steve on Nostr: “The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War” by Nicholas ...
“The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War” by Nicholas Mulder
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What makes certain actions in war human or morale? Does the way we exert force on an enemy matter, or do end results speak for themselves? Mulder explores these questions in his work tracing the history of economic sanctions through Ancient Greece to the current age. Like modern strategic bombing and drone warfare, economic sanctions have become the preferred “easy button” policy choice for decision-makers thanks to their relative low cost and perceived high benefit. Herein lies the folly: history has shown that targeting populations in hopes of coercing enemy leadership rarely works. If firebombing the Japanese couldn’t force a surrender, why would economic sanctions or blockade have any measurable political effect? Sanctioning of Turkey during WWII resulted in nearly 250,000 civilian deaths due to starvation, yet this was deemed more “moral” since such casualties were only indirectly the result of Allied actions. Mulder concludes that the unpredictable nature of sanctions’ 2nd and 3rd-order effects make it less the potent political tool than its frequent use would seem to predict. Juxtaposing Mulder’s arguments against current sanctions against Russia presents an interesting thought experiment: are sanctions actually affecting the Putin regime’s decision-making? What costs are the West bearing due to their choices (like removing 🇷🇺 from SWIFT)? Sanctions—like air power—are effective only when they are directly linked to political objectives. Unless the political objective in WWII was to kill thousands of Turks, sanctioning proved to be an ineffective strategy. 💸📉
⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️
What makes certain actions in war human or morale? Does the way we exert force on an enemy matter, or do end results speak for themselves? Mulder explores these questions in his work tracing the history of economic sanctions through Ancient Greece to the current age. Like modern strategic bombing and drone warfare, economic sanctions have become the preferred “easy button” policy choice for decision-makers thanks to their relative low cost and perceived high benefit. Herein lies the folly: history has shown that targeting populations in hopes of coercing enemy leadership rarely works. If firebombing the Japanese couldn’t force a surrender, why would economic sanctions or blockade have any measurable political effect? Sanctioning of Turkey during WWII resulted in nearly 250,000 civilian deaths due to starvation, yet this was deemed more “moral” since such casualties were only indirectly the result of Allied actions. Mulder concludes that the unpredictable nature of sanctions’ 2nd and 3rd-order effects make it less the potent political tool than its frequent use would seem to predict. Juxtaposing Mulder’s arguments against current sanctions against Russia presents an interesting thought experiment: are sanctions actually affecting the Putin regime’s decision-making? What costs are the West bearing due to their choices (like removing 🇷🇺 from SWIFT)? Sanctions—like air power—are effective only when they are directly linked to political objectives. Unless the political objective in WWII was to kill thousands of Turks, sanctioning proved to be an ineffective strategy. 💸📉