Pieter Wuille [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2013-11-04 📝 Original message:On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2013-11-04
📝 Original message:On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> The correct, and rational, approach for a miner is to always mine to
> extend the block that the majority of hashing power is trying to extend.
> The current relay rules don't give you that information at all, but they
> can if we do two things:
>
> 1) Relay all blocks that meet the PoW target. (as suggested in the
> paper)
>
> 2) Relay block headers that nearly meet the PoW target.
>
> Mining strategy is now to mine to extend the first block you see, on the
> assumption that the earlier one probably propagated to a large portion
> of the total hashing power. But as you receive "near-blocks" that are
> under the PoW target, use them to estimate the hashing power on each
> fork, and if it looks like you are not on the majority side, switch.
Doesn't that mean that by selective blocking these near-PoW headers,
you can bias peers into preferring to mine on those with near-PoW
headers, turning the attack around? Of course, because of their size,
headers are likely much harder to slow down (in propagation speed)
than full blocks...
--
Pieter
📝 Original message:On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> The correct, and rational, approach for a miner is to always mine to
> extend the block that the majority of hashing power is trying to extend.
> The current relay rules don't give you that information at all, but they
> can if we do two things:
>
> 1) Relay all blocks that meet the PoW target. (as suggested in the
> paper)
>
> 2) Relay block headers that nearly meet the PoW target.
>
> Mining strategy is now to mine to extend the first block you see, on the
> assumption that the earlier one probably propagated to a large portion
> of the total hashing power. But as you receive "near-blocks" that are
> under the PoW target, use them to estimate the hashing power on each
> fork, and if it looks like you are not on the majority side, switch.
Doesn't that mean that by selective blocking these near-PoW headers,
you can bias peers into preferring to mine on those with near-PoW
headers, turning the attack around? Of course, because of their size,
headers are likely much harder to slow down (in propagation speed)
than full blocks...
--
Pieter