Jeff Garzik [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: š Original date posted:2015-12-16 š Original message:Maybe a new analogy helps. ...
š
Original date posted:2015-12-16
š Original message:Maybe a new analogy helps.
SW presents a blended price and blended basket of two goods. You can
interact with the Service through the blended price, but that does not
erase the fact that the basket contains two separate from similar resources.
A different set of economic actors uses one resource, and/or both. There
are explicit incentives to shift actors from solely using one resource to
using both.
The fact that separate sets of economic actors and incentives exist is
sufficient to prove it is indeed a basket of goods, not a single good.
On Wed, Dec 16, 2015 at 4:36 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille at gmail.com>
wrote:
> Thus, the miners' best strategy is to accept the witness transactions,
> as it allows 1000000/110=9090 transactions rather than
> 1000000/200=5000.
>
Under your blended algorithm, this seems reasonable as a first pass.
> In fact, the optimal fee maximizing strategy is always to maximize fee
> per virtual size.
>
This is a microscopic, not macroscopic analysis. Externalities and long
term incentives can severely perturb or invalidate that line of thinking.
Typical counter-example: Many miners are perfectly happy with very low
fees to encourage long term growth of their bitcoin income through network
effect growth -- rendering fee micro-optimizations largely in the realm of
DoS prevention rather than miner incentive.
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š Original message:Maybe a new analogy helps.
SW presents a blended price and blended basket of two goods. You can
interact with the Service through the blended price, but that does not
erase the fact that the basket contains two separate from similar resources.
A different set of economic actors uses one resource, and/or both. There
are explicit incentives to shift actors from solely using one resource to
using both.
The fact that separate sets of economic actors and incentives exist is
sufficient to prove it is indeed a basket of goods, not a single good.
On Wed, Dec 16, 2015 at 4:36 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille at gmail.com>
wrote:
> Thus, the miners' best strategy is to accept the witness transactions,
> as it allows 1000000/110=9090 transactions rather than
> 1000000/200=5000.
>
Under your blended algorithm, this seems reasonable as a first pass.
> In fact, the optimal fee maximizing strategy is always to maximize fee
> per virtual size.
>
This is a microscopic, not macroscopic analysis. Externalities and long
term incentives can severely perturb or invalidate that line of thinking.
Typical counter-example: Many miners are perfectly happy with very low
fees to encourage long term growth of their bitcoin income through network
effect growth -- rendering fee micro-optimizations largely in the realm of
DoS prevention rather than miner incentive.
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