Natanael [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2018-02-15 📝 Original message:Den 15 feb. 2018 22:58 ...
📅 Original date posted:2018-02-15
📝 Original message:Den 15 feb. 2018 22:58 skrev "Tim Ruffing via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
Also, the miners will indeed see one valid decommitment. This
decommitment may have been sent by the attacker but it's the preimage
chal of the address, because otherwise it's not valid for the malicious
commitment. But if the decommitment is chal, then this decommitment is
also valid for the commitment of the honest user, which is earliest
additionally. So the honest commitment wins. The attacker does not
succeed and everything is fine.
The reason why this works:
There is only one unique decommitment for the UTXO (assuming H_addr is
collision-resistant). The decommitment does not depend on the
commitment. The attacker cannot send a different decommitment, just
because there is none.
If your argument is that we publish the full transaction minus the public
key and signatures, just committing to it, and then revealing that later
(which means an attacker can't modify the transaction in advance in a way
that produces a valid transaction);
Allowing expiration retains insecurity, while allowing expiration makes it
a trivial DoS target.
Anybody can flood the miners with invalid transaction commitments. No miner
can ever prune invalid commitments until a valid transaction is finalized
which conflicts with the invalid commitments. You can't even rate limit it
safely.
Like I said in the other thread, this is unreasonable. It's much more
practical with simple hash commitment that you can "fold away" in a Merkle
tree hash and which you don't need to validate until the full transaction
is published.
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📝 Original message:Den 15 feb. 2018 22:58 skrev "Tim Ruffing via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
Also, the miners will indeed see one valid decommitment. This
decommitment may have been sent by the attacker but it's the preimage
chal of the address, because otherwise it's not valid for the malicious
commitment. But if the decommitment is chal, then this decommitment is
also valid for the commitment of the honest user, which is earliest
additionally. So the honest commitment wins. The attacker does not
succeed and everything is fine.
The reason why this works:
There is only one unique decommitment for the UTXO (assuming H_addr is
collision-resistant). The decommitment does not depend on the
commitment. The attacker cannot send a different decommitment, just
because there is none.
If your argument is that we publish the full transaction minus the public
key and signatures, just committing to it, and then revealing that later
(which means an attacker can't modify the transaction in advance in a way
that produces a valid transaction);
Allowing expiration retains insecurity, while allowing expiration makes it
a trivial DoS target.
Anybody can flood the miners with invalid transaction commitments. No miner
can ever prune invalid commitments until a valid transaction is finalized
which conflicts with the invalid commitments. You can't even rate limit it
safely.
Like I said in the other thread, this is unreasonable. It's much more
practical with simple hash commitment that you can "fold away" in a Merkle
tree hash and which you don't need to validate until the full transaction
is published.
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