Russell O'Connor [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-10-18 📝 Original message:On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2022-10-18
📝 Original message:On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 9:07 AM Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> However, what *is* important about what Satoshi wrote is that it is sort
> of the "social contract" of what Bitcoin is that we can all sort of
> minimally agree to. This makes it clear, when we try to describe Bitcoin
> with differing assumptions than in the whitepaper, what the changes are and
> why we think the system might support those claims. But if we can't prove
> the new description sound, such as showing tip mining to be rational in a
> fully adversarial model, it doesn't mean Bitcoin doesn't work as promised,
> since all that was promised originally is functioning under an honest
> majority. Caveat Emptor!
>
I still think it is misguided to think that the "honest" (i.e. rule
following) majority is to just be accepted as an axiom and if it is
violated, well, then sorry. The rules need to be incentive compatible for
the system to be functional. The honest majority is only considered an
assumption because even if following the rules were clearly the 100%
dominant strategy, this doesn't prove that the majority is honest, since
mathematics cannot say what is happening in the real world at any given
time. Still, we must have a reason to think that the majority would be
honest, and that reasoning should come from an argument that the rule set
is incentive compatible.
The stability of mining, i.e. the incentives to mine on the most work
chain, is actually a huge concern, especially in a future low subsidy
environment. There is actually much fretting about this issue, and rightly
so. We don't actually know that Bitcoin can function in a low subsidy
environment because we have never tested it. Bitcoin could still end up a
failure if that doesn't work out. My current understanding/guess is that
with a "thick mempool" (that is lots of transactions without large gaps in
fee rates between them) and/or miners rationally leaving behind
transactions to encourage mining on their block (after all it is in a
miner's own interest not to have their block orphaned), that mining will be
stable. But I don't know this for sure, and we cannot know with certainty
that we are going to have a "thick mempool" when it is needed.
It is most certainly the case that one can construct situations where not
mining on the tip is going to be the prefered strategy. But even if that
happens on occasion, it's not like the protocol immediately collapses,
because mining off the tip is indistinguishable from being a high latency
miner who simply didn't receive the most work block in time. So it is more
of a question of how rare does it need to be, and what can we do to reduce
the chances of such situations arising (e.g. updating our mining policy to
leave some transactions out based on current (and anticipated) mempool
conditions, or (for a sufficiently capitalized miner) leave an explicit,
ANYONECANSPEND transaction output as a tip for the next miner to build upon
mined blocks.)
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📝 Original message:On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 9:07 AM Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> However, what *is* important about what Satoshi wrote is that it is sort
> of the "social contract" of what Bitcoin is that we can all sort of
> minimally agree to. This makes it clear, when we try to describe Bitcoin
> with differing assumptions than in the whitepaper, what the changes are and
> why we think the system might support those claims. But if we can't prove
> the new description sound, such as showing tip mining to be rational in a
> fully adversarial model, it doesn't mean Bitcoin doesn't work as promised,
> since all that was promised originally is functioning under an honest
> majority. Caveat Emptor!
>
I still think it is misguided to think that the "honest" (i.e. rule
following) majority is to just be accepted as an axiom and if it is
violated, well, then sorry. The rules need to be incentive compatible for
the system to be functional. The honest majority is only considered an
assumption because even if following the rules were clearly the 100%
dominant strategy, this doesn't prove that the majority is honest, since
mathematics cannot say what is happening in the real world at any given
time. Still, we must have a reason to think that the majority would be
honest, and that reasoning should come from an argument that the rule set
is incentive compatible.
The stability of mining, i.e. the incentives to mine on the most work
chain, is actually a huge concern, especially in a future low subsidy
environment. There is actually much fretting about this issue, and rightly
so. We don't actually know that Bitcoin can function in a low subsidy
environment because we have never tested it. Bitcoin could still end up a
failure if that doesn't work out. My current understanding/guess is that
with a "thick mempool" (that is lots of transactions without large gaps in
fee rates between them) and/or miners rationally leaving behind
transactions to encourage mining on their block (after all it is in a
miner's own interest not to have their block orphaned), that mining will be
stable. But I don't know this for sure, and we cannot know with certainty
that we are going to have a "thick mempool" when it is needed.
It is most certainly the case that one can construct situations where not
mining on the tip is going to be the prefered strategy. But even if that
happens on occasion, it's not like the protocol immediately collapses,
because mining off the tip is indistinguishable from being a high latency
miner who simply didn't receive the most work block in time. So it is more
of a question of how rare does it need to be, and what can we do to reduce
the chances of such situations arising (e.g. updating our mining policy to
leave some transactions out based on current (and anticipated) mempool
conditions, or (for a sufficiently capitalized miner) leave an explicit,
ANYONECANSPEND transaction output as a tip for the next miner to build upon
mined blocks.)
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