Luke Dashjr [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-03-05 📝 Original message:On Friday 05 March 2021 ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-03-05
📝 Original message:On Friday 05 March 2021 14:51:12 Ryan Grant via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2021 at 7:32 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev
>
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > So that leads me to believe here that the folks who oppose LOT=true
> > primarily have an issue with forced signaling, which personally I
> > don't care about as much, not the idea of committing to a UASF from
> > the get go.
>
> The biggest disconnect is between two goals: modern soft-fork
> activation's "Don't (needlessly) lose hashpower to un-upgraded
> miners"; and UASF's must-signal strategy to prevent inaction.
>
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-January/017547
>.html
>
> This question dives to the heart of Bitcoin's far-out future.
> Of two important principles, which principle is more important:
>
> - to allow everyone (even miners) to operate on the contract they
> accepted when entering the system; or
There was never any such a contract. Even full nodes must upgrade in a
softfork, or they lose their security and become comparable to light wallets.
> - to protect against protocol sclerosis for the project as a whole?
What?
> Do miners have a higher obligation to evaluate upgrades than economic
> nodes implementing cold storage and infrequent spends? If they do,
> then so far it has been implicit. LOT=true would make that obligation
> explicit.
Miners either make valid blocks or they don't.
The only thing they "need" to evaluate is the market for their work.
Luke
📝 Original message:On Friday 05 March 2021 14:51:12 Ryan Grant via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2021 at 7:32 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev
>
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > So that leads me to believe here that the folks who oppose LOT=true
> > primarily have an issue with forced signaling, which personally I
> > don't care about as much, not the idea of committing to a UASF from
> > the get go.
>
> The biggest disconnect is between two goals: modern soft-fork
> activation's "Don't (needlessly) lose hashpower to un-upgraded
> miners"; and UASF's must-signal strategy to prevent inaction.
>
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-January/017547
>.html
>
> This question dives to the heart of Bitcoin's far-out future.
> Of two important principles, which principle is more important:
>
> - to allow everyone (even miners) to operate on the contract they
> accepted when entering the system; or
There was never any such a contract. Even full nodes must upgrade in a
softfork, or they lose their security and become comparable to light wallets.
> - to protect against protocol sclerosis for the project as a whole?
What?
> Do miners have a higher obligation to evaluate upgrades than economic
> nodes implementing cold storage and infrequent spends? If they do,
> then so far it has been implicit. LOT=true would make that obligation
> explicit.
Miners either make valid blocks or they don't.
The only thing they "need" to evaluate is the market for their work.
Luke