvault_d2d
> _______________________________________________
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📝 Original message:I can't see this working, if 51% of the mining power doesn't like your
coins, when you create the commitment they will reject it.
If the commitment is opaque at the time of inclusion in the block then
I will create multiple commitments and then after revealing the
commitment and spend to you I will reveal the earlier commitment which
commits the coins to an address I control.
On the topic of reversibility, I suspect in the long term the lack of
chargebacks will create issues as criminals learn that for the first
time in history, kidnap & ransom is effective. Suffice to say after the
first >= $10mn kidnapping-for-bitcoin heist, governments will be forced
to decide how they view the system. It will likely fall somewhere between
"arrest/question anyone identified holding tainted coins" to something
nonsensical and reactionary like "blocking" bitcoin as Iran does TOR.
Thanks,
Caleb
On 05/15/2013 07:49 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 07:19:06AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
>> Protocols aren't set in stone - any attacker that controls enough
>> hashing power to pose a 51% attack can simply demand that you use a
>> Bitcoin client modified [to facilitate evaluation of his policy]
>
> Protocol voting is a vote per user policy preference, not a CPU vote, which
> is the point. Current bitcoin protocol is vulnerable to hard to prove
> arbitrary policies being imposable by a quorum of > 50% miners. The blind
> commitment proposal fixes that, so even an 99% quorum cant easily impose
> policies, which leaves the weaker protocol vote attack as the remaining
> avenue of attack. That is a significant qualitative improvement.
>
> The feasibility of protocol voting attacks is an open question, but you
> might want to consider the seeming unstoppability of p2p protocols for a
> hint.
>
> Adam
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> AlienVault Unified Security Management (USM) platform delivers complete
> security visibility with the essential security capabilities. Easily and
> efficiently configure, manage, and operate all of your security controls
> from a single console and one unified framework. Download a free trial.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/alienvault_d2d
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>