shymaa arafat [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-08-27 📝 Original message: Allow me to ask: -Untill ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-08-27
📝 Original message:
Allow me to ask:
-Untill you find a mitigation that consolidate all dust UTXOS, why don't
you separate them and all probably Unspendable UTXOS in a different
partition?
-I'm talking at the real UTXO storage level (to be kept in secondary
storage), and at the Merkleization level in any accumulator design Utreexo
or what so ever(putting them in one or two subtree/forest with hardly
changing roots according to the categorization will reduce the proof size,
even if slightly)
-This will also help things like Bloom filters, assume UTXOs,...etc when
about 10% with almost zero probability are trimmed from the pool you are
withdrawing from.
.
-The paper I mentioned earlier says in Feb 2018, there was about 2.4m UTXOS
less than 1000 Satoshi, of which ~824,892 holds exactly 1 Satoshi
-I don't think any of those were spent since that time, in fact there could
be a possibility that the numbers may have increased
-As the last previous reply mentioned you have to consider the long run
effect on the UTXO set forever, this is a straight forward improvement that
comes with almost no effort
.
Ps.
-If there is something wrong, something I missed in this idea please
explain it to me
-Or do you find the improvement itself a "dust" that doesn't worth the
effort???
.
Regards & thank you all for your time in reading & replying
Shymaa M. Arafat
On Fri, Aug 27, 2021, 00:06 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> One interesting thing I thought of: the cost of maintenance of the dust
> creates a (very) small incentive to mine transactions that *use* dust
> outputs with a slightly lower fee that contain dust, in order to reduce the
> future maintenance cost for themselves. However, the rational discount
> would likely be vanishingly small. It would be interesting to add
> something to the consensus rules to decrease the vbytes for a transaction
> that consumes dust outputs such that the value of removing them from the
> system (saving the future cost of maintenance) is approximately equal to
> the amount that the fee could be made lower for such transactions. Even
> measuring this as a value over the whole (future) bitcoin network, I'm not
> sure how to evaluate the magnitude of this future cost.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 8:12 PM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Good morning Jeremy,
>>
>> > one interesting point that came up at the bitdevs in austin today that
>> favors remove that i believe is new to this discussion (it was new to me):
>> >
>> > the argument can be reduced to:
>> >
>> > - dust limit is a per-node relay policy.
>> > - it is rational for miners to mine dust outputs given their cost of
>> maintenance (storing the output potentially forever) is lower than their
>> immediate reward in fees.
>> > - if txn relaying nodes censor something that a miner would mine, users
>> will seek a private/direct relay to the miner and vice versa.
>> > - if direct relay to miner becomes popular, it is both bad for privacy
>> and decentralization.
>> > - therefore the dust limit, should there be demand to create dust at
>> prevailing mempool feerates, causes an incentive to increase network
>> centralization (immediately)
>> >
>> > the tradeoff is if a short term immediate incentive to promote network
>> centralization is better or worse than a long term node operator overhead.
>>
>> Against the above, we should note that in the Lightning spec, when an
>> output *would have been* created that is less than the dust limit, the
>> output is instead put into fees.
>>
>> https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/03-transactions.md#trimmed-outputs
>>
>> Thus, the existence of a dust limit encourages L2 protocols to have
>> similar rules, where outputs below the dust limit are just given over as
>> fees to miners, so the existence of a dust limit might very well be
>> incentivize-compatible for miners, regardless of centralization effects or
>> not.
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> ZmnSCPxj
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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📝 Original message:
Allow me to ask:
-Untill you find a mitigation that consolidate all dust UTXOS, why don't
you separate them and all probably Unspendable UTXOS in a different
partition?
-I'm talking at the real UTXO storage level (to be kept in secondary
storage), and at the Merkleization level in any accumulator design Utreexo
or what so ever(putting them in one or two subtree/forest with hardly
changing roots according to the categorization will reduce the proof size,
even if slightly)
-This will also help things like Bloom filters, assume UTXOs,...etc when
about 10% with almost zero probability are trimmed from the pool you are
withdrawing from.
.
-The paper I mentioned earlier says in Feb 2018, there was about 2.4m UTXOS
less than 1000 Satoshi, of which ~824,892 holds exactly 1 Satoshi
-I don't think any of those were spent since that time, in fact there could
be a possibility that the numbers may have increased
-As the last previous reply mentioned you have to consider the long run
effect on the UTXO set forever, this is a straight forward improvement that
comes with almost no effort
.
Ps.
-If there is something wrong, something I missed in this idea please
explain it to me
-Or do you find the improvement itself a "dust" that doesn't worth the
effort???
.
Regards & thank you all for your time in reading & replying
Shymaa M. Arafat
On Fri, Aug 27, 2021, 00:06 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> One interesting thing I thought of: the cost of maintenance of the dust
> creates a (very) small incentive to mine transactions that *use* dust
> outputs with a slightly lower fee that contain dust, in order to reduce the
> future maintenance cost for themselves. However, the rational discount
> would likely be vanishingly small. It would be interesting to add
> something to the consensus rules to decrease the vbytes for a transaction
> that consumes dust outputs such that the value of removing them from the
> system (saving the future cost of maintenance) is approximately equal to
> the amount that the fee could be made lower for such transactions. Even
> measuring this as a value over the whole (future) bitcoin network, I'm not
> sure how to evaluate the magnitude of this future cost.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 8:12 PM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Good morning Jeremy,
>>
>> > one interesting point that came up at the bitdevs in austin today that
>> favors remove that i believe is new to this discussion (it was new to me):
>> >
>> > the argument can be reduced to:
>> >
>> > - dust limit is a per-node relay policy.
>> > - it is rational for miners to mine dust outputs given their cost of
>> maintenance (storing the output potentially forever) is lower than their
>> immediate reward in fees.
>> > - if txn relaying nodes censor something that a miner would mine, users
>> will seek a private/direct relay to the miner and vice versa.
>> > - if direct relay to miner becomes popular, it is both bad for privacy
>> and decentralization.
>> > - therefore the dust limit, should there be demand to create dust at
>> prevailing mempool feerates, causes an incentive to increase network
>> centralization (immediately)
>> >
>> > the tradeoff is if a short term immediate incentive to promote network
>> centralization is better or worse than a long term node operator overhead.
>>
>> Against the above, we should note that in the Lightning spec, when an
>> output *would have been* created that is less than the dust limit, the
>> output is instead put into fees.
>>
>> https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/03-transactions.md#trimmed-outputs
>>
>> Thus, the existence of a dust limit encourages L2 protocols to have
>> similar rules, where outputs below the dust limit are just given over as
>> fees to miners, so the existence of a dust limit might very well be
>> incentivize-compatible for miners, regardless of centralization effects or
>> not.
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> ZmnSCPxj
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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