Greg Sanders [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-10-27 📝 Original message:During off-channel ...
📅 Original date posted:2022-10-27
📝 Original message:During off-channel discussion, Suhas made a great point that even with
fullrbf, you can get stuck by bip125 rule#5 pinning if an adversary
controls a number of inputs(4 with default mempool settings).
Implication being, while we can mitigate rule#3 damage potentially with
fullrbf, we cannot actually make promises about mempool entry beyond quite
small transaction sizes. Adversary has to make 100 transactions, 4 chains
of 25, but it achieves the original pin.
On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 1:44 PM Greg Sanders <gsanders87 at gmail.com> wrote:
> > For instance, the double-spend could be low-feerate and large, and
> effectively pin any attempt to replace it.
>
> Yes, this is the biggest hole left. You *could* replace it with RBF when
> before you simply could not, so perhaps the pinning door is slightly
> smaller in scenarios where going feerates are significantly higher than min.
>
> > Or it could be higher feerate and confirm and B/C have to start all over.
>
> Coinjoins have "blame rounds" exactly for this. Ruling out the above hole
> where you don't want to pay the 100kvb rule#3 penalty, you can kick the
> griefer out. Without replacement, you likely can not.
>
> > Or, A could stall things in the signing phase and B/C have to figure out
> when to give up on the channel with A.
>
> Again, blame rounds solve this.
>
> So to recap, it makes it *possible* to over-bid your griefer, vs simply
> not able to and have funds tied up for weeks(or guess you're being pinned
> and double-spend your input, which again looks blame-worthy).
>
> Properly replacing rule#3 would give these protocols higher assurances,
> but this is where we're at now.
>
> On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 1:35 PM Suhas Daftuar via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> I have more to say on this broader topic, but since you've brought up
>> this particular example I think it's worth commenting:
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 1:23 PM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Is that true? Antoine claims [1] that opt-in RBF isn't enough to avoid
>>> a DoS issue when utxos are jointly funded by untrusting partners, and,
>>> aiui, that's the main motivation for addressing this now.
>>>
>>> [1]
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html
>>>
>>> The scenario he describes is: A, B, C create a tx:
>>>
>>> inputs: A1, B1, C1 [opts in to RBF]
>>> fees: normal
>>> outputs:
>>> [lightning channel, DLC, etc, who knows]
>>>
>>> they all analyse the tx, and agree it looks great; however just before
>>> publishing it, A spams the network with an alternative tx, double
>>> spending her input:
>>>
>>> inputs: A1 [does not opt in to RBF]
>>> fees: low
>>> outputs: A
>>>
>>> If A gets the timing right, that's bad for B and C because they've
>>> populated their mempool with the 1st transaction, while everyone else
>>> sees the 2nd one instead; and neither tx will replace the other. B and
>>> C can't know that they should just cancel their transaction, eg:
>>>
>>> inputs: B1, C1 [opts in to RBF]
>>> fees: 50% above normal
>>> outputs:
>>> [smaller channel, refund, whatever]
>>>
>>> and might instead waste time trying to fee bump the tx to get it mined,
>>> or similar.
>>>
>>> What should folks wanting to do coinjoins/dualfunding/dlcs/etc do to
>>> solve that problem if they have only opt-in RBF available?
>>>
>>
>> I think this is not a real example of a DoS vector that is available
>> because we support non-rbf signaling transactions. Even in a world where
>> all transactions are replaceable, person A could double-spend their input
>> in a way that is annoying for B and C. For instance, the double-spend
>> could be low-feerate and large, and effectively pin any attempt to replace
>> it. Or it could be higher feerate and confirm and B/C have to start all
>> over. Or, A could stall things in the signing phase and B/C have to figure
>> out when to give up on the channel with A.
>>
>> So I find this example to be unconvincing. Are there any other examples
>> where having a non-replacement policy for some transactions causes problems
>> for protocols people are trying to build?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Suhas
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
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📝 Original message:During off-channel discussion, Suhas made a great point that even with
fullrbf, you can get stuck by bip125 rule#5 pinning if an adversary
controls a number of inputs(4 with default mempool settings).
Implication being, while we can mitigate rule#3 damage potentially with
fullrbf, we cannot actually make promises about mempool entry beyond quite
small transaction sizes. Adversary has to make 100 transactions, 4 chains
of 25, but it achieves the original pin.
On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 1:44 PM Greg Sanders <gsanders87 at gmail.com> wrote:
> > For instance, the double-spend could be low-feerate and large, and
> effectively pin any attempt to replace it.
>
> Yes, this is the biggest hole left. You *could* replace it with RBF when
> before you simply could not, so perhaps the pinning door is slightly
> smaller in scenarios where going feerates are significantly higher than min.
>
> > Or it could be higher feerate and confirm and B/C have to start all over.
>
> Coinjoins have "blame rounds" exactly for this. Ruling out the above hole
> where you don't want to pay the 100kvb rule#3 penalty, you can kick the
> griefer out. Without replacement, you likely can not.
>
> > Or, A could stall things in the signing phase and B/C have to figure out
> when to give up on the channel with A.
>
> Again, blame rounds solve this.
>
> So to recap, it makes it *possible* to over-bid your griefer, vs simply
> not able to and have funds tied up for weeks(or guess you're being pinned
> and double-spend your input, which again looks blame-worthy).
>
> Properly replacing rule#3 would give these protocols higher assurances,
> but this is where we're at now.
>
> On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 1:35 PM Suhas Daftuar via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> I have more to say on this broader topic, but since you've brought up
>> this particular example I think it's worth commenting:
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 1:23 PM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Is that true? Antoine claims [1] that opt-in RBF isn't enough to avoid
>>> a DoS issue when utxos are jointly funded by untrusting partners, and,
>>> aiui, that's the main motivation for addressing this now.
>>>
>>> [1]
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html
>>>
>>> The scenario he describes is: A, B, C create a tx:
>>>
>>> inputs: A1, B1, C1 [opts in to RBF]
>>> fees: normal
>>> outputs:
>>> [lightning channel, DLC, etc, who knows]
>>>
>>> they all analyse the tx, and agree it looks great; however just before
>>> publishing it, A spams the network with an alternative tx, double
>>> spending her input:
>>>
>>> inputs: A1 [does not opt in to RBF]
>>> fees: low
>>> outputs: A
>>>
>>> If A gets the timing right, that's bad for B and C because they've
>>> populated their mempool with the 1st transaction, while everyone else
>>> sees the 2nd one instead; and neither tx will replace the other. B and
>>> C can't know that they should just cancel their transaction, eg:
>>>
>>> inputs: B1, C1 [opts in to RBF]
>>> fees: 50% above normal
>>> outputs:
>>> [smaller channel, refund, whatever]
>>>
>>> and might instead waste time trying to fee bump the tx to get it mined,
>>> or similar.
>>>
>>> What should folks wanting to do coinjoins/dualfunding/dlcs/etc do to
>>> solve that problem if they have only opt-in RBF available?
>>>
>>
>> I think this is not a real example of a DoS vector that is available
>> because we support non-rbf signaling transactions. Even in a world where
>> all transactions are replaceable, person A could double-spend their input
>> in a way that is annoying for B and C. For instance, the double-spend
>> could be low-feerate and large, and effectively pin any attempt to replace
>> it. Or it could be higher feerate and confirm and B/C have to start all
>> over. Or, A could stall things in the signing phase and B/C have to figure
>> out when to give up on the channel with A.
>>
>> So I find this example to be unconvincing. Are there any other examples
>> where having a non-replacement policy for some transactions causes problems
>> for protocols people are trying to build?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Suhas
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
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