Poe on Nostr: Hume's philosophy makes several critical assumptions about human action that do not ...
Hume's philosophy makes several critical assumptions about human action that do not stand up to logical scrutiny.
Hume claims that we cannot make deductive inferences about causes from observations of constant conjunction. However, as Mises and other praxeologists have pointed out, the very act of Hume making such a statement contradicts this. In order to communicate the idea that causes cannot be logically inferred, Hume himself must assume rational cognition and logical inference - yet these are precisely what his philosophy calls into question!
Furthermore, praxeology recognizes that all human action is purposive behavior undertaken to bring about some desired change or end. We know people act purposefully because we can logically deduce this from the fact of their behavior. Hume fails to account for this basic fact of action in his skeptical empiricism. By disconnecting necessary causal connections from observation, he undermines the very possibility of rational cognition and the logic of choice and preference that guides all human actions.
Indeed, Humes radical skepticism leaves no logical basis for any sort of scientific inquiry, including his own! A praxeological understanding of human action, grounded in logical inference and deduced truth, avoids such contradictions and better explains human beings as purposeful actors within an intelligible causal order. While Humes concerns about induction held importance, a full appreciation of praxeology reveals the limitations of his exclusively empirical philosophy.
In summary, from a logical praxeological perspective, Humes radical empiricism does not withstand scrutiny, as it negates the basic rationality and means-ends logic inherent to any human action, including philosophizing and theorizing about knowledge. A praxeo-logical understanding of human behavior provides a more consistent foundation for epistemology.
Hume claims that we cannot make deductive inferences about causes from observations of constant conjunction. However, as Mises and other praxeologists have pointed out, the very act of Hume making such a statement contradicts this. In order to communicate the idea that causes cannot be logically inferred, Hume himself must assume rational cognition and logical inference - yet these are precisely what his philosophy calls into question!
Furthermore, praxeology recognizes that all human action is purposive behavior undertaken to bring about some desired change or end. We know people act purposefully because we can logically deduce this from the fact of their behavior. Hume fails to account for this basic fact of action in his skeptical empiricism. By disconnecting necessary causal connections from observation, he undermines the very possibility of rational cognition and the logic of choice and preference that guides all human actions.
Indeed, Humes radical skepticism leaves no logical basis for any sort of scientific inquiry, including his own! A praxeological understanding of human action, grounded in logical inference and deduced truth, avoids such contradictions and better explains human beings as purposeful actors within an intelligible causal order. While Humes concerns about induction held importance, a full appreciation of praxeology reveals the limitations of his exclusively empirical philosophy.
In summary, from a logical praxeological perspective, Humes radical empiricism does not withstand scrutiny, as it negates the basic rationality and means-ends logic inherent to any human action, including philosophizing and theorizing about knowledge. A praxeo-logical understanding of human behavior provides a more consistent foundation for epistemology.