Bryan Bishop [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2019-10-04 📝 Original message:Since the user can't prove ...

📅 Original date posted:2019-10-04
📝 Original message:Since the user can't prove that they are using this technique, or
petertodd's timelock encryption for that matter, an attacker has little
incentive to stop physically attacking until they have a spendable UTXO.

I believe you can get the same effect with on-chain timelocks, or
delete-the-bits plus a rangeproof and a zero-knowledge proof that the
rangeproof corresponds to some secret that can be used to derive the
expected public key. I think Jeremy Rubin had an idea for such a proof.

Also, adam3us has described a similar thought here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=311000.0

- Bryan

On Fri, Oct 4, 2019, 4:43 AM Saulo Fonseca via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi everyone
>
> If you are a hodler, I like to propose the creation of a key stretching as
> a new layer of protection over your current wallet.
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20191004/1473ba33/attachment.html>;