Luke Dashjr [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2017-09-19 📝 Original message:On Tuesday 19 September ...
📅 Original date posted:2017-09-19
📝 Original message:On Tuesday 19 September 2017 12:46:30 AM Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> After the main discussion session it was observed that tail-call semantics
> could still be maintained if the alt stack is used for transferring
> arguments to the policy script.
Isn't this a bug in the cleanstack rule?
(Unrelated...)
Another thing that came up during the discussion was the idea of replacing all
the NOPs and otherwise-unallocated opcodes with a new OP_RETURNTRUE
implementation, in future versions of Script. This would immediately exit the
program (perhaps performing some semantic checks on the remainder of the
Script) with a successful outcome.
This is similar to CVE-2010-5141 in a sense, but since signatures are no
longer Scripts themselves, it shouldn't be exploitable.
The benefit of this is that it allows softforking in ANY new opcode, not only
the -VERIFY opcode variants we've been doing. That is, instead of merely
terminating the Script with a failure, the new opcode can also remove or push
stack items. This is because old nodes, upon encountering the undefined
opcode, will always succeed immediately, allowing the new opcode to do
literally anything from that point onward.
Luke
📝 Original message:On Tuesday 19 September 2017 12:46:30 AM Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> After the main discussion session it was observed that tail-call semantics
> could still be maintained if the alt stack is used for transferring
> arguments to the policy script.
Isn't this a bug in the cleanstack rule?
(Unrelated...)
Another thing that came up during the discussion was the idea of replacing all
the NOPs and otherwise-unallocated opcodes with a new OP_RETURNTRUE
implementation, in future versions of Script. This would immediately exit the
program (perhaps performing some semantic checks on the remainder of the
Script) with a successful outcome.
This is similar to CVE-2010-5141 in a sense, but since signatures are no
longer Scripts themselves, it shouldn't be exploitable.
The benefit of this is that it allows softforking in ANY new opcode, not only
the -VERIFY opcode variants we've been doing. That is, instead of merely
terminating the Script with a failure, the new opcode can also remove or push
stack items. This is because old nodes, upon encountering the undefined
opcode, will always succeed immediately, allowing the new opcode to do
literally anything from that point onward.
Luke