Anthony Towns [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2019-03-12 📝 Original message: Hi all, The following has ...
📅 Original date posted:2019-03-12
📝 Original message:
Hi all,
The following has some more thoughts on trying to make a NOINPUT
implementation as safe as possible for the Bitcoin ecosystem.
One interesting property of NOINPUT usage like in eltoo is that it
actually reintroduces the possibility of third-party malleability to
transactions -- ie, you publish transactions to the blockchain (tx A,
which is spent by tx B, which is spent by tx C), and someone can come
along and change A or B so that C is no longer valid). The way this works
is due to eltoo's use of NOINPUT to "skip intermediate states". If you
publish to the blockchain:
funding tx -> state 3 -> state 4[NOINPUT] -> state 5[NOINPUT] -> finish
then in the event of a reorg, state 4 could be dropped, state 5's
inputs adjusted to refer to state 3 instead (the sig remains valid
due to NOINPUT, so this can be done by anyone not just holders of some
private key), and finish would no longer be a valid tx (because the new
"state 5" tx has different inputs so a different txid, and finish uses
SIGHASH_ALL for the signature so committed to state 5's original txid).
There is a safety measure here though: if the "finish" transaction is
itself a NOINPUT tx, and has a a CSV delay (this is the case in eltoo;
the CSV delay is there to give time for a hypothetical state 6 to be
published), then the only way to have a problem is for some SIGHASH_ALL tx
that spends finish, and a reorg deeper than the CSV delay (so that state
4 can be dropped, state 5 and finish can be altered). Since the CSV delay
is chosen by the participants, the above is still a possible scenario
in eltoo, though, and it means there's some risk for someone accepting
bitcoins that result from a non-cooperative close of an eltoo channel.
Beyond that, I think NOINPUT has two fundamental ways to cause problems
for the people doing NOINPUT sigs:
1) your signature gets applied to a unexpectedly different
script, perhaps making it look like you've being dealing
with some blacklisted entity. OP_MASK and similar solves
this.
2) your signature is applied to some transaction and works
perfectly; but then someone else sends money to the same address
and reuses your prior signature to forward it on to the same
destination, without your consent
I still like OP_MASK as a solution to (1), but I can't convince myself that
the problem it solves is particularly realistic; it doesn't apply to
address blacklists, because for OP_MASK to make the signature invalid
the address has to be different, and you could just short circuit the
whole thing by sending money from a blacklisted address to the target's
personal address directly. Further, if the sig's been seen on chain
before, that's probably good evidence that someone's messing with you;
and if it hasn't been seen on chain before, how is anyone going to tell
it's your sig to blame you for it?
I still wonder if there isn't a real problem hiding somewhere here,
but if so, I'm not seeing it.
For the second case, that seems a little more concerning. The nightmare
scenario is maybe something like:
* naive users do silly things with NOINPUT signatures, and end up
losing funds due to replays like the above
* initial source of funds was some major exchange, who decide it's
cheaper to refund the lost funds than deal with the customer complaints
* the lost funds end up costing enough that major exchanges just outright
ban sending funds to any address capable of NOINPUT, which also bans
all taproot/schnorr addresses
That's not super likely to happen by chance: NOINPUT sigs will commit
to the value being spent, so to lose money, you (Alice) have to have
done a NOINPUT sig spending a coin sent to your address X, to someone
(Bob) and then have to have a coin with the exact same value sent from
someone else again (Carol) to your address X (or if you did a script
path NOINPUT spend, to some related address Y with a script that uses the same
key). But because it involves losing money to others, bad actors might
trick people into having it happen more often than chance (or well
written software) would normally allow.
That "nightmare" could be stopped at either the first step or the
last step:
* if we "tag" addresses that can be spent via NOINPUT then having an
exchange ban those addresses doesn't also impact regular
taproot/schnorr addresses, though it does mean you can tell when
someone is using a protocol like eltoo that might need to make use
of NOINPUT signatures. This way exchanges and wallets could simply
not provide NOINPUT capable addresses in the first place normally,
and issue very large warnings when asked to send money to one. That's
not a problem for eltoo, because all the NOINPUT-capable address eltoo
needs are internal parts of the protocol, and are spent automatically.
* or we could make it so NOINPUT signatures aren't replayable on
different transactions, at least by third parties. one way of doing
this might be to require NOINPUT signatures always be accompanied by a
non-NOINPUT signature (presumably for a different public key, or there
would be no point). This would prevent NOINPUT key-path spends, you'd
always have to use the taproot script-path for a NOINPUT signature so
that you could specify both public keys, and would also increase the
witness size due to needing two signatures and specifying an additional
public key -- this would increase the cost in fees by about 25% compared
to a plain key-path spend.
Conversely, this "nightmare" scenario *can't* be stopped if we allow
key-path spending of (untagged) taproot addresses with NOINPUT signatures:
exchanges could not distinguish such addresses from regular addresses, and
the only way to prevent the signature from applying to two tx's with the
same value and address would be for the sig to commit to info from the tx.
It seems like there's one big choice then:
- just ignore this concern
- drop NOINPUT from normal taproot key path spending
If we drop NOINPUT from taproot key path spending, then we can do NOINPUT
as a logically separate upgrade to taproot, rather than it needing to
be done at the same time. There's two ways we could do proceed:
- introduce a new NOINPUT-capable scriptPubKey format (ie, "tag"
NOINPUT spendable addresses); either a different length segwit v1
output, or a different segwit version entirely. Using version "16" in
this scenario might be appealing: we could reserve all v16 addresses
for "not intended to be used by humans directly" and update BIP 173
to say these aren't even something you should use bech32 to represent.
- alternatively, we could require every script to have a valid signature
that commits to the input. In that case, you could do eltoo with a
script like either:
<A> CHECKSIGVERIFY <B> CHECKSIG
or <P> CHECKSIGVERIFY <Q> CHECKSIG
where A is Alice's key and B is Bob's key, P is muSig(A,B) and Q is
a key they both know the private key for. In the first case, Alice
would give Bob a NOINPUT sig for the tx, and when Bob wanted to publish
Bob would just do a SIGHASH_ALL sig with his own key. In the second,
Alice and Bob would share partial NOINPUT sigs of the tx with P, and
finish that when they wanted to publish.
This is a bit more costly than a key path spend: you have to reveal
the taproot point to do a script (+33B) and you have two signatures
instead of one (+65B) and you have to reveal two keys as well
(+66B), plus some script overhead. If we did the <P,Q> variant,
we could provide a "PUSH_TAPROOT_KEY" opcode that would just push
the taproot key to stack, saving 33B from pushing P as a literal,
but you can't do much better than that. All in all, it'd be about 25%
overhead in order to prevent cheating. [0]
I think that output tagging doesn't provide a workable defense against the
third party malleability via a deeper-than-the-CSV-delay reorg mentioned
earlier; but requiring a non-NOINPUT sig does: you'd have to replace
the non-NOINPUT sig to make state 5 spend state 3 instead of state 4,
and only the holders of the appropriate private key can do that.
In any event, if we get some experience with NOINPUT in practice, we can
reconsider whether NOINPUT key path spends are a good idea when we do
the next segwit version -- both cross-input signature aggregation and
graftroot will need an upgrade anyway.
(Also, note that, at least for eltoo, all of the above only applies to
non-cooperative closes: the funding tx's txid is known from the start,
so you can always arrange to spend it via SIGHASH_ALL, so it doesn't
need to be tagged, and a cooperative/mutual close of the channel will
still just be a simple key path spend)
Anyway, presented for your consideration.
FWIW, I don't have a strong opinion here yet, but:
- I'm still inclined to err on the side of putting more safety
measures in for NOINPUT, rather than fewer
- the "must have a sig that commits to the input tx" seems like it
should be pretty safe, not too expensive, and keeps taproot's privacy
benefits in the cases where you end up needing to use NOINPUT
Cheers,
aj
📝 Original message:
Hi all,
The following has some more thoughts on trying to make a NOINPUT
implementation as safe as possible for the Bitcoin ecosystem.
One interesting property of NOINPUT usage like in eltoo is that it
actually reintroduces the possibility of third-party malleability to
transactions -- ie, you publish transactions to the blockchain (tx A,
which is spent by tx B, which is spent by tx C), and someone can come
along and change A or B so that C is no longer valid). The way this works
is due to eltoo's use of NOINPUT to "skip intermediate states". If you
publish to the blockchain:
funding tx -> state 3 -> state 4[NOINPUT] -> state 5[NOINPUT] -> finish
then in the event of a reorg, state 4 could be dropped, state 5's
inputs adjusted to refer to state 3 instead (the sig remains valid
due to NOINPUT, so this can be done by anyone not just holders of some
private key), and finish would no longer be a valid tx (because the new
"state 5" tx has different inputs so a different txid, and finish uses
SIGHASH_ALL for the signature so committed to state 5's original txid).
There is a safety measure here though: if the "finish" transaction is
itself a NOINPUT tx, and has a a CSV delay (this is the case in eltoo;
the CSV delay is there to give time for a hypothetical state 6 to be
published), then the only way to have a problem is for some SIGHASH_ALL tx
that spends finish, and a reorg deeper than the CSV delay (so that state
4 can be dropped, state 5 and finish can be altered). Since the CSV delay
is chosen by the participants, the above is still a possible scenario
in eltoo, though, and it means there's some risk for someone accepting
bitcoins that result from a non-cooperative close of an eltoo channel.
Beyond that, I think NOINPUT has two fundamental ways to cause problems
for the people doing NOINPUT sigs:
1) your signature gets applied to a unexpectedly different
script, perhaps making it look like you've being dealing
with some blacklisted entity. OP_MASK and similar solves
this.
2) your signature is applied to some transaction and works
perfectly; but then someone else sends money to the same address
and reuses your prior signature to forward it on to the same
destination, without your consent
I still like OP_MASK as a solution to (1), but I can't convince myself that
the problem it solves is particularly realistic; it doesn't apply to
address blacklists, because for OP_MASK to make the signature invalid
the address has to be different, and you could just short circuit the
whole thing by sending money from a blacklisted address to the target's
personal address directly. Further, if the sig's been seen on chain
before, that's probably good evidence that someone's messing with you;
and if it hasn't been seen on chain before, how is anyone going to tell
it's your sig to blame you for it?
I still wonder if there isn't a real problem hiding somewhere here,
but if so, I'm not seeing it.
For the second case, that seems a little more concerning. The nightmare
scenario is maybe something like:
* naive users do silly things with NOINPUT signatures, and end up
losing funds due to replays like the above
* initial source of funds was some major exchange, who decide it's
cheaper to refund the lost funds than deal with the customer complaints
* the lost funds end up costing enough that major exchanges just outright
ban sending funds to any address capable of NOINPUT, which also bans
all taproot/schnorr addresses
That's not super likely to happen by chance: NOINPUT sigs will commit
to the value being spent, so to lose money, you (Alice) have to have
done a NOINPUT sig spending a coin sent to your address X, to someone
(Bob) and then have to have a coin with the exact same value sent from
someone else again (Carol) to your address X (or if you did a script
path NOINPUT spend, to some related address Y with a script that uses the same
key). But because it involves losing money to others, bad actors might
trick people into having it happen more often than chance (or well
written software) would normally allow.
That "nightmare" could be stopped at either the first step or the
last step:
* if we "tag" addresses that can be spent via NOINPUT then having an
exchange ban those addresses doesn't also impact regular
taproot/schnorr addresses, though it does mean you can tell when
someone is using a protocol like eltoo that might need to make use
of NOINPUT signatures. This way exchanges and wallets could simply
not provide NOINPUT capable addresses in the first place normally,
and issue very large warnings when asked to send money to one. That's
not a problem for eltoo, because all the NOINPUT-capable address eltoo
needs are internal parts of the protocol, and are spent automatically.
* or we could make it so NOINPUT signatures aren't replayable on
different transactions, at least by third parties. one way of doing
this might be to require NOINPUT signatures always be accompanied by a
non-NOINPUT signature (presumably for a different public key, or there
would be no point). This would prevent NOINPUT key-path spends, you'd
always have to use the taproot script-path for a NOINPUT signature so
that you could specify both public keys, and would also increase the
witness size due to needing two signatures and specifying an additional
public key -- this would increase the cost in fees by about 25% compared
to a plain key-path spend.
Conversely, this "nightmare" scenario *can't* be stopped if we allow
key-path spending of (untagged) taproot addresses with NOINPUT signatures:
exchanges could not distinguish such addresses from regular addresses, and
the only way to prevent the signature from applying to two tx's with the
same value and address would be for the sig to commit to info from the tx.
It seems like there's one big choice then:
- just ignore this concern
- drop NOINPUT from normal taproot key path spending
If we drop NOINPUT from taproot key path spending, then we can do NOINPUT
as a logically separate upgrade to taproot, rather than it needing to
be done at the same time. There's two ways we could do proceed:
- introduce a new NOINPUT-capable scriptPubKey format (ie, "tag"
NOINPUT spendable addresses); either a different length segwit v1
output, or a different segwit version entirely. Using version "16" in
this scenario might be appealing: we could reserve all v16 addresses
for "not intended to be used by humans directly" and update BIP 173
to say these aren't even something you should use bech32 to represent.
- alternatively, we could require every script to have a valid signature
that commits to the input. In that case, you could do eltoo with a
script like either:
<A> CHECKSIGVERIFY <B> CHECKSIG
or <P> CHECKSIGVERIFY <Q> CHECKSIG
where A is Alice's key and B is Bob's key, P is muSig(A,B) and Q is
a key they both know the private key for. In the first case, Alice
would give Bob a NOINPUT sig for the tx, and when Bob wanted to publish
Bob would just do a SIGHASH_ALL sig with his own key. In the second,
Alice and Bob would share partial NOINPUT sigs of the tx with P, and
finish that when they wanted to publish.
This is a bit more costly than a key path spend: you have to reveal
the taproot point to do a script (+33B) and you have two signatures
instead of one (+65B) and you have to reveal two keys as well
(+66B), plus some script overhead. If we did the <P,Q> variant,
we could provide a "PUSH_TAPROOT_KEY" opcode that would just push
the taproot key to stack, saving 33B from pushing P as a literal,
but you can't do much better than that. All in all, it'd be about 25%
overhead in order to prevent cheating. [0]
I think that output tagging doesn't provide a workable defense against the
third party malleability via a deeper-than-the-CSV-delay reorg mentioned
earlier; but requiring a non-NOINPUT sig does: you'd have to replace
the non-NOINPUT sig to make state 5 spend state 3 instead of state 4,
and only the holders of the appropriate private key can do that.
In any event, if we get some experience with NOINPUT in practice, we can
reconsider whether NOINPUT key path spends are a good idea when we do
the next segwit version -- both cross-input signature aggregation and
graftroot will need an upgrade anyway.
(Also, note that, at least for eltoo, all of the above only applies to
non-cooperative closes: the funding tx's txid is known from the start,
so you can always arrange to spend it via SIGHASH_ALL, so it doesn't
need to be tagged, and a cooperative/mutual close of the channel will
still just be a simple key path spend)
Anyway, presented for your consideration.
FWIW, I don't have a strong opinion here yet, but:
- I'm still inclined to err on the side of putting more safety
measures in for NOINPUT, rather than fewer
- the "must have a sig that commits to the input tx" seems like it
should be pretty safe, not too expensive, and keeps taproot's privacy
benefits in the cases where you end up needing to use NOINPUT
Cheers,
aj