ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: đź“… Original date posted:2020-04-02 đź“ť Original message: Good morning Nadav, > I ...
đź“… Original date posted:2020-04-02
đź“ť Original message:
Good morning Nadav,
> I could be missing something, but it seems to me like the proposal to close channels after a soft timeout unless non-cooperation can be proven upstream adds a cost to the attacker of two on-chain transactions, which they can immediately revoke (as they know both pieces to the revocation priv key), but still allows very long lock-ups of other's funds (with a 10x multiplier if they choose a long route). I do think that this is certainly an improvement on what we have now but I'm not sure it properly punishes the attacker in its current form.
Ah, right, E knows the revocation for the unilateral close of EE, because it is a self-channel, sigh.
And by this revocation clause it can claim the money immediately and put it into a channel as well.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
đź“ť Original message:
Good morning Nadav,
> I could be missing something, but it seems to me like the proposal to close channels after a soft timeout unless non-cooperation can be proven upstream adds a cost to the attacker of two on-chain transactions, which they can immediately revoke (as they know both pieces to the revocation priv key), but still allows very long lock-ups of other's funds (with a 10x multiplier if they choose a long route). I do think that this is certainly an improvement on what we have now but I'm not sure it properly punishes the attacker in its current form.
Ah, right, E knows the revocation for the unilateral close of EE, because it is a self-channel, sigh.
And by this revocation clause it can claim the money immediately and put it into a channel as well.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj