cedric perronnet [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-08-18 📝 Original message:Sounds like a much better ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-08-18
📝 Original message:Sounds like a much better approach than arbitrary deciding what the
block size should be
BR
Le 18/08/2015 14:13, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
> Regarding:
> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html
>
>
>
> I am arguing with the following statement here...
>
> /I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a
> miner with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases
> by only ever mining empty blocks./
>
>
>
> First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone
> wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by
> mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not
> economical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners
> will find out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of pool
> owner's intention. Hence, they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose
> out. This is the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even if
> a pool gets more than 51% hash power.
>
>
> Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution
> to this problem in algorithmic format...
>
> If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
> Double MaxBlockSize
> Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the
> last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
> Half MaxBlockSize
> Else
> Keep the same MaxBlockSize
>
> This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than
> 50% hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more
> than 10% hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in
> all blocks. In this approach, not only miners, but also the end user
> have their say. Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from
> where miners will take Tx to fill up the blocks. Please note that,
> taking first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important to avoid data
> discrepancy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It is assumed
> that a chain can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation.
>
> Looking for comments.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150818/5fb19624/attachment.html>;
📝 Original message:Sounds like a much better approach than arbitrary deciding what the
block size should be
BR
Le 18/08/2015 14:13, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
> Regarding:
> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html
>
>
>
> I am arguing with the following statement here...
>
> /I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a
> miner with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases
> by only ever mining empty blocks./
>
>
>
> First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone
> wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by
> mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not
> economical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners
> will find out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of pool
> owner's intention. Hence, they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose
> out. This is the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even if
> a pool gets more than 51% hash power.
>
>
> Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution
> to this problem in algorithmic format...
>
> If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
> Double MaxBlockSize
> Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the
> last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
> Half MaxBlockSize
> Else
> Keep the same MaxBlockSize
>
> This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than
> 50% hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more
> than 10% hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in
> all blocks. In this approach, not only miners, but also the end user
> have their say. Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from
> where miners will take Tx to fill up the blocks. Please note that,
> taking first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important to avoid data
> discrepancy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It is assumed
> that a chain can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation.
>
> Looking for comments.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150818/5fb19624/attachment.html>;