(RSS Feed) on Nostr: Security and Sanctions in Post-Assad Syria After the collapse of the Assad regime, ...
Security and Sanctions in Post-Assad Syria
After the collapse of the Assad regime, the current sanctions laws are in desperate need of reform. The Syrian people have longhttps://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/syria-unintended-consequences-aita-12-20.pdf
boasted about for years.
World leaders—particularly in the United States and Europe—should devise a sanctions reform strategy to address these issues. The U.S. Treasury’s issuing ofhttps://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933861/download?inline
“by, with, and through” defense policy in Syria and Iraq.
Sectoral, Targeted, And Terrorism Sanctions On Syria
The Assad regime was one of the first members of President Jimmy Carter’shttps://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/
reinforced these initial sanctions, leading to a first wave of capital flight and foreign direct investment.
As the Syrian uprising spread in 2011, the scope of trade restrictionshttps://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/executive-order-13582-blocking-property-government-syria-and-prohibiting
the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which aimed at protecting civilians from Assad’s criminal enterprise.
A deluge of terrorism-related sanctions has also applied to multiple military factions in Syria since 2012. Some of the designations are multilateral, issued by the United Nations Security Council, such ashttps://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n15/437/45/pdf/n1543745.pdf
HTS-related transactions for public services while banning military transactions.
In general, terrorism sanctions require an audit and a potential remedy through a step-for-step model. As the designations are aimed at national security, they should not be extended to the Syrian economy at large, nor should they constitute a barrier to the express issuance of sanctions waivers.
Biden’s Legacy In Syria
Historically, the Biden administration did not ramp up pressure against the regime and signaled that sanctions arehttps://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/05/09/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-actions-of-the-government-of-syria-2/
. According to sources who spoke on background, Biden’s National Security Council (NSC) actively blocked reform to Syria sanctions by pressuring Congress to freeze all Syria-related bills, especially in 2024. The subsequent delays in the U.S. Congress to update and advance Syria legislation caused friction in the bipartisan agreement against the Assad regime.
The administration did not enforce multiple bills that had passed through previous National Defense Authorization Acts. Officials also ignored existinghttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1705
that Bashar al-Assad’s wife, Asma, abused.
On https://nationalinterest.org/feature/tackling-middle-east%E2%80%99s-captagon-conundrum-212615
on the Arab gas project and sent mixed messages until it was stalled. Ultimately, regional geopolitics focused on flawed security considerations dominated U.S. Syria policy every time.
On Caesar, the White House has been treading water inhttps://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-118s5095is/pdf/BILLS-118s5095is.pdf
and renewal. The Caesar code goes well beyond sanctions, requiring accountability and elimination of chemical weapons. It contains economic recovery provisions that facilitate USAID assistance. Hence, it represents a roadmap for transitional justice supported by Syrians. After the collapse of the regime, Caesar’s secondary sanctions are effectively moot as the extraterritorial reach to deter Assad’s re-normalization is no longer applicable. In addition, the names of regime war criminals need an update and expansion as part of a broad legal redefinition of the government of Syria.
The Urgent Need For Licensure Reform
Despite the embeddedhttps://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-542/subpart-E/section-542.516
(EARs) enforced by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) still constitute a significant barrier to stabilization and reconstruction.
A series of waivers are necessary for NGOs to achieve aid localization and overcome procurement hurdles. According tohttps://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-flash-update-no-10-recent-developments-syria-7-january-2025-enar
. It will help reverse derisking and overcome ambiguous compliance issues, especially as humanitarian organizations are often stretched in human resources and face clearance hurdles that delay their operations. That said, it is not a perfect or permanent solution.
Wider sanctions reform serves multiple purposes. First, it alleviates the compliance concerns of regional states and companies for an emergency crisis response. Second, it allows USAID to increase itshttps://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/SRTF%20Fact%20Sheet%20508.pdf
for Internally Displaced Persons. Third, it would align the U.S. policy stance with regional and international partners who signaled their readiness for speedy humanitarian assistance at scale.
Ultimately, thehttps://www.law.nyu.edu/news/reiss-center-law-security-syria-barnard-kress-finer
to Syria.
https://gulfif.org/authors/alexander-langlois/
.
Abed Al-Thalji is a policy analyst focused on Sanctions & Foreign Affairs. He holds an MSc. in International Trade from Gothenburg University’s School of Business, Economics, and Law.
Image: Shutterstock.com.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/security-and-sanctions-post-assad-syria-214293
After the collapse of the Assad regime, the current sanctions laws are in desperate need of reform. The Syrian people have longhttps://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/syria-unintended-consequences-aita-12-20.pdf
boasted about for years.
World leaders—particularly in the United States and Europe—should devise a sanctions reform strategy to address these issues. The U.S. Treasury’s issuing ofhttps://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933861/download?inline
“by, with, and through” defense policy in Syria and Iraq.
Sectoral, Targeted, And Terrorism Sanctions On Syria
The Assad regime was one of the first members of President Jimmy Carter’shttps://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/
reinforced these initial sanctions, leading to a first wave of capital flight and foreign direct investment.
As the Syrian uprising spread in 2011, the scope of trade restrictionshttps://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/executive-order-13582-blocking-property-government-syria-and-prohibiting
the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which aimed at protecting civilians from Assad’s criminal enterprise.
A deluge of terrorism-related sanctions has also applied to multiple military factions in Syria since 2012. Some of the designations are multilateral, issued by the United Nations Security Council, such ashttps://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n15/437/45/pdf/n1543745.pdf
HTS-related transactions for public services while banning military transactions.
In general, terrorism sanctions require an audit and a potential remedy through a step-for-step model. As the designations are aimed at national security, they should not be extended to the Syrian economy at large, nor should they constitute a barrier to the express issuance of sanctions waivers.
Biden’s Legacy In Syria
Historically, the Biden administration did not ramp up pressure against the regime and signaled that sanctions arehttps://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/05/09/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-actions-of-the-government-of-syria-2/
. According to sources who spoke on background, Biden’s National Security Council (NSC) actively blocked reform to Syria sanctions by pressuring Congress to freeze all Syria-related bills, especially in 2024. The subsequent delays in the U.S. Congress to update and advance Syria legislation caused friction in the bipartisan agreement against the Assad regime.
The administration did not enforce multiple bills that had passed through previous National Defense Authorization Acts. Officials also ignored existinghttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1705
that Bashar al-Assad’s wife, Asma, abused.
On https://nationalinterest.org/feature/tackling-middle-east%E2%80%99s-captagon-conundrum-212615
on the Arab gas project and sent mixed messages until it was stalled. Ultimately, regional geopolitics focused on flawed security considerations dominated U.S. Syria policy every time.
On Caesar, the White House has been treading water inhttps://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-118s5095is/pdf/BILLS-118s5095is.pdf
and renewal. The Caesar code goes well beyond sanctions, requiring accountability and elimination of chemical weapons. It contains economic recovery provisions that facilitate USAID assistance. Hence, it represents a roadmap for transitional justice supported by Syrians. After the collapse of the regime, Caesar’s secondary sanctions are effectively moot as the extraterritorial reach to deter Assad’s re-normalization is no longer applicable. In addition, the names of regime war criminals need an update and expansion as part of a broad legal redefinition of the government of Syria.
The Urgent Need For Licensure Reform
Despite the embeddedhttps://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-542/subpart-E/section-542.516
(EARs) enforced by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) still constitute a significant barrier to stabilization and reconstruction.
A series of waivers are necessary for NGOs to achieve aid localization and overcome procurement hurdles. According tohttps://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-flash-update-no-10-recent-developments-syria-7-january-2025-enar
. It will help reverse derisking and overcome ambiguous compliance issues, especially as humanitarian organizations are often stretched in human resources and face clearance hurdles that delay their operations. That said, it is not a perfect or permanent solution.
Wider sanctions reform serves multiple purposes. First, it alleviates the compliance concerns of regional states and companies for an emergency crisis response. Second, it allows USAID to increase itshttps://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/SRTF%20Fact%20Sheet%20508.pdf
for Internally Displaced Persons. Third, it would align the U.S. policy stance with regional and international partners who signaled their readiness for speedy humanitarian assistance at scale.
Ultimately, thehttps://www.law.nyu.edu/news/reiss-center-law-security-syria-barnard-kress-finer
to Syria.
https://gulfif.org/authors/alexander-langlois/
.
Abed Al-Thalji is a policy analyst focused on Sanctions & Foreign Affairs. He holds an MSc. in International Trade from Gothenburg University’s School of Business, Economics, and Law.
Image: Shutterstock.com.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/security-and-sanctions-post-assad-syria-214293