dtonon on Nostr: > Signing and encrypting are different operations Perhaps in the diagram you could ...
> Signing and encrypting are different operations
Perhaps in the diagram you could include the premise that the user is operating in the two clients with a signer that cannot encrypt (FROST bunker); this would make it easier to understand why such a structure becomes necessary.
Even if there are probably other uses cases, like
Perhaps in the diagram you could include the premise that the user is operating in the two clients with a signer that cannot encrypt (FROST bunker); this would make it easier to understand why such a structure becomes necessary.
Even if there are probably other uses cases, like
quoting nevent1q…475xI’m experimenting with building a simple wealth tracker, where you save encrypted records of your assets’ value to a local relay (indexedDB), and sync to a trusted relay.
If your nsec is compromised, the ideal would be for the data to not be revealed without an extra key.
If I’m not mistaken, the scheme you shared allows me to achieve this, since you’d need the device as well to decrypt. And I would add a passphrase, for when the device is compromised.
Am I doing something stupid? 😅