Hugo Nguyen [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-02-11 📝 Original message:Hi Pavol, On Thu, Feb 11, ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-02-11
📝 Original message:Hi Pavol,
On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 5:25 AM Pavol Rusnak <stick at satoshilabs.com> wrote:
> > ENCRYPTION_KEY = SHA256(SHA256(TOKEN))
>
> This scheme might be vulnerable to rainbow table attack.
>
Thank you for pointing this out! Incidentally, Dmitry Petukhov also told me
the same privately.
>
> The following scheme might be more secure:
>
> DESCRIPTION = ASCII description provided by user
> NONCE = 256-bit random number
> ENCRYPTION_KEY = hmac-sha256(key=NONCE, msg=DESCRIPTION)
>
> Coordinator distributes DESCRIPTION (fka TOKEN) together with NONCE to
> the signers.
>
This does seem to add a lot more entropy. The challenge is to balance the
security requirement with UX. In the absence of some handshake protocol to
exchange the shared secrets (DESCRIPTION / NONCE) , the user will have to
enter these manually on the devices. I'll think about this some more.
>
> Also, is there any reason why you'd want to disable encryption? Why not
> keep that as mandatory?
>
Making it mandatory would be nice, but IMHO not all use cases might require
encryption. For example, if you are setting up the multisig locally under a
safe environment you control, encryption might be an overkill.
Best,
Hugo
>
>
> On Tue, 9 Feb 2021 at 12:39, Hugo Nguyen via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 2:19 AM Christopher Allen <
>> ChristopherA at lifewithalacrity.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 2:06 AM Hugo Nguyen <hugo at nunchuk.io> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't think reusing XPUBs inside different multisig wallets is a good
>>>> idea... For starters, loss of privacy in one wallet will immediately affect
>>>> privacy of other wallets. I think multisig wallets should be completely
>>>> firewalled from each other. That means one unique XPUB per wallet. This is
>>>> what we have been doing with the Nunchuk wallet.
>>>>
>>>
>>> To be clear, I have stated repeatedly that xpub reuse into multisig is a
>>> poor practice. However, finding a trustless solution when a wallet is
>>> airgapped with no network, or is stateless like Trezor, is quite hard.
>>>
>>> The challenge also includes how does an airgapped or stateless wallet
>>> know that it is talking to the same process on the other side that that it
>>> gave the xpub to in the first place. Without state to allow for a
>>> commitment, or at least a TOFU, a cosigner who thought he was part of a 3
>>> of 5 could discover that he instead is in a 2 of 3, or in a script with an
>>> OR, as some form of scam.
>>>
>>
>> The shared secret approach that I mentioned in the proposal actually can
>> help you here. The TOKEN doubles as a session ID - thereby establishing a
>> common state on both sides.
>>
>> Best,
>> Hugo
>>
>>
>>>
>>> — Christopher Allen
>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
>
> --
> Best Regards / S pozdravom,
>
> Pavol "stick" Rusnak
> CTO, SatoshiLabs
>
>
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📝 Original message:Hi Pavol,
On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 5:25 AM Pavol Rusnak <stick at satoshilabs.com> wrote:
> > ENCRYPTION_KEY = SHA256(SHA256(TOKEN))
>
> This scheme might be vulnerable to rainbow table attack.
>
Thank you for pointing this out! Incidentally, Dmitry Petukhov also told me
the same privately.
>
> The following scheme might be more secure:
>
> DESCRIPTION = ASCII description provided by user
> NONCE = 256-bit random number
> ENCRYPTION_KEY = hmac-sha256(key=NONCE, msg=DESCRIPTION)
>
> Coordinator distributes DESCRIPTION (fka TOKEN) together with NONCE to
> the signers.
>
This does seem to add a lot more entropy. The challenge is to balance the
security requirement with UX. In the absence of some handshake protocol to
exchange the shared secrets (DESCRIPTION / NONCE) , the user will have to
enter these manually on the devices. I'll think about this some more.
>
> Also, is there any reason why you'd want to disable encryption? Why not
> keep that as mandatory?
>
Making it mandatory would be nice, but IMHO not all use cases might require
encryption. For example, if you are setting up the multisig locally under a
safe environment you control, encryption might be an overkill.
Best,
Hugo
>
>
> On Tue, 9 Feb 2021 at 12:39, Hugo Nguyen via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 2:19 AM Christopher Allen <
>> ChristopherA at lifewithalacrity.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 2:06 AM Hugo Nguyen <hugo at nunchuk.io> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't think reusing XPUBs inside different multisig wallets is a good
>>>> idea... For starters, loss of privacy in one wallet will immediately affect
>>>> privacy of other wallets. I think multisig wallets should be completely
>>>> firewalled from each other. That means one unique XPUB per wallet. This is
>>>> what we have been doing with the Nunchuk wallet.
>>>>
>>>
>>> To be clear, I have stated repeatedly that xpub reuse into multisig is a
>>> poor practice. However, finding a trustless solution when a wallet is
>>> airgapped with no network, or is stateless like Trezor, is quite hard.
>>>
>>> The challenge also includes how does an airgapped or stateless wallet
>>> know that it is talking to the same process on the other side that that it
>>> gave the xpub to in the first place. Without state to allow for a
>>> commitment, or at least a TOFU, a cosigner who thought he was part of a 3
>>> of 5 could discover that he instead is in a 2 of 3, or in a script with an
>>> OR, as some form of scam.
>>>
>>
>> The shared secret approach that I mentioned in the proposal actually can
>> help you here. The TOKEN doubles as a session ID - thereby establishing a
>> common state on both sides.
>>
>> Best,
>> Hugo
>>
>>
>>>
>>> — Christopher Allen
>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
>
> --
> Best Regards / S pozdravom,
>
> Pavol "stick" Rusnak
> CTO, SatoshiLabs
>
>
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