steve on Nostr: “Arms and Influence” by Thomas C. Schelling ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ The ...
“Arms and Influence” by Thomas C. Schelling
⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️
The late Prussian general, Carl Von Clausewitz, once described war as a contest of wills. Victory is then achieved when your opponent does what you want. Schelling expands on this fundamental idea to great detail, showing how states and individuals alike use force (or the threat of force) to coerce others. Schelling makes an important distinction in defining coercion. He splits it up into two sub-categories: deterrence (“don’t do that, or else”) and compellence (“do what I say, or else”). This distinction is subtle but incredibly relevant. Anyone who has spent even a small amount of time with children has used both deterrence and compellence strategies—it is a fundamental aspect of all bargaining behaviors. On the world stage, nations bargain in a very similar fashion. While Schelling idealistically models nations as unitary rational actors (they’re really large conglomerates of multiple decision-makers with complex interests), his simplification creates a useful baseline to discuss strategy in a more effective way. What behaviors do we want our adversaries to exhibit? What does our adversary value? What do we value? These questions can guide fruitful discussions on how best to approach complex environments like security between nuclear powers. Schelling is renowned for his work and this book is indicative of that fame… it is well earned. 🔫🧠
⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️
The late Prussian general, Carl Von Clausewitz, once described war as a contest of wills. Victory is then achieved when your opponent does what you want. Schelling expands on this fundamental idea to great detail, showing how states and individuals alike use force (or the threat of force) to coerce others. Schelling makes an important distinction in defining coercion. He splits it up into two sub-categories: deterrence (“don’t do that, or else”) and compellence (“do what I say, or else”). This distinction is subtle but incredibly relevant. Anyone who has spent even a small amount of time with children has used both deterrence and compellence strategies—it is a fundamental aspect of all bargaining behaviors. On the world stage, nations bargain in a very similar fashion. While Schelling idealistically models nations as unitary rational actors (they’re really large conglomerates of multiple decision-makers with complex interests), his simplification creates a useful baseline to discuss strategy in a more effective way. What behaviors do we want our adversaries to exhibit? What does our adversary value? What do we value? These questions can guide fruitful discussions on how best to approach complex environments like security between nuclear powers. Schelling is renowned for his work and this book is indicative of that fame… it is well earned. 🔫🧠