Expatriotic on Nostr: _Good Morning_\ ☕ 📖 🌞 # Cryptoeconomics **by [Erik ...
_Good Morning_\
☕ 📖 🌞
# Cryptoeconomics
**by [Erik Voskuil](https://github.com/evoskuil).**\
**The book can be found on [GitHub](https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Cryptoeconomics).**
### Balance of Power Fallacy
- **Power Distribution**: In Bitcoin, power is with miners (transaction selection) and merchants (validity), not balanced but orthogonal.
- **Influence vs. Power**: Merchants influence miners by not buying services; miners influence merchants by not producing. Power can ignore influence, unlike the state's coercion.
- **Defense Against State**: Miners and merchants together defend against state aggression; neither can alone.
- **Individual vs. State**: True balance of power in Bitcoin is between individuals and the state, with resistance to political control.
- **Non-Adversarial Relationship**: Miners and merchants engage in trade, not conflict; tensions are resolved through price.
- **Security Model Misunderstanding**: Belief that centralized mining is secure if merchants are decentralized is flawed; a proof-of-work hard fork by merchants doesn't control miners.
The rest of the summarized chapters are at https://expatriotic.me
☕ 📖 🌞
# Cryptoeconomics
**by [Erik Voskuil](https://github.com/evoskuil).**\
**The book can be found on [GitHub](https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Cryptoeconomics).**
### Balance of Power Fallacy
- **Power Distribution**: In Bitcoin, power is with miners (transaction selection) and merchants (validity), not balanced but orthogonal.
- **Influence vs. Power**: Merchants influence miners by not buying services; miners influence merchants by not producing. Power can ignore influence, unlike the state's coercion.
- **Defense Against State**: Miners and merchants together defend against state aggression; neither can alone.
- **Individual vs. State**: True balance of power in Bitcoin is between individuals and the state, with resistance to political control.
- **Non-Adversarial Relationship**: Miners and merchants engage in trade, not conflict; tensions are resolved through price.
- **Security Model Misunderstanding**: Belief that centralized mining is secure if merchants are decentralized is flawed; a proof-of-work hard fork by merchants doesn't control miners.
The rest of the summarized chapters are at https://expatriotic.me